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This thesis focuses on deductive reasoning and how the belief bias effect can be
reduced or ameliorated. Belief bias is a phenomenon whereby the evaluation of the
logical validity of an argument is skewed by the degree to which the reasoner believes
the conclusion. There has been little research examining ways of reducing such bias
and whether there is some sort of effective intervention which makes people reason
more on the basis of logic. Traditional analyses of this data has focussed on simple
measures of accuracy, typically deducting the number of incorrect answers from the
number of correct answers to give an accuracy score. However, recent theoretical
developments have shown that this approach fails to separate reasoning biases
and response biases. A reasoning bias, is one which affects individuals’ ability to
discriminate between valid and invalid arguments, whereas a response bias is simply
the individual’s tendency to give a particular answer, independent of reasoning. A
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) approach is used to calculate measures of reasoning
accuracy and response bias. These measures are then analysed using mixed effects
models. Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to the topic, and outlines the content
of subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, I review the psychological literature around
belief bias, the growth of the use of SDT models, and approaches to reducing bias.
Chapter 3 covers the methodology, and includes a a thorough description of the
calculation of the SDT measures, and an explanation of the mixed effects models I
used to analyse these. Chapter 4 presents an experiment in which the effects of
feedback on reducing belief bias is examined. In Chapter 5, the focus shifts in the
direction of individual differences, and looks at the effect of different instructions
given to participants, and Chapter 6 examines the effects of both feedback and
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We come across vast amounts of information in everyday life, and even more
so as the near-ubiquitous availability of internet access is becoming increasingly
commonplace. According to Hilbert and Lo´pez (2011), in 2008, people encountered
five times as much information every day than they did in 1986, with this quantity
continuously increasing. Given the amount of information which we process daily,
the ability to distinguish what is true and relevant from what is not is an important
skill if we are to make sense of an increasingly complex world.
This can have serious consequences; for example, the anti-vaccination movement
gained a lot of support as the result of a now discredited paper published in 1998
which linked the MMR vaccine to autism spectrum disorders (Wakefield et al.,
1998). This led to a drop in uptake of the MMR vaccine, despite numerous studies
and large scale meta-analyses showing no evidence of a link between the vaccine
and autism (e.g. Jefferson, Price, Demicheli, & Bianco, 2003; Doja & Roberts, 2006;
DeStefano, 2007; Taylor, Swerdfeger, & Eslick, 2014). One of the consequences of
this was a large outbreak of measles in Swansea in 2013, which led to over 1200
people falling ill and one death. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Clearly, the ability to assess the veracity of ideas and arguments is important,
and examining the reasoning process in order to evaluate how it works and po-
tentially even improve it is a worthwhile research pursuit. Lilienfeld, Ammirati,
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and Landfield (2009) even go as far as to discuss the potential of debiasing as an
important tool in the reduction of idelogical extremism and conflict on a much
larger scale. Modern reasoning research really picked up speed with the publication
of an influential paper, “Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and a subsequent volume of the same name a few
years later containing the original paper and a collection of other similar research by
a variety of authors (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tverky, 1982). This research suggested
that many of the judgements made by humans are influenced by systematic biases,
which can lead to illogicality. These biases are caused by the use of heuristics;
quick and automatic processes which tend to be association-based and require little
cognitive effort.
One such bias is the belief bias effect - whereby people tend to subject informa-
tion which disagrees with their pre-existing beliefs to a higher degree of scrutiny
compared to information that conforms with pre-existing beliefs. For example, Lord,
Ross, and Lepper (1979) presented participants, who had completed prior surveys
about their opinions regarding the death penalty, with information from fictional
studies focussed on the use of the death penalty as a deterrent against crime. Both
the pro- and anti- death penalty groups showed a tendency to argue that the
study which corresponded with their personal belief had greater methodological
and empirical validity.
Much of the subsequent research on belief bias has used syllogistic reasoning
problems. Syllogisms are simple three statement arguments, containing two premises
and a conclusion. They are a useful form of stimuli as they are short, so multiple
syllogisms can be evaluated by a single participant in an experiment, and their
structure is easy to replicate across multiple studies.
A syllogism might have a believable, unbelievable, or neutral conclusion. An
example of each is shown below.
Believable:
Some metals are soft
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No soft things are steel
Therefore, some metals are not steel
Unbelievable:
No animals are reptiles
Some reptiles are cats
Therefore, some cats are not animals
Neutral:
Some junarics are lizards
All lizards are panphids
Therefore, some panphids are junarics
Earlier theories of syllogistic reasoning were predominantly single process theo-
ries; that is, they explained differences in syllogistic reasoning performance as either
due to the use of heuristics, quick “rules of thumb”, which people apply automati-
cally, or due to analytic processes involving rules and slower more effortful thinking.
However, trends in more recent research on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning
began with a study by Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) who found that, despite
the brevity of syllogistic reasoning problems, the belief bias effect still affected
participants’ reasoning. Participants were asked to evaluate a number of syllogisms
as either ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’. Half of these syllogisms were valid - the conclusion
did logically lead on from the premises, and half were invalid - the conclusion did
not logically lead on from the premises. Within the valid and invalid conclusions,
believability was also manipulated - half of the conclusions were believable and the
other half unbelievable. The results of this study constitute one of the key findings
in belief bias research - an interaction between validity and believability; whilst
for valid problems, believability did not influence reasoning, belief bias did affect
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the evaluation of invalid problems. For invalid problems, participants were much
more likely to deem the conclusion as “valid” if it was believable. This finding
of a believability by validity interaction sparked over two decades of research and
theoretical development to explain the basis of the phenomenon, as well as the
application of dual-process theory to belief bias research. Rather than focus on
single-processes; dual-process theories suggest that this interaction is driven by a
conflict between heuristic (quick and automatic) and analytic (slower and effortful)
processes, although accounts differ in their explanations of exactly how this conflict
is detected and resolved. A major methodological shift in this research began in
2010 when Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) provided evidence to show that the way
in which indices of accuracy and bias had been calculated was flawed. Previously,
accuracy and belief bias were measured by simply testing for the effects of validity,
believability, and an interaction between the two, often examined through the
use of a number of indices. These were linear in nature, calculated by adding
and subtracting the number of problems of different types that had been deemed
‘valid’ by participants. Although theoretical accounts differed in their details, there
was a broad agreement that the belief bias effect was due to superior reasoning
on unbelievable problems. However, Dube et al. (2010) argued that belief bias
primarily manifests as a response bias - participants’ tendency to choose the option
‘valid’ or ‘invalid’ is independent of any reasoning. They argue that the traditional
method of calculation fails to separate reasoning and response bias and instead
posited that the use of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) based analyses led to a
more accurate model of belief bias as they can properly distinguish these two forms
of bias. Subsequent research (e.g. Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2013) has extended
this view, demonstrating that when complex reasoning takes place, for example
in participants of a higher cognitive ability or when there are no time constraints,
belief bias also has an effect upon reasoning. This constituted a major shift in
focus and highlighted the importance of considering individual differences between
reasoners in response style when examining belief bias. Later research, such as
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that of Trippas, Verde, and Handley (2015) also examined the role of cognitive
style; that is, whether individuals have the tendency to rely on heuristic or analytic
processing, regardless of their actual ability to do so.
As discussed earlier, debiasing reasoning is an important research aim, and
Stupple and Ball (2014) emphasise that understanding and improving reasoning
are not mutually exclusive research goals. Thus, debiasing has two roles to play -
primarily in identifying methods of reducing or eliminating the extent to which bias
affects reasoning, but also to simply aid in further developing theoretical knowledge
of the nature of the reasoning process itself. Given that individual differences affect
the way in which belief bias affects reasoning, and that even strategy change can
be affected by individual differences (e.g. Roberts & Newton, 2003), it is clear that
such differences should be accounted for when developing debiasing strategies.
Little research has focussed on debiasing reasoning; the findings of earlier
research which aimed to reduce belief bias (e.g. Evans, Newstead, & Allen, 1994;
Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992) has been disputed by more recent work
such as Heit and Rotello (2014) who found that SDT analyses show that attempts
to reduce reasoning bias only affected response bias. Although Ball (2013) found
an effect of feedback on reducing belief bias, once again, the lack of SDT analyses
makes these results unclear.
The limited amount of previous research on debiasing that exists has predomi-
nantly used traditional indices, making interpretation of these results problematic.
The only empirical work which uses SDT is that of Heit and Rotello (2014), which
does not examine individual differences. Thus, this thesis provides a novel con-
tribution to the belief bias literature by using SDT analyses to explore potential
methods of debiasing reasoning whilst accounting for individual differences.
In Chapter 2, I review a range of literature related to belief bias and syllogistic
reasoning experiments. Firstly, belief bias is described in more detail and the
structural components of syllogisms are explained, followed by a discussion of
general theories of syllogistic reasoning. Following this, I go on to describe the
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belief bias effect and compare the different theories which have been suggested to
explain this phenomenon, leading into more recent debates regarding the importance
of SDT analyses in accurately analysing belief bias data. After summarising the
main points in this ongoing debate, Chapter 2 concludes with an overview of
debiasing techniques which have been used in the past in order to attempt to
improve thinking and reasoning, and reduce or eliminate the effects of bias.
In Chapter 3, I present a detailed discussion of the statistical methodology used
to analyse the data in this thesis. Previous approaches to analysing belief bias data
are outlined first, followed by an in-depth discussion of SDT models, beginning
with theoretical background and moving on to how the various SDT measures are
calculated. I explain the importance of using unequal-variance SDT models when
they are warranted, along with the use of confidence rating Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves. Furthermore, I discuss the benefits conferred through
use of mixed effects regression models and include formulae for the models contained
in this thesis. This is followed by an explanation of the model selection techniques
used.
Chapter 4 presents an experimental investigation as to whether the provision of
feedback across multiple testing sessions is an effective intervention for debiasing
reasoning. This chapter constitutes a novel contribution to the literature, in using
an SDT approach to track changes in bias across time.
Chapter 5 is another empirical chapter, and provides a novel contribution by
testing the hypothesis that individual differences between participants are cru-
cial to consider when examining debiasing. Here, the effect of differing sets of
instructions as a debiasing technique was investigated. This chapter also compares
lab-based testing and online testing, and makes a case for the wider use of on-
line experimentation, whilst considering the advantages and drawbacks of both
methodologies.
Chapter 6 is the final experimental chapter and investigates the use of specific
training and feedback, as a tool to reduce belief bias. Once again, the effects of
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individual differences are considered. Also examined here is participants’ ability to
correctly discriminate between different types of syllogism.
Chapter 7 summarises the conclusions to the research questions presented
throughout the thesis, and discusses the possible implications these findings have
when considered in the wider context of the underlying theoretical assumptions
surrounding the mechanisms underlying belief bias.
An examination of human reasoning cannot be without mention of normativism,
the idea that reasoning either does or should conform to rules of logic. This topic
is not without controversy and there has been recent debate as to whether it
is appropriate to apply normative standards to human reasoning. For example,
Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue that when examining human reasoning, using
normative standards not only narrows the research questions which are to be asked
but also makes unnecessary assumptions, whereas a descriptivist approach, which
simply describes the system, could instead be taken. They do concede, however, that
when the intention is to improve reasoning, some standard against which reasoning
can be measured is necessary. Stupple and Ball (2014) provide a more reasonable
middle ground between normativism and descriptivism, which they term “soft
normativism”, which allows for a normative approach as long as the problems which
can be caused by normativism are accounted for, and individual differences between
individuals are taken into account. Stupple and Ball (2014) also argue that accounts
of reasoning can be strengthened by the use of triangulation; examining multiple
measures simultaneously in order to better capture the finer nuances of responses.
Question responses alone are an overly simplistic measure of reasoning; given that
there is a wealth of evidence showing differences between individuals’ strategies,
we need to be able to distinguish between a rapid, automatic normatively incorrect
response, and one which is slow and effortful yet still incorrect. Although both of
these responses may appear identical if only individual responses are examined,
the underlying processes behind each of them are likely to be quite different, and
this may become more apparent if other information, such as response time, is
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also examined. In summary, belief bias and debiasing are both methodologically
and theoretically complex topics. In the next chapter, I will review the relevant
literature surrounding these areas.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Although the focus of this thesis is removing bias from reasoning, we first must
examine the nature of belief bias and the theories of the cognitive processes thought
to underlie the belief bias phenomenon. In addition, it is important to consider the
ways in which belief bias is investigated and potential influencing factors which must
be controlled for in any empirical investigation of the topic. In this chapter, I first
outline the belief bias effect and discuss tasks which have been used to investigate it,
focussing upon syllogistic reasoning tasks. This leads on to an in-depth discussion
of these tasks, including properties of syllogisms, general theories of syllogistic
reasoning, and then goes on to explore theories of the way in which belief bias
affects syllogistic reasoning and how methods based around Signal Detection Theory
(SDT) have added extra dimensions to the syllogistic reasoning debate. Finally I
examine ways in which previous studies have attempted to reduce the effects of
bias on reasoning, and categorise and compare the differing approaches.
2.1 Belief Bias and Syllogistic Reasoning Tasks
It has been widely demonstrated that when individuals engage in deductive reason-
ing, their competence in both forming and evaluating logically valid conclusions
can be affected by a number of cognitive biases and errors. When these errors are
9
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systematic in nature, that is, common across multiple individuals and settings,
their examination allows us insight into the particulars of the underlying process
behind them. One of these potential biases is known as belief bias, defined as
when an individual’s prior beliefs affects their ability to make an accurate logical
judgement about facts that they have been presented with (Evans et al., 1983).
The predominant methodology used to investigate this phenomenon involves syllo-
gistic reasoning tasks; individuals are shown an argument containing two premises
followed by a conclusion and are asked to evaluate whether the conclusion logically
follows on from the premises. When logic and belief are in conflict, individuals’
logical judgements are often impeded by the believability of the argument’s con-
clusion (Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006; Evans, 1989; Newstead et al., 1992;
Stanovich & West, 1997; Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). This effect
has been shown to be stronger with invalid content, with individuals typically
being equally likely to accept valid conclusions whether believable or unbelievable,
but more likely to incorrectly accept invalid believable than invalid unbelievable
conclusions.
A number of different tasks have been used to investigate belief bias. One such
example is an adaptation of the base-rate neglect problem (Kahneman & Tversky,
1973) used by De Neys and Franssens (2009). In this task, participants are given a
short description of an individual person chosen at random from a pool of people.
A number of characteristics of the person are described, and paint a picture which
conforms to various stereotypes. Participants are then asked if the individual being
described is more likely to be a member of a group coherent with these stereotypes
or another group which differs. Participants are also told that the pool of people
which the individual has been selected from contains a certain number of member
of each group. An example of such a problem from De Neys and Franssens (2009)
is shown below.
“In a study 100 people were tested. Jo is a randomly chosen participant
of this study. Among the 100 participants there were 5 men and 95
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women. Jo is 23 years old and is finishing a degree in engineering. On
Friday nights, Jo likes to go out cruising with friends while listening to
loud music and drinking beer. What is most likely?
A. Jo is a man
B. Jo is a woman.”
It has widely been shown that even when it is stated that the pool contains 5%
stereotype-conforming and 95% stereotype-opposing individuals, participants will
tend to ignore this information and be influenced by their prior beliefs rather than
logical probability when choosing which group the individual is likely to be from.
Base-rate neglect problems are more commonly used in judgement and decision-
making research, and deductive reasoning studies commonly use categorical syllo-
gistic reasoning tasks. These tasks typically use a conclusion-evaluation paradigm;
participants evaluate whether the conclusion to a categorical syllogism logically
follows on from the two preceding premises, and are told to accept that the infor-
mation contained in premises is true (e.g. Evans et al., 1983). This task is known
as the conclusion-evaluation task, and the number of conclusions accepted for each
of the different combinations of conclusion believability (believable/unbelievable)
and validity (valid/invalid) are then submitted to statistical analysis. This gives
us four different problem types; valid-believable (VB), valid-unbelievable (VU),
invalid-believable (IB) and invalid-unbelievable (IU). Examples of all four types of
categorical syllogism using the same content are shown below.
Valid-believable:
Some metals are soft
No soft things are steel
Therefore, some metals are not steel
Valid-unbelievable:
No soft things are metal
Some steel is soft
Therefore, some steel is not metal
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Invalid-believable:
No metals are soft
Some soft things are steel
Therefore, some metals are not steel
Invalid-unbelievable:
Some soft things are metal
No steel is soft
Therefore, some steel is not metal
VB and IU problems are often referred to as ’non-conflict’ problems (Stupple et
al., 2011). This means that for these problems, whether responding on the basis of
logic or on the basis of belief, the same response is likely to be given. However, on VU
and IB problems, which can be termed ’conflict’ problems, there is a clash between
logic and belief, or rather, a belief-based response is incongruent with a logic-based
response. Research has found that individuals find conflict problems more difficult
than non-conflict problems, and are more likely to respond non-normatively to such
stimuli (e.g De Neys, 2013). This effect is stronger for IB than VU problems, with
many theoretical perspectives on belief bias arguing that is because these problem
types are inherently different to each other. Whilst valid problems are determinately
valid (i.e. the conclusion is necessitated by the premises), typically, invalid problems
which are used in such studies are indeterminately invalid. However, the belief
bias effect has also been demonstrated on determinately invalid problems (Klauer,
Musch, & Naumer, 2000); this will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
A slightly different methodology, the conclusion-production paradigm, requires
participants to generate their own conclusions; however, it has been shown that
the belief bias effect persists regardless (Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985; Markovits
& Nantel, 1989; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1989). Belief bias has also been demon-
strated on relational reasoning tasks; in such tasks, participants are given a number
of premises which are related on a temporal or spatial basis, and must evaluate the
validity of a given conclusion on this basis, for example (from Roberts & Sykes,
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2003):
The Pharaohs ruled after the Romans
The Pharaohs ruled before the Normans
The Pyramids were built at the time of the Romans
At the time of the Normans, William the Conqueror was king Therefore,
William the Conqueror was king after the Pyramids were built
Despite the difference in overall structure, Roberts and Sykes (2003) found that
participants showed similar patterns of results on relational reasoning tasks to
those typically found on categorical syllogistic reasoning tasks. In addition, the
effect of belief on conditional reasoning has been investigated. There are a number
of variants of conditional reasoning problems. For example, Thompson, Prowse,
and Pennycook (2011) used the following format:
If the TV is plugged in, then it works The TV works, therefore, it is
plugged in
However, Santamar´ıa, Garc´ıa-Madruga, and Johnson-Laird (1998) used double
conditionals, which bear more similarities to categorical syllogisms e.g.:
If Pablo is at home, then he watches the news. If Pablo is at home, then
he turns on the television. Therefore, if Pablo turns on the television,
then he watches the news.
In both cases, regardless of the specific nature of the task completed, belief bias
effect was still found to have an effect upon responses, providing further evidence
for the generality of the belief bias effect. The widespread use of categorical
syllogistic reasoning tasks can be attributed to the fact that categorical syllogisms
are unambiguously valid or invalid, and their properties can be described in a
standardised way, thus making different studies by different authors easily directly
comparable. Although this type of task is somewhat removed from everyday
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experience of deductive reasoning, the empirical benefits mentioned above along
with the generality of the belief bias phenomenon to a variety of different contexts
lead many to argue that, for these reasons, syllogistic reasoning tasks are an
invaluable tool for investigating the underlying processes behind deductive reasoning
(e.g. Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985).
2.2 Properties of Syllogisms
Syllogisms are logical arguments which, typically, contain two premises followed
by a conclusion. Depending on the structure and content of the premises, the
conclusion may or may not be valid. The structure of a syllogism can be described
in terms of figure and mood (Evans et al., 1983). The figure is the order in which the
individual terms within the syllogism are presented. An example of a syllogism is:
“some metals are soft; no soft things are steel; therefore, some metals are not steel”.
Here, ‘metals’ are the predicate of the conclusion, ‘soft things’ are the middle term,
and ‘steel’ is the subject of the conclusion. For the purpose of simplicity, these
terms are often denoted as ‘A’ (predicate of the conclusion), ‘B’ (the middle term),
and ‘C’ (subject of the conclusion). The predicate and subject of the conclusion
each appear once in either the first or second premise, but not together, whereas
the middle term appears once in both. The different combinations of the terms
results in four possible figures for the premises; ABBC (Figure 1), BACB (Figure
2), ABCB (Figure 3), and BABC (Figure 4). These pairs of premises then will
be followed by a conclusion of either AC or CA figure. In the example above, the
premises are in the ABBC figure, and the conclusion is in the AC figure.
The use of the phrasing ‘some...are...’ in the first premise of the example
syllogism above is termed the affirmative existential mood. There are four different
possible moods, which are commonly denoted by the letters A, E, I and O (Evans
et al., 1983); affirmative universal (‘all X are Y’ - A), negative universal (‘no X
are Y’ - E), affirmative existential (‘some X are Y’ - I), and negative existential (
‘some X are not Y’ - O).
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The combination of the possible different moods and figures gives a total of 512
different potential structures for a syllogism, with 64 different pairs of premises.
However, out of these 64, not all have a valid conclusion that logically leads on from
the premises. The traditional Aristotelian approach identifies 24 valid categorical
syllogisms, as shown in Table 2.1.
Figure
1 2 3 4
AAI AAA AEE AAI
AEE AAI AEO AII
AEO AII AOO EAO
EAO EAE EAE EIO
EIO EAO EAO IAI
IAI EIO EIO OAO
Table 2.1: Valid Syllogisms: Aristotelian definition
It should be noted that the enumeration of syllogistic figure in Aristotelian
terms differs from the convention used in the modern syllogistic reasoning literature
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). For the sake of simplicity, the modern enumeration
has been used. The syllogisms in italics are ones which, if a category they mention
is empty, are invalid. In other words, if any of the categories mentioned in a premise
don’t actually contain any members, the conclusion drawn is no longer valid. The
syllogisms in bold italics in Table 1 are ones which can be said to be containing
weakened moods, i.e. a more definite conclusion can be drawn. For example, given
an AA premise pair with a valid A conclusion, one could argue that an I conclusion
could technically be also correct as it is a subset of A.
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984), however, identify 27 possible valid premise
pairs, but 29 valid premise and conclusion combinations as some premises have
more than one valid conclusion. This number is not taking into account the order in
which the terms in the conclusion are presented; whether in AC order or CA order.
The difference from the Aristotelian total comes from the fact that Johnson-Laird
and Bara (1984) exclude syllogisms which can have weakened moods, and include
syllogisms which can be concluded with AC conclusions (the Aristotelian method
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only includes those which can be concluded in CA order). These syllogisms can
be found in Table 2.2. Nine of these syllogisms are valid in both AC and CA
conclusion order, leading to a total of 48 unique valid syllogisms when mood and
figure for the premises and conclusion order are taken into account.
Figure
1 2 3 4
AAA* AAAˆ AEE AAI
AAIˆ AAI* AOOˆ AEO*
AEE AII EAE AII
EAOˆ AEO* EIOˆ AOO*
EIOˆ EAE IEO* EAOˆ




Table 2.2: Valid syllogisms, Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) * =valid only in AC
mood ˆ=valid only in CA mood
2.3 Theories of Syllogistic Reasoning
Before discussing theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, we must first
examine the more general theories of syllogistic reasoning. There are a number
of consistent effects and patterns of responses in terms of typical errors which
reasoners make which have been shown to occur in both conclusion generation and
conclusion evaluation paradigms. These errors appear routinely across numerous
studies, and some categorical syllogisms are easily solved or evaluated whereas
others have been found repeatedly to be difficult. A number of theories outline
typical errors, and give an account of potential underlying causes.
It has been shown that figural effects can have an impact upon individuals’
competence at assessing whether or not a syllogism has a valid conclusion or not.
Research has demonstrated that individuals find some figures easier to reason
with than others (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1975; Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978).
Participants tend to give conclusions in the order AC for Figure 1 premises, and
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CA for Figure 2 premises, with a smaller preference for AC conclusions for Figures
3 and 4 (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012). Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) argue
that this is because reasoning is simplest when the middle ‘B’ terms are contiguous
(i.e. adjacent to one another). Therefore, Figure 1 is the easiest, with Figure 2
being slightly more complex, requiring reordering of the premises to bring the
middle terms together. Figures 3 and 4 are more difficult still, with reordering of
the terms within one of the premises also being required in order for the middle
terms to become contiguous. If a valid conclusion requires the terms to be given in
an order which goes against the direction of this effect, participants find it difficult
to produce a correct answer.
The atmosphere account of syllogistic reasoning (Woodworth & Sells, 1935;
Revlis, 1975) argues that individuals’ perceptions of the validity of the conclusion
of a syllogism depends heavily upon the mood of the premises. If the two premises
are in the same mood as each other, the conclusion drawn is likely to also be in that
mood. When different moods are present, if a negative mood (i.e. E or O) is used
in one or more of the premises, reasoners are more likely to accept a conclusion
which also has a negative mood. In addition, if an existential mood (i.e. I or O) is
used in one or more of the premises, the most likely conclusion to be drawn will be
in the existential mood.
Similarly, the matching account (Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) agrees that the
mood of a syllogism will influence individuals’ selection of conclusion. However,
this account argues that the atmosphere account is flawed due to problems with the
methodology used by Sells (1936) on which much of this theory is based. Instead,
Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) argue that it is the number of category members that
the mood describes which is important in determining variation in reasoners ability
to correctly deduce valid conclusions. Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) argue that the
individuals will tend to match the conclusion to the most conservative premise (i.e.
the one which makes inferences about the smallest number of category members).
The negative universal mood (“no X are Y”) is the most conservative, followed by
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the negative existential (“some X are not Y”) and affirmative existential (“some
X are not Y”) moods, which are equally conservative, and then the affirmative
universal mood (“all X are Y”), which is the least conservative. Wetherick and
Gilhooly (1995) do not argue that matching is the only way in which individuals
engage in syllogistic reasoning, but rather clarify that this is just one of many
possible strategies (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012).
The conversion account (Chapman & Chapman, 1959; Revlis, 1975) postulates
that errors in syllogistic reasoning can be accounted for by illicit conversion. The
terms in premises in moods E (“no X are Y”) and I (“some X are Y”) can
legitimately be reordered as they are logically equivalent and so terms X and Y are
interchangeable here. However, this is not the case for moods A (“All X are Y”)
and O (“Some X are not Y”); for example, in the case of the former, although all
instances of X must also be Y, this does not preclude the existence of instances of
Y which are not X. Thus, erroneous conversion of premises can lead to incorrect
conclusions being drawn. Although evidence has shown that when participants
are given instructions explaining that this sort of conversion can lead to errors
then their performance improves (Dicksten, 1975), it has also been highlighted by
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) that if conversion was a universal error which
all reasoners engaged in on all syllogisms then there should be no evidence for
figural effects. To illustrate this point, take the example of a syllogism in Figure 1
(ABBC), with the second premise in the O (“some X are not Y”) mood, and the
first premise in a legitimately convertible mood. If universal conversion were the
case, there should be no difference between whether this syllogism is presented in
Figure 1 (ABBC) or Figure 3 (ABCB), given that conversion will occur anyway.
However, systematic differences in correct solution rate dispute this.
Chater and Oaksford’s (1999) Probability Heuristics Model has a few similarities
to the matching account in that it ranks moods in terms of informativeness. The
term “informativeness” comes from Information Theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949)
and the informativeness of a given statement has an inverse relationship to its
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probability, and is related to how often a statement is likely to be true in natural
language. Unlike the matching account, however, Chater and Oaksford (1999)
employ a different ranking, with “all X are Y” premises ranked as the most
informative, followed by “some X are Y”, then “no X are Y”, and finally “some X
are not Y”. This model has a greater number of complexities than other heuristics-
based models of syllogistic reasoning. Chater & Oaksford discuss a number of
heuristics which reasoners use, which predict how likely a conclusion is to be chosen.
Firstly, the min-heuristic leads to reasoners drawing conclusions in moods which are
the same as the premise with the least amount of information contained within them.
The p-entailment heuristic means that the conclusion which is probabilistically
entailed by the conclusion, for example, conclusions in mood A entail those in
mood I as “some” is entailed by “all”, and so the conclusion next most likely to
be selected by reasoners is the one which is p-entailed by the min-heuristic. The
attachment heuristic determines the ordering of terms in the conclusion; if the
min-premise, that is, the premise which is least informative, has term A or C as the
subject of the sentence, then this term will appear as the subject in the conclusion.
If it does not appear as the subject of the min-premise, then the A or C term
which is the subject of the max-premise (most informative premise) becomes the
subject of the conclusion. Chater & Oaksford also discuss a further two heuristics
which are suggested to aid reasoners in assessing how accurate the conclusion
generated according to the above principles is. The max-heuristic leads to higher
confidence for conclusions with more informative premises and lower confidence for
premises with less informative premises. The O-heuristic leads reasoners to be less
likely to choose a conclusion in the O mood, as this is the least informative mood.
The probability heuristics model has been lauded by Khemlani and Johnson-Laird
(2012) as it is a detailed explanation of syllogistic reasoning, which accounts for
figural effects, and can be extend further than simply problems with A, E, I and O
moods to describe reasoning about problems which contain more specific quantifiers
such as “most”, “few”, and others. However, it has also been criticised by the same
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authors for not fully explaining the role of logic when participants give normative
answers that diverge from these heuristics, and cannot account for improvements
in performance over time. If reasoners are mainly employing a particular heuristic,
one would expect their performance to remain stable over time, and to generally
show low levels of normative responding.
Some theories of syllogistic reasoning places much more emphasis on the role
of logic rather than heuristics in reasoning. Such theories argue that logical
reasoning is an innate human ability, and Rips (1994) argues that reasoners reason
in accordance with formal inferential rules including those such as modus ponens
and modus tollens. Modus ponens is a rule, whereby, if the statement “if A, then
B” is given, then if the existence or truth of A is stated, the existence or truth
of B must logically follow. The same statement, but with the non-existence of B,
logically A cannot exist either. Some rules operate in a forwards direction, linking
premises to conclusions, others operate in a backwards direction, linking conclusions
back to their premises, and others can work in either direction. Errors in syllogistic
reasoning are argued to stem from improper or non-existent application of the
relevant rule, and difficulty is said to be based upon the number of rules which are
needed to be used. This theory has been used to construct a computational model
PSYCOP which simulates these tendencies.
Many of the theories discussed above focus mainly on how people reason
about syllogisms. However, other theories place more emphasis on examining
how syllogisms are mentally represented in order to make inferences about the
specific nature of the reasoning process. Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) argue
that convincing theories explaining syllogistic reasoning rely upon the individual
constructing mental models or representations of the premises in order to assess
whether the associated conclusion is valid, or to generate their own conclusion. They
cite previous research which has posited that these representations are in the form
or Euler circles or Venn diagrams. Johnson-Laird & Byrne argue that these theories
do not explain variations in difficulty; premise pairs which, when mapped out using
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Euler circles, should generate a larger number of possible representations are not
necessarily those found to be most difficult, and individuals struggle with some
premise pairs which have a very small number of valid diagrammatic representations.
Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) give the example of the premises “Some A are B,
All B are C” and “All B are A, No C are B”. They argue that to fully map out
all the possible conclusions for these examples with Euler circles would require
16 combinations for the former and 6 for the latter, and so the second premise
pairs should be simpler to solve. However, in fact, they cite evidence which shows
that 88% of people correctly solve the first syllogism, but only 8% correctly solve
the second, and conclude that this seriously undermines the credibility of these
representations.
Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) argue that the commonalities of most model-
based theories are that they all generally agree that reasoners begin by generating
models representing the premises in the simplest possible way. They then go on
to draw a conclusion based on this information, and then add in further complex
details to these representations during a search for counterexamples, in an attempt
to falsify the conclusion they are testing out. If the conclusion is still found to
hold true after such comparisons, it is deemed to be valid. Johnson-Laird & Byrne
(1991) discuss their mental models theory of syllogistic reasoning and argue that
individuals use symbolic representations of instances of category members described
in the premises in order to assess or construct a conclusion. These representations
denote members of the categories mentioned in the premises and aim to represent
various possible combinations of group membership or exclusion. Extra premises
are incorporated by simply adding them on to the representation of the existing
premises in any way as long as it does not invalidate them. Johnson-Laird &
Byrne argue that their theory better accounts for difficulty than those dependent
on Euler circle or Venn diagrams, as in their theory, difficulty is related to the
number of possible models that can be used to represent the premises. Additionally,
difficult syllogisms are those in which the valid conclusion is only found in one of
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the multiple representations.
In their verbal reasoning theory, Polk and Newell (1995) argue that, given the
relative sophistication of humans’ linguistic processing ability, reasoning is more
verbally based than alternative theories suggest. Deductive reasoning relies on
the use of syntactic rules, and re-encoding of the premises a number of times,
until a conclusion can be generated or verified. If the conclusion is consistent
with the model generated by the encoding of the premises, it is accepted as valid.
Computational models VR1-VR3 were constructed to explain this process. Model
VR1 is the simplest; any information which cannot be inferred indirectly from the
premises is not included. Because of this, this model has been found to lead to a
large proportion of “no valid conclusion” responses. VR2 extends VR1 by allowing
the legitimate conversions of “some X are Y” to “some Y are X” and “no X are
Y” to “no Y are X”. VR3 allows more of what is termed “indirect knowledge”, for
example, if we were to state that “all Y are Y”, then we can infer that “no things
that are not X are Y”. This theory has some aspects in common with mental models
theory, discussed below; however, it explicitly rejects the possibility of reasoners
constructing counterexamples to falsify potential conclusions. A later version of
this theory, modified verbal reasoning theory (Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter,
& Campbell, 2003), also adds in further conditions, for example, that reasoners
allocate a finite amount of time to the encoding and re-encoding process before
giving up. However, these theories differ from mental models theory, as it does not
account for the possibility that individuals may construct counterexamples.
Although mental rules and logic based theories have been criticised for under-
playing the role of heuristic processes (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012), it is not
necessarily the case that such theories argue that it is reliance on mental rules
alone that influence reasoning (Braine & OBrien, 1991). There is, however, some
evidence that reasoners, to some extent, use rules-based techniques in reasoning.
Ford (1995) found support for this theory using protocols in which participants
were asked to discuss their answers with the experimenter, and found that some
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engaged in verbal substitutions, in which terms were interrelated or substituted
from one premise to another. Errors occur when reasoners use substitutions which
are not logically consistent with the ways in which the terms in the premises are
interrelated. Revising earlier ideas dismissed by mental models theorists, Ford
(1995) has argued that other reasoners may use a different version of Euler circles
to those described by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). This version does not
suffer the problem of the number of possible representations differing from the
perceived difficulty. Johnson-Laird (2005) argues that this theory is indistinguish-
able from their mental models theory. However, Ford (1995), makes a few key
distinctions. Firstly, Ford criticises the way in which Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991)
categorise syllogisms as single or multiple-model syllogisms, arguing that there are
inconsistencies between their definitions and those in earlier work, such as that of
Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984). Ford specifically highlights the example of a model
which is originally classed as a single model syllogism, but in later work, reclassified
as a multiple model syllogism. Ford argues that Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) give
an explanation for model construction for this syllogism which is inconsistent with
explanations they give for other similar examples, and implies that this explanation
has been given as the authors are unable to explain participants relatively low
accuracy rates on what should be a simple single model syllogism. Ford goes on to
detail how this syllogism is the only single-model syllogism in which the conclusion
is not in the same mood as either of its premises, and given that reasoners have
a tendency to produce or select conclusions with a mood matching one of the
premises, this would explain the low accuracy rate on this particular problem,
which is in line with accuracy rates for multiple-model problems, all of which are
only valid with moods which do not correspond to one of the premises.
Ford also argues that despite very little evidence to support it, mental models
theory suggests that individuals’ mental representations are of individual members
of a group, whereas alternative theories which posit individuals constructing repre-
sentations of sets as a whole may be more accurate. Ford provides evidence for
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this claim from an experiment in which the conclusion generation paradigm was
used. Participants were shown the 27 premise pairs which led to a valid conclusion,
and were instructed to derive a conclusion for each. They were instructed to think
out loud as they completed the problems, and were also given a pen and paper
with which they were allowed to make notes. Once they had completed all 27
problems, participants gave a written explanation of their answers. Ford found that
some participants, whom she termed ‘spatial reasoners’ reasoned using diagram-
matic representations, many similar to Euler circles, which tended to represent
entire sets rather than particular members of a set. Other participants, labelled
‘verbal reasoners’, used verbal substitution techniques which Ford argues worked
on algebraic and rules-based techniques, with some using a fairly basic version of
this, and others employing more complicated techniques. The distinction between
these two types of reasoners also accounted for differences in solution rates for
different types of syllogisms, with spatial and verbal reasoners showing wide gulfs
in proficiency on differing syllogisms. Ford argues that these results show that
the differences between spatial and verbal reasoners must be accounted for when
examining syllogistic reasoning data. However, others such as Rips (2002) suggests
that people only use diagrammatic methods like those used by the spatial reasoners
if they have been taught how to use them in the past. In addition, (Stenning &
Oberlander, 1997) highlight how it can be shown that Euler circles can be seen to
be equivalent to mental models theory in terms of how people use representations
to reason about syllogisms at a computational level. A similar inference is made
by Stenning and Yule (1997) comparing Euler circles and mental rules.
There are a large number of current theories which attempt to account for
difference in reasoners’ performance on different syllogisms, which seem in part to
explore different aspects of syllogistic reasoning, for example, what drives normative
responding and what drives erroneous responses. This may appear to make
comparison between some of these theories somewhat difficult. A meta-analysis
conducted by Khemlani & Johnson-Laird (2012) found some support for heuristic
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theories of syllogistic reasoning, and also greater support for mental-models based
theories than rules-based theories. Thus, they concluded that syllogistic reasoning is
likely to operate under the constraint of a number of heuristics which determines the
content of what is mentally represented, but the mental representations themselves
deliberated between and reasoned about using some sort of set or model. They
also highlight how, as strategies may vary between different individuals, that it
may not be as simple as a single one of the current theories being able to account
for all syllogistic reasoning. Research on the belief bias effect seems to tie these
two areas together, and shifts the focus away from the specific nature of heuristics
and analytic processes, and towards the interplay between the two in providing a
response. I will now go on to consider theories of belief bias, including dual-process
theories, and the extra insight which they give us into the deductive reasoning
process.
2.4 Theories of Belief Bias
Some earlier theories of belief bias adapt more general theories of syllogistic
reasoning to explain this phenomenon. Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, and Yopp (1980)
argues that belief bias can be beneficial to reasoning, as it can prevent conversion
of the premises from occurring. Individuals are much more likely to erroneously
convert the terms in premises containing abstract terms than make the same
mistake with sentences containing increased semantic content such as “all cats are
animals” and “all animals are cats”. However, subsequent research (e.g. Evans
et al., 1983; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985) controlled for conversion by using
premises in mood E (i.e. “some X are y”) and mood I (i.e. “no X are Y”), for
which conversion does not alter the validity of potential conclusions to be drawn.
The belief bias effect was found to persist under such conditions, indicating that
the conversion account was not an adequate explanation.
Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2012) highlight how, in other areas of human
cognition, many theories have been concerned with the role of Type 1 and Type 2
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process, and later theories of belief bias predominantly fall within this dual-process
framework. These theories stipulate that the belief bias effect arises from the
interplay between two different types of processes. The terminology used to describe
these processes varies from one account to another, with Type 1 processes also
being labelled as heuristic, implicit, associative, impulsive, automatic, experiential,
non-conscious, intuitive, or reflexive, and Type 2 processes being described as
logical, explicit, rule-based, reflective, controlled, rational, conscious, analytic, or
reflective (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). It must be noted that some theorists draw a
distinction between accounts which characterise these different sorts of cognitions
as belonging to different systems, and those which describe them as simply being
the result of separate processes. Evans and Stanovich (2013) caution against the
’system’ designation, given that there is some evidence to suggest overlap between
multiple systems and multiple systems contributing towards output. In addition,
they argue that it is crucial not to confuse the concept of features which are defining
properties of a system with features that are often correlated but do not necessitate
cognition being due to one specific process or the other. Evans & Stanovich argue
that the most important defining feature of Type 1 processing is its autonomous
nature. Whether or not a Type 1 response is given, Type 1 processing will always
be engaged in, given the relevant stimuli. A further feature of Type 1 processing is
the lack of demands it places on working memory resources. On the other hand,
Type 2 processing is characterised by its higher working memory demands, and
its use in “cognitive decoupling”, which will be discussed in more detail below.
Longer response latencies on problems have been thought to be indicative of Type
2 processing, although this assumption has been challenged. For example, Handley,
Newstead, and Trippas (2011) found that when participants were asked to respond
on the basis of believability, they took longer to make such judgements than
judgements made on the basis of logical validity. Dual-process theories differ to
each other in terms of the point at which belief bias is thought to affect a reasoner’s
response to a reasoning problem they are trying to solve. Whereas earlier accounts
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such as conversion (Revlin et al., 1980) argue believability affects the encoding of
problems, other accounts place it in the reasoning stage, response stage or both.
Although traditional analyses cannot easily make this distinction, SDT analyses
allow us to get insight into where in the reasoning process is affected by belief bias.
In addition, accounts differ in that some theories argue that believability affects
amount of Type 2 processing which occurs, whereas others argue that it has a
strong effect on the type of strategy employed by participants. I will now review
the a number of theories of belief bias, and the empirical evidence for and against
them.
Dual process theories of belief bias began with work by Evans et al. (1983).
They criticised earlier accounts of belief bias, such as that of Revlin et al. (1980),
for using inappropriate methodology and insufficiently exploring or controlling for
other things thought to have an impact on reasoning, such as conversion of the
premises, figural bias, atmosphere, and validity or determinacy. In their empirical
work, Evans and colleagues accounted for these shortcomings, and their data led
them to develop the selective scrutiny account, which suggests that individuals
adopt different strategies on the basis of conclusion believability. If a conclusion
is believable, it is accepted, with no further analysis. However, in the case of an
unbelievable conclusion, the problem is analysed logically, with valid problems
being accepted and invalid-believable problems being rejected. Evans et al. (1983)
support this theory by highlighting qualitative findings from their reasoning-aloud
protocol. Participants who were incorrectly endorsing invalid problems tended to
make more reference to information not relevant to the task, whereas those who
were reasoning normatively discussed the premises of the syllogism, suggesting a
difference in the degree to which analytic processing was engaged. However, the
selective scrutiny account has been challenged by more recent work examining
response latencies, that has shown that participants show longer response times,
which is associated with Type 2 processing, on invalid-believable problems (Ball et
al., 2006; Thompson, Morley, & Newstead, 2011), which would not be the case if
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believable conclusions were simple accepted without any further analysis.
An alternative explanation of these results, also proposed by Evans et al. (1983),
has been termed the misinterpreted necessity model. In this explanation, it is
argued that reasoning operates prior to the effect of logic. Reasoners first assess
whether the conclusion falsifies the premises (i.e. if it is determinately invalid). If it
does, it is rejected outright. However, if not, the reasoner then goes on to attempt
to decide if the conclusion is determined by the premises (i.e. if it is determinately
valid). If this is the case, the conclusion is accepted as valid. However, if it is
not determinately valid, then the conclusion believability is used to resolve this
ambiguity, with believable conclusions being accepted and unbelievable conclusions
being rejected. As valid syllogisms are determinately valid, they cannot be falsified,
and thus have a generally high acceptance rate. However, the invalid syllogisms used
in the study were indeterminately invalid; their conclusion is possible, but is not
necessitated by the premises, and therefore the use of believability to guide reasoning
on invalid problems leads to higher numbers of invalid-believable conclusions and
low number of invalid-unbelievable conclusions being accepted. Support for this
theory comes from evidence to show that when participants are given instructions
that emphasise the importance of logical necessity, the belief by validity interaction
is diminished (Evans et al., 1983, Experiment 3). However, it has been criticised
as it cannot explain the presence of the belief bias effect on determinately invalid
syllogisms (Newstead et al, 1992).
The mental models account (Oakhill, Johnson-Laird & Garnham, 1989) extends
the earlier mental models theory of syllogistic reasoning to incorporate belief bias.
This theory argues that individuals construct a single mental model incorporating
the premises of a syllogism. If the mental model they have constructed is inconsistent
with the given conclusion, the conclusion is deemed to be invalid. However, if is
consistent, then believability is examined. At this stage in the reasoning process,
believable conclusions are accepted as valid, whereas unbelievable conclusions are
subjected to further analysis in which the individual attempts to construct all
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possible model of the premises. If the given conclusion is true in all models, it is
accepted, otherwise it is rejected. This theory explains the difference in difficulty
found between single-model and multiple-model syllogisms as being a consequence
of the increased demands on working-memory memory resources for multiple-model
syllogisms. However, Ball et al (2006) found that response latencies did not support
the claim that unbelievable problems result in a greater degree of logical analysis.
Ball and colleagues got participants to respond to categorical syllogisms whilst
attached to equipment which tracked the direction of their gaze. This methodology
allowed the timing of attention paid to specific parts of the syllogism. Whilst
mental models theory would have predicted longer processing times for unbelievable
problems, due to the extra effort spent on model construction for such problems.
However, the data showed that participants actually spent longer responding to
believable problems, in direct opposition to this prediction.
The metacognitive uncertainty account (Quayle & Ball, 2000) is similar to both
the misinterpreted necessity and mental models accounts, in that it agrees that
reasoners construct mental models of syllogisms, and that belief operates after
some reasoning has taken place. However, it differs in that it argues that when
the reasoner’s working-memory capacity is exhausted, due to a larger number of
generated models for invalid conclusions, a state of uncertainty in induced. If
their confidence is below a certain threshold, this will prompt them to rely on
conclusion believability to guide their response. This is reflected in lower confidence
ratings given by participants when responding to invalid than to valid syllogisms
(Experiment 1), and participants with lower scores on a working memory test being
more influenced by belief bias than higher scoring participants (Experiment 3).
However, eye tracking data provided by Ball et al (2006) was inconsistent with
predictions of this theory, regarding time spent examining premises and conclusions.
Whilst metacognitive uncertainty theory would have predicted longer premise
inspection times for invalid problems, Ball and colleagues found that problem
validity was not predictive of response time.
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Many of the aforementioned accounts suggest that belief bias affects the amount
of logical reasoning that occurs. In these theories, the interplay between heuristic
and analytic systems is determined by whether Type 2 processing occurs at all,
or whether the output of Type 2 processing is deemed sufficient information for a
response to be given. On the other hand, selective processing theory (Evans, 2000;
Klauer et al., 2000) argues that all individuals engage in Type 2 processing, but do
it in qualitatively different ways depending upon conclusion believability. Selective
processing theory is somewhat in agreement with mental models theory in that
individuals are thought to construct a single model of the premises. However, it
posits that qualitatively different models are constructed on the basis of believability;
a confirming model is constructed for believable conclusions, and a disconfirming
model is constructed for unbelievable conclusions. Empirical evidence involving
response latencies (Ball et al., 2006; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Thompson et al., 2003)
and time-limited responses (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) support this theory.
For example, Ball et al (2006), using an eye-tracking methodology were able to
analyse how much time was spent examining the separate parts of a syllogism.
They found no evidence for any differences in response times before the conclusion
was viewed, and differences only arose subsequently. This led to the conclusion
that, at least in a conclusion evaluation paradigm, this provides strong support
for conclusion-to-premises theories such as selective processing theory, but refutes
premises-to-conclusion theories, such as mental-models theory.
Nevertheless, this version of selective processing theory cannot account for
instances in which a smaller subset of participants show almost perfectly normative
responses. Thus, Stupple et al (2011) posit an extended version of the theory. The
key distinction between the original model and the revised model is that the latter
allows analytical reasoning, if heuristic responding is suppressed, to go down one
of two pathways. Individuals either perform an exhaustive search or a satisficing
search. The word ‘satisficing’ is a portmanteau of ‘satisfying and ‘sufficing’ and this
kind of search does exactly that it looks for a model that satisfies the criteria of
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either rejecting or accepting the conclusion, and does not perform a comprehensive
search, but instead conducts one which is sufficient to yield a response within
time and memory constraints. It may be that individuals choose to reject or
accept the given conclusion as soon as they find a model which is consistent with
their initial heuristic response. An exhaustive search involves a more in-depth
and wide-ranging search of possible models to examine whether the conclusion in
question is necessarily valid or not.
It has been highlighted that reasoners may be more aware of their own biased
responses than the above theories might suggest. De Neys, Moyens, and Vansteen-
wegen (2010) found that participants showed higher level of autonomic arousal,
measured via skin conductance rates, when they encountered conflict problems.
It is tempting to suppose that this could be accounted for by the parallel process
model suggested by Sloman (1996), in which it is argued that both Type 1 and Type
2 reasoning take place in parallel. Conflict between heuristic and analytic output
is detected when the two types of processing give different responses; however,
due to the speed of Type 1 responses, a Type 2 response is less likely to be given.
This model, however, has been criticised as there would be no benefit of employing
Type 2 processing when Type 1 would suffice, in the case of non-conflict problems
(Handley & Trippas, 2015).
De Neys and Bonnefon (2013) argues that differences in the extent of belief bias
are due to differences in storage, monitoring, or inhibition. A storage failure is one
which is present due to the lack of knowledge of formal rules of logic. Monitoring
failure accounts suggest that belief bias arises from the inappropriate use of heuristic
thinking resulting in non-normative responding. Earlier theories of belief bias such
as selective scrutiny can be seen as monitoring failure accounts; these theories do
not allow for reasoners being able to detect a conflict between logic and belief.
Inhibition failure accounts argue that the vast majority of individuals are capable
of formal reasoning. However, differences in the ability to suppress a heuristic
response lead to belief based responding.
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De Neys and Bonnefon (2013) argues that this override mechanism is logical
in nature, but also implicit. The logical intuitions account of belief bias is a
hybrid of serial and parallel process models, and suggests that heuristic and logical
processes, which are both intuitive in nature, are initially activated. However, it is
only when a conflict between these processes is detected that logical deliberative
processing happens. They argue that this intuitive logic is acquired early in
human development, and highlight some studies which show high levels of logically
normative responding in very young children (e.g. Brainerd & Reyna, 2001).
Handley et al. (2011) highlight a paradox within the default interventionist
approach. Such theories characterise heuristics as a default response, which can be
overridden by analytical processing. When a conflict is detected between belief and
validity, this can lead to the additional Type 2 processing. However, the detection
of the conflict in the first place already requires some type of Type 2 processing to
have already taken place, thus making the theories logically inconsistent. However,
research by Thompson, Prowse-Turner, et al. (2013) suggests that rather than
being some sort of Type 2 process, this mechanism is a separate entity entirely.
Thompson and colleagues asked participants to given an initial quick response to a
number of reasoning problems, which was followed by the opportunity to change
this response. The term answer fluency was used to define the amount of time
it took to give this initial response. Answer fluency was found to be predictive
of how likely a participant was to engage in Type 2 thinking, operationalised by
Thompson and colleagues as the amount of time spent rethinking an answer, or
the chance of changing an answer. It was not, however, predictive of accuracy.
It was argued that it is metacognitive cues that are based upon the ease with
which an initial heuristic response can be given that determines conflict detection.
When a heuristic response is given with great ease, and thus high confidence, an
accompanying analytic response is less likely to occur. This also once again raises
the question of when in the reasoning process belief bias occurs.
In summary, earlier theories of belief bias argued that this phenomenon was the
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result of either belief operating prior to reasoning (e.g. selective scrutiny), belief
resolving uncertainties in reasoning (e.g. misinterpreted necessity, metacognitive
uncertainty), belief affecting the extent of processing which takes place (e.g. mental
models). However, more recent theories, such as selective processing theory argue
that belief affects the type of reasoning which takes place. Evidence concerning
autonomic arousal and confidence suggests that even when reasoners give a biased
response, they have some sort of underlying awareness of this (e.g. De Neys et
al., 2010; De Neys, 2013). Other evidence, such as the inspection-time findings
of Ball et al (2006) further supports this view that reasoners are competent at
detecting conflict between logic and belief, and thus that typically both Type 1 and
Type 2 processing take place. Despite this evidence in favour of belief bias taking
effect during the reasoning process, there is reason to believe it also manifests as a
response bias, and these theories need not be mutually exclusive (Trippas et al.,
2013). This will be discussed in the next section. As shown in the research of
Thompson et al. (2003) and Ball et al. (2006) amongst others, the use of a wider
range of methodology than simply calculating the number of correct responses has
led to developments in theorising about belief bias. More recent methodological
developments have been concerned with the statistics used to measure performance
on syllogistic reasoning tasks. In the next section, I will discuss the MPT model of
Klauer et al. (2000), and go on to examine SDT models, such as those of Dube et
al. (2010) and Trippas et al. (2013).
2.4.1 Separating Reasoning and Response Bias
In developing their selective processing model of belief bias, Klauer et al. (2000)
highlighted an important nuance of belief bias that had been previously overlooked;
the importance of considering the effects of bias at both the reasoning stage of
processing and the response stage. Typically, belief bias is measured using a number
of indices. The logic index, which measures the degree of logical responding is calcu-
lated by deducting the number of invalid problems endorsed by participants as valid
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from the number of valid problems endorsed. Belief based responses are measured
using the belief index, calculated by deducting the number of unbelievable problems
endorsed as valid from believable problems endorsed. Finally, the interaction index
is designed to assess the degree of the belief bias effect, that is, the number of
conflict problems endorsed minus the number of non-conflict problems endorsed.
These indices have been criticised for conflating response bias and reasoning bias
(Klauer et al., 2000; Dube et al., 2010; Trippas et al., 2013). Klauer and colleagues
argue that whenever individuals are presented with a task in which a single response
must be chosen from a number of given responses, it is crucial that response bias is
accounted for, and so a model which can accommodate response bias is necessitated.
Therefore, an alternative approach was used by Klauer et al, who constructed
a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model, which separated reasoning biases
from response biases. MPT models allow parameters to be mapped onto separate
psychological processes in order to calculate the probability of a given response,
and the particular process that led to that response. To illustrate this more clearly,
Figure 2.1 shows the MPT model fitted by Klauer and colleagues.
Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic representation of Klauer et al’s MPT model of belief
bias
Theoretical predictions about belief bias can be tested by examining which
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parameter estimates are statistically different or equal; for example, in the figure,
if 𝑟𝑣𝑢 is equal to 𝑟𝑣𝑏, this indicates a lack of difference in the process for both types
of valid problems. Using this methodology, Klauer et al. (2000) found evidence for
belief bias affecting both response bias and playing a part earlier in the reasoning
process. The idea of belief bias affecting the response stage is not novel; Oakhill &
Johnson-Laird (1989) have suggested that belief bias is mainly a reasoning bias,
although do allow for the possibility of “conclusion filtering”, which takes place in
the response stage. However, the MPT model of Klauer et al allows for specific
statistical parameters to measure this response bias, and assess the two components
of belief bias separately.
The MPT model was later criticised by Dube et al (2010), who argued that an
SDT model is far more appropriate than an MPT model for the analysis of belief
bias data. The mathematical basis of SDT models are discussed in greater depth
in Chapter 3, but in brief, it characterises responses as lying somewhere on one
of two continuous probability distributions (one representing valid problems, and
the other representing invalid problems), lying on an X axis representing perceived
argument strength. A visual representation of this can be found in Figure 2.2.
The distribution representing invalid problems, in most reasoners, lies to the
left of the valid problem distribution, as such problems will have lower strength
due to their lack of validity. A single cutoff point, the response criterion, shown by
the bold black line, is indicative of response bias, and varies from person to person.
If the argument strength is to the left of this threshold, a response of “invalid” will
be given, whereas perceived argument strength greater than the criterion leads to
the reasoner responding with “valid”. As the probability of a certain response lies
on a curve, changes in response bias will increment the number of hits (responses of
“valid” to valid problems) and false alarms (responses of “valid” to invalid problems)
by different amounts, and thus changes in response bias will still be erroneously
conflated with changes in accuracy if this is not accounted for.
To further demonstrate the bases for this claim, Dube et al. (2010) employed
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Figure 2.2: Plot showing SDT model of belief bias
a base-rate method, more commonly used in recognition memory research, in
which participants in different conditions were either told that there was a very
high or very low number of valid syllogisms in the materials that they would be
presented with. In both conditions, despite instructions indicating otherwise, half
of the syllogisms were valid and the other half invalid. Thus, this allowed Dube
et al manipulate response bias whilst accuracy remains constant, as there is no
theoretical reason that there should be any differences between the two conditions
in being able to identify valid or invalid syllogisms as part of the reasoning process.
When the resulting data was analysed using traditional approaches (i.e. logic,
belief, and interaction indices), the base-rate manipulations appeared to affect
accuracy, whereas the SDT model showed that in fact only response bias was
altered. Plotting the predicted values of these statistical models against the actual
data, and analysing the relevant goodness-of-fit statistics showed that the SDT
model fit the data better than both the traditional models and the MPT model.
Further support for the increased accuracy of the SDT approach is provided
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by Heit and Rotello (2014) who simulated data which was generated to reflect
experimental manipulations in which participants’ performance varied in terms of
response bias but not reasoning accuracy. They found that the higher number of
participants, and the higher number of trials per participant, the more likely it
was that traditional analyses would erroneously indicated an accuracy difference
between conditions, whereas SDT analyses clearly distinguished between the dif-
ferent components of belief bias. A graphical approach, the plotting of Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were also used to explore this data. ROC
curves plot changes in response bias whilst accuracy is held constant, and in the
belief bias paradigm, are typically generated using confidence ratings. These are
generated by asking participants to give a rating of how sure they are that they
have given a correct response. The combination of binary response and confidence
rating is then transformed into a single scale, with “totally sure, valid” at one end
and “totally sure, invalid” at another end. The cumulative proportions are then
plotted; an example can be seen in Figure 2.3.
More details can be found in Chapter 3, but the key point argued by Dube et
al (2010) is that MPT and traditional approaches assume a linear ROC, whereas
the SDT approach specifies a curved ROC, which reflects response bias affecting
hits and false alarms in a non-linear fashion. When experimental data was plotted
as ROCs, evidence overwhelmingly suggested that belief bias data produces curved
ROCs and thus necessitated the use of SDT modelling (Dube et al., 2010; Dube,
Rotello, & Heit, 2011; Trippas et al., 2013; Handley & Trippas, 2015). This may
not be solely applicable to syllogistic reasoning; Heit & Rotello (2014) re-analysed
data from earlier research (i.e. Rips, 2001; Markovits & Handley, 2005). Although
these studies focussed on conditional reasoning rather than categorical syllogisms,
a curved ROC was still found, showing the more general applicability of SDT
analyses to investigating reasoning. In addition, the SDT approach has been used
to criticise the way in which neurological data is used to support the theory that
individuals implicitly detect a conflict between logic and belief. Rotello, Heit, and
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Figure 2.3: Example of a ROC Curve
Way (2014) argue that the use of traditional indices used to assess accuracy is
deeply problematic, and many studies which claim support for these on the basis
of activation of different regions of the brain whilst completing deductive reasoning
problems are flawed. Whilst such studies argue that these patterns of activation
give support to a conflict detection account, Rotello et al (2014) argue that this
supposed link with conflict detection is, in fact, just activation of different regions
because of differences in response bias.
The SDT approach has been criticised, however, on a number of grounds, by
Klauer and Kellen (2011), their main arguments being that confidence rating data
artificially produces curved ROCs, and that there were a number of methodological
flaws in the procedure used by Dube et al (2010). Firstly, Klauer & Kellen (2011)
claim that the use of confidence ratings ROCs artificially produce non-linear ROCs
which would not be found with binary choice data. In response, Dube et al (2011)
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argue that this claim is based upon poorly substantiated claims of Broder and
Schutz, and conducted further experiments in which they found a curved ROC,
despite using a binary choice method with no confidence ratings. Although Klauer
& Kellen (2011) refit the SDT and MPT models to a large and varied dataset and
found greater support for their MPT model, Dube et al (2011) argued that any
improvement in model fit was due to the use of an overly narrow rating scale, and
simulations on a wider scale provided greater support for the SDT model.
The application of the alternative modelling techniques led Dube et al (2010)
to find that the apparent interaction between belief and logic disappears when an
SDT approach is taken to analyse data. The lack of interaction effect renders many
previous theories of belief bias incompatible with this SDT account. Therefore,
Dube et al offer a number of possible explanations for how belief bias affects
deductive reasoning, all based around a single process theory which suggests that
perceived argument strength lies at the heart of the belief bias effect. Dube et
al’s criterion shift account suggests that believability affects the required level
of strength of argument to determine whether a reasoner responds with “valid”
or “invalid”. Believable problems lead to the response criterion becoming more
liberal, and thus, less evidence in favour of the particular conclusion is required
for a reasoner to say that it is valid. Unbelievable problems, relative to believable
problems, result in a more conservative response criterion. An alternative, the
distribution shift account, posits that believability leads to a change in location
of the argument strength distribution. Instead of two distributions representing
valid and invalid arguments, there are four, with one for each problem type. The
distance between the distributions for the two types of believable problems is
equal to the distance between the distributions for the two types of unbelievable
problems. However, Dube et al argue that the criterion shift account is more easily
interpretable in line with their base-rate manipulation findings.
Although the SDT model suggested by Dube et al (2010) is a single-process
theory and suggests that belief bias is purely response stage bias, more recent
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research by Trippas et al (2013) manage to reintegrate SDT analyses with reasoning-
based accounts of belief bias. The effects of time constraints, cognitive ability, and
syllogism complexity were examined, given that dual-process accounts predict that
all these factors should mediate the way in which believability affects deductive
reasoning. Conversely, if belief bias is merely a response bias, as suggested by
Dube et al, there should be no interactions between believability and any of these
factors. Indeed, although Dube et al found that conclusion believability affected
response bias but not accuracy, Trippas et al (2013) found that believability
did affect accuracy unless participants were tested in circumstances under which
sophisticated reasoning was unlikely to occur (i.e. with simple syllogisms, with
a 10 second response time limit, and participants with a lower cognitive ability).
Trippas and colleagues concluded that belief bias affects reasoning both at the
processing stage as well as the response stage, although processing effects are only
exhibited if complex processing can occur.
Further evidence for belief bias having components in both reasoning and
response bias comes from Trippas, Verde, and Handley (2014), who found that
when participants were presented with syllogisms side-by-side and asked to choose
which was valid, when believability was manipulated between-participants, there
was no effect of belief bias. The design naturally eliminated response bias by giving
simultaneous presentations, and they argue that the lack of effect on reasoning
stems from the fact that when all conclusions are either believable or unbelievable,
participants can no longer rely on believability as a heuristic for responding.
Later manipulations with believability as a within-participants factor did uncover
reasoning accuracy differences due to belief bias.
The use of the SDT approach to investigate performance is neither novel to
belief bias, nor mutually exclusive with previous theories of belief bias. Hayes, Heit,
and Rotello (2014) argue that it is a common set of processes that are responsible for
cognition in areas typically investigated entirely separately. They use the example of
similarities in findings in memory, categorisation and reasoning research, and argue
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that a more unified approach is important. A similar view is espoused by Khemlani
& Johnson-Laird (2012), who discuss how a dual-process theoretical approach
is important to tie together different ways of looking at syllogistic reasoning in
order to acquire a more unified approach, combining ideas about both algorithmic
(“how”) and computational (“what”) aspects of reasoning. Due to methodological
and analytical differences, the reconciliation of theoretical models based upon SDT
and non-SDT approaches may be a complicated thing to achieve.
However, Handley et al. (2011) suggest a modified elaboration of De Neys
(2012) logical intuitions model, and their parallel competitive model suggests
that conflict between logic and belief is bidirectional. Although much research
investigates how beliefs can interfere with logical responding, there is also evidence
to suggest that logic may interfere with belief-based responses (e.g. Handley
et al., 2011; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014). In such cases,
where participants are asked to provide a response based upon believability, the
interference of logic on belief for conflict problems reduced the accuracy of these
belief-based responses compared to non-conflict problems. Handley et al. (2011)
argue that Type 1 processing is comprised both of processes related to structure,
and of those related to knowledge or beliefs. Once Type 2 processing is engaged,
any conflict between the two processes may be identified, after which point, one
response is inhibited based upon the demands of the task. For simple problems, a
structural Type 1 response is available rapidly, which accounts for the interference
of logic on tasks in which a response based upon beliefs is required. However, for
complex problems, a knowledge-based Type 1 response is more readily accessible,
and so this must be inhibited in order to produce a logically normative response.
Although there is growing support for theories of belief bias which focus around
conflict resolution, there is no clear consensus on which particular theory best
describes the data. As discussed in Chapter 1, further insight into the deductive
reasoning processes can be ascertained by examining how attempts to influence
strategy change affects task performance. In the next section, I will consider both
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general approaches to debiasing and ones specific to deductive reasoning and belief
bias.
2.5 Debiasing
Cognitive biases are persistent, and reducing or eliminating them is a difficult task.
Debiasing techniques that have been successful in one domain may not necessarily
be effective when applied to other biases or tasks. The importance of the debiasing
technique being specifically targeted at overriding the particular cause of bias has
been important as being a key factor in the success of such an intervention (Slovic
& Fischhoff, 1977). Given the lack of consensus regarding the specific mechanisms
behind the source of belief bias, it is not immediately clear as to the approach which
will garner the most success. Conversely, the discovery of a successful debiasing
technique may lead to new insights into the belief bias effect. In addition, the
majority of prior studies examining debiasing approaches have used statistical
analysis techniques which risk conflating changes in reasoning bias and changes in
response bias. This thesis will make a novel contribution to the field by examining
debiasing interventions and analysing the resulting data using an SDT approach to
adequately distinguish between the two types of belief bias.
A number of approaches to debiasing thinking errors are discussed by Arkes
(1991). Arkes identifies various categories of errors, including association-based
errors, such as belief bias. Association-based errors are thought to be caused
by the influence of semantic associations in an individual’s knowledge or memory
interfering with more logical processes. In this section I will discuss general methods
of debiasing thinking errors, along with their application to belief bias. Debiasing
methods can be roughly divided into 3 categories: external factors which are
independent from the given task, for example, financial incentives; prior instruction
interventions, such as written descriptions of optimal strategies, which are given
before the task; and online processing interventions, such as the provision of
feedback, which attempt to modify how the individual engages with the task.
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2.5.1 External Factors
Although providing individuals with incentives for better performance can be effec-
tive in overriding other types of bias, this strategy has been found to be ineffective
for association-based errors. Arkes argues that individuals give high ratings of
confidence in their own answers even when they are responding inaccurately, as
they will proceed to create justifications for whatever answers they give. Even
when given monetary incentives, confidence ratings remain high, despite incorrect
answers (e.g. Fischhoff et al, 1977). This tendency has also been demonstrated
in syllogistic reasoning research, such as Evans et al (1983), in which participants
who were asked to explain their choice of answer out loud made reference to irrel-
evant information from the task in order to justify their erroneous responses. In
some cases, for example, the base-rate task, incentives have been found to have
a worsening effect on performance (Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Hogarth,
Gibbs, McKenzie, & Marquis, 1991).
Repeated practice on tasks may lead to improvements in performance as partic-
ipants become better acquainted with the demands of the task. However, where
bias is present, it could also be argued that without any other intervention, the
bias may become more deeply ingrained in the absence of corrective intervention.
Johnson-Laird & Steedman (1978, Experiment 2) found that performance on a
conclusion generation task taken two weeks apart led to improved performance.
However, there was no belief bias manipulation in this experiment, and so we
cannot make any inferences as to the effect of practice on reducing the reliance on
this heuristic. Ball (2013) found that both feedback and practice led to improved
performance, however, SDT analyses were not conducted, and it is unclear as to
whether the response-bias or reasoning-bias components were affected by these
manipulations.
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2.5.2 Prior Instruction Interventions
Informing participants about the particular cognitive bias in question, and asking
them to try to resist succumbing to it when making logical judgements is appealing
because of its simplicity. However, this approach has been found to be ineffective
(e.g. Fischhoff, 1975). This may be explained by the fact that association-based
errors occur because of processes which are beyond the grasp of conscious awareness
and these automatic behaviours cannot be easily altered (Arkes, 1991; Larrick,
2004). This argument has been developed further by Evans (1989) who argues
that even when individuals are capable of engaging in effective analytic reasoning,
such biases divert their attention to irrelevant aspects of the task in hand, and so
providing an analytic solution to a heuristic-influenced problem will be unsuccessful.
However, Macpherson and Stanovich (2007) found that when participants were
both informed about a particular cognitive bias, and told to use the “consider the
opposite” strategy, there was some increase in performance.
Nevertheless, descriptive materials which giving people in-depth instructions
about logical necessity and the precise logical meaning of the different qualifiers
in syllogisms has been claimed to reduce, although not completely eliminate, the
belief bias effect (Evans et al., 1994; Newstead et al., 1992). This method of
debiasing, however, required very detailed instructions, and simply explaining
logical necessity but not further details led to no change in the levels of belief bias
exhibited by participants (Evans et al, 1994, Experiment 2). These results have
been disputed by Heit & Rotello (2014), who replicated this experiment, and found
that fitting an SDT model to the data revealed that instructions had an effect on
response bias, but not on reasoning bias. A more subtle variation on the previously
mentioned specific instructions, which instead involves instructing individuals to
perform a behaviour connected with debiasing has been found to be effective in
some cases. Encouraging participants to imagine that their alternatives to their
choice were true can reduce the effects of hindsight bias (Arkes, Faust, Guihnette,
& Hart, 1988), can reduce overconfidence in the accuracy of responding (Koriat,
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Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Hoch, 1985), and is more effective than simply
instructing individuals to reason without bias (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984).
Arkes argues that this strategy is effective as association-based errors occur because
a biased response is cued, and so cuing the alternative response as well leads to a
lower tendency to simply choose the more easily accessible biased choice. Simply
cuing debiasing behaviours is also effective; Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found
that participants who were shown a story in which a character displayed certain
decision making strategies were more likely use to the same technique themselves
in a later task than participants who had not read the story. Explicitly telling
participants to use a disconfirming strategy has been shown to be effective in
debiasing performance on the Wason (1960) 2-4-6 task (Gorman & Gorman, 1984),
but advising participants to test multiple hypotheses has little effect on belief bias
(Evans et al, 1994).
2.5.3 Online Processing Interventions
Belief bias is a contextual bias; that is, it manifests predominantly not when
a problem is considered alone, but in the context of other problems, some of
which have believable conclusions, and others with unbelievable conclusions. When
manipulated within-participants, the belief bias effect is often diminished (e.g.
Evans & Pollard, 1990) or eliminated (Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014). This
trend is also found when participants are asked to choose the valid syllogism from
an unbelievable and a believable syllogism presented side by side (Trippas et al,
2014, Experiments 1 and 2).
Milkman, Chugh, and Bazerman (2009) discuss an approach to debiasing in
decision-making research, which involves providing individuals with an alternative
heuristic to the one which is the source of their bias, with the replacement being
one which results in more accurate responding. However, given the strength of the
belief bias effect, this seems unlikely to prove useful. Alternatively, as belief bias
may be caused by an over-reliance on Type 1 responses, providing reasoners with a
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strategy which explicitly engages a Type 2 response may produce improvements
in performance. This approach has been found in other areas of cognition to lead
to novice task performance becoming more accurate than that of experts (Dawes,
1971). The use of simultaneous presentation to encourage a shift from Type 1
to Type 2 responding discussed above has also been found in other domains (e.g.
Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992). However, in everyday life, it is rare that
logical arguments are encountered in such a specific context, and so alternative
ways of altering processing are still important to examine.
The use of disfluent texts has been argued by some to be effective in this regard;
Thompson, Prowse-Turner, et al. (2013) found that participants of higher cognitive
ability were more accurate on the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005)
when the text of the task was presented in a font which was difficult to read. They
concluded that this was because it promoted extra processing. However, Trippas,
Handley, and Verde (2014) found that, in the case of syllogistic reasoning, disfluency
actually led to lower accuracy for higher ability participants, concluding that on
complex tasks, disfluent fonts leads to additional processing which would otherwise
be used to deduce a correct answer. Meyer et al. (2015) reported the results of
research in which 16 separate experiments attempted to replicate the effect of
disfluent fonts on improving performance. They found no effects of disfluency at all,
even when cognitive ability was accounted for, and concluded the only consistent
change in performance was an increase in response time.
Feedback has been used in other domains such as memory and decision making
to improve task performance. When rapid feedback is available on a large number
of decisions for which ratings of confidence have been given, individuals show a
stronger link between accuracy and confidence in that domain (Wagenaar & Keren,
1986). Feedback and confidence ratings have also been used as a debiasing technique
in a classroom setting, with participants only showing an increase in accuracy
after being given both immediate feedback and having to give confidence ratings
(Renner & Renner, 2001). Indeed, it has been argued that response confidence acts
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as a metacognitive cue for reasoners in determining whether they give an answer
consistent with Type 1 responding or Type 2 responding (Thompson, Prowse-
Turner, et al., 2013). Therefore, asking reasoners to give a rating of confidence
in a given answer, followed by evaluative feedback may lead to better calibrated
confidence and higher accuracy.
Specific training can be an effective debiasing technique, as rather than attempt-
ing to modify behaviours, it simply gives people “those tools needed to arrive at
correct answers” (Arkes, 1991). The benefits of undertaking a course in statistics,
or training in statistical principles in the lab, have been shown to be transferable to
a later task involving statistical inference (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986). As dis-
cussed earlier, inhibition may play an important role in the suppression of intuitive
response on conflict problems. Houde´ et al. (2000) attempted to debias participants
completing a matching bias task. Participants were given a pre- and post-test, with
an inhibition training task in-between. It was found that participants showed lower
levels of matching bias on the post-test, and increased activation in areas of the
brain thought to be associated with inhibitory control. One problem with taking
this as evidence of the success of inhibition training, however, is that Houd et al
did not include a control condition in their experiment. Moutier, Angeard, and
Houde´ (2002) compared the effects of inhibition training and general logic training
on performance on the matching bias task. It was found that inhibition training
improved performance, but logic training had no effect.
Later research by Moutier and Houde´ (2003) examined debiasing of the con-
junction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy is often demonstrated by participants’
response to the Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983):
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
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Linda is a bank teller.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”
When given such a task, individuals tend to choose the second option, fitting
in with the extra information that they have been given. However, logically, the
first option is more likely given that membership of a single category cannot be
probabilistically more likely than membership of that category in addition to
another one. Moutier & Houde (2003) found that inhibition training was the key
to enhanced performance on this task. When participants were given training
which shared many underlying features with the main task, little improvement
in performance was shown compared to a control group who were given no such
training, even when the underlying logic of the task was explicitly discussed, and
it was checked that the participants understood it fully. However, an additional
condition combined this logic training with an inhibition component, in which the
experimenter explained why the participant’s intuitive response may be misleading,
and had the participant repeat the explanation back to them until it was clear
that they had a complete understanding of it. It was found that in this condition
participants showed significantly less bias on a post-test than the control or logic-
trained group, indicating that the demonstration of principles of inhibition were
key to debiasing responses on this task.
Logic training alone is thought to fail, as people struggle to apply abstract
the concepts they have been trained in to the specific tasks they are required
to complete. Specific task training alone is also ineffective; to get any benefit,
individuals must be simultaneously trained in both the specific task they will be
tested on, and the underlying logical principles (Bransford, Sherwood, Vye, &
Rieser, 1986; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986).
Task-specific training has been shown to improve performance in syllogistic
reasoning tasks; Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009) found that a short training
session in which participants were taught how to construct diagrams to represent
syllogisms, and then training on just 5 practice syllogisms subsequently improved
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 49
performance on a later task in which 16 syllogisms were evaluated. A more
detailed approach was taken compared to the typical binary response design, which
showed participants became better at categorising syllogisms on the basis of logical
necessity. However, this study did not use belief-oriented materials, and it is
unclear whether this technique would be sufficient to override an effect of such
magnitude. In addition, Prowse-Turner & Thompson added further nuance to the
issue of confidence rating data; item-by-item confidence was no better calibrated
with training. However, a single overall estimate of performance was found to be
significantly more accurate for the group who did receive training.
2.6 Conclusion
Debiasing reasoning is a complex task and little research has been done on whether
the belief bias effect can be reduced or eliminated. Evidence from related areas, such
as decision-making, affords us insight into methods which have worked here. There is
some evidence that the belief bias effect can be attenuated (Ball, 2013; Macpherson
& Stanovich, 2007; Newstead et al., 1992); however, the recent application of
SDT methods to analysing belief bias data has highlighted the importance of
distinguishing between reasoning and response bias when evaluating such methods
(Heit & Rotello, 2014). In the next chapter, I go on to discuss the methodological
bases of the analyses presented in this thesis, and then in Chapter 4 report the
results from an experiment in which participants were given feedback to their
responses on a syllogistic evaluation task. Chapter 5 examines the use of differing
sets of instructions and aims to investigate whether individual differences have a
part to play in the efficacy of debiasing methods. A final experiment reported in
Chapter 6 continues the theme of individual differences, and examines whether
such differences affect the ability of individuals to improve performance and reduce
bias via the combination of training and feedback.
Chapter 3
Methodology
This thesis contains the results and analyses of three experimental studies. This
chapter will discuss the statistical methodology used to analyse the results of these
experiments. The analyses for all three experiments involves generating accuracy
and response bias score using the SDT model. The effects of various factors on
these scores will be analysed using mixed effects models. The same procedure will
also be applied to analyse the traditional endorsement rates measures, the results
of which will be compared to the SDT models. In this chapter, I will briefly discuss
traditional approaches to analysing belief bias, and then move on to examining
SDT, beginning by outlining the theoretical underpinnings of this model. I have
already discussed the arguments for and against the use of SDT in the previous
chapter; here, I will present a more in-depth discussion of the conceptual and
mathematical principles of SDT. Following this, I will go on to discuss the use of
mixed-effects models, and the criteria which can be used to select the fixed and
random effects for the various models. Due to differences between each of the three
experiments, discussion of methodological considerations such as sampling design
and specific experimental design will be located in the methodology section of those
specific chapters.
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3.1 Traditional Approaches
Earlier approaches to analysing belief bias data involved aggregating multiple
responses from a single participant in order to generate a number of indices which
were then analysed as dependent variables. Typically, three different indices are
























(“𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑”|𝑉 𝐵) + (“𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑”|𝐼𝑈)
)︁
The logic index is meant to be a measure of how much the participants’ responses
correspond with normative logic; belief index a measure of the influence of belief
on their answers, and interaction index a measure of how much this effect of belief
differs for valid and invalid conclusions. These indices are then typically analysed
using analysis of variance (ANOVA). For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, the use of
these indices has fallen out of favour, in many cases replaced by an SDT approach.
I will now go on to discuss the origins and mathematical principles behind SDT
analysis.
3.2 Signal Detection Theory
Recently, there has been a growing trend to investigate belief bias using a signal
detection paradigm. It was originally a mathematical concept used to describe
engineering problems, but has also been applied to topics in cognitive psychology.
SDT has its roots in information theory, a concept developed by Shannon (1948),
and is concerned with how information can be transmitted over a noisy channel.
The term ‘noise’ refers to randomness and extraneous influences which can affect
the interpretation of the signal.
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3.2.1 Response Types
SDT differs from traditional approaches to examining belief bias in that it gives
a more general description of the reasoning process and task responses, and puts
less focus on the underlying mental architecture. It can be employed in binary
choice tasks where participants make binary choice responses in regards to the
presence or absence of a target stimulus. Participants’ responses are divided
into four categories; hits (responding “valid” to valid problems), false alarms
(“valid”|invalid), correct rejections (“invalid”|invalid) and misses (“invalid”|valid).
In the belief-bias paradigm, trials in which invalid problems are presented would
be classified as noise trials, and trials in which valid problems are presented are
signal-plus-noise trials, or simply signal trials. This is summarised in Table 3.1.
“Valid” “Invalid”
Signal Hit Miss
Noise False alarm Correct rejection
Table 3.1: SDT response classifications
3.2.2 SDT conceptualisation as distributions
Another way of representing an individual’s responses is as two continuous probabil-
ity distributions on a single axis, as shown in Figure 3.1. The x axis can be thought
of as indicating perceived signal strength and the y axis is the probability of the
response. In the traditional example of tone perception, the x axis would represent
loudness, and in belief bias research it represents argument strength (Dube, Rotello
& Heit, 2010). One of the two distributions represents the noise distribution, and
the other represents the signal-plus-noise distribution. An individual’s sensitivity
(i.e. ability to discriminate between signal-plus-noise and just noise; accuracy) is
represented by the distance between the centre points of the two distributions. It
is quantified using the statistic 𝑑′.
The probability of an individual classifying a signal of a particular strength as
either noise or signal-plus-noise depends on the height of the relevant distribution
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Figure 3.1: Plot showing example signal and noise distributions
at that particular point on the x axis. The greater the overlap between the two
distributions, the greater the uncertainty of whether the signal has been perceived
or not. This uncertainty is resolved by the use of a response criterion. This is a
location on the x axis at which any stimuli that fall to the left of this point (i.e.
have a weaker perceived signal strength), will be reported by the individual as being
just noise, whereas to the right, individuals will report that they have detected the
signal. In Figure 1, the grey vertical line demarks the response criterion.
The number of correct rejections made by the individual is determined by the
total area under the noise distribution that falls to the left of the response criterion
point, and false alarms by the area under the same distribution that falls to the
right of the response criterion. Similarly, the equivalent applies to misses and hits
depending on the location of the response criterion relative to the signal-plus-noise
distribution. This is shown in Figure 3.2, which shows data from an individual, but
with different attributes highlighted in each image. The first image shows the valid
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distribution. For all problems that are actually valid, if the argument strength falls
to the right of the individual’s response criterion, they give a response of ”valid”, a
hit, as highlighted in green; for arguments with a strength below (i.e. to the left)
of that criterion, the individual will response with ”invalid”, a miss, highlighted in
grey. The second image shows the ”invalid” distribution, and here, arguments with
strength lower than the criterion results in a correct rejection, highlighted in blue;
those with a higher strength results in a false alarm, highlighted in orange.
Response criterion
A liberal response criterion would lead to high levels of hits and false alarms,
and low levels of correct rejections and misses, reflecting a tendency to report
that a signal has been detected even if the individual is uncertain. Conversely, a
conservative response criterion would lead to more correct rejections and misses,
but less hits and false alarms, due to an answer of “no” being unlikely in the case
of uncertainty. The response criterion in Figure 3.1 is a fairly liberal response
criterion, with high levels of hits, moderate levels of false alarms, low levels of
misses, and moderate levels of correct rejections. An individual’s response criterion
is independent of their accuracy, as demonstrated in research that has included
manipulations such as incentivising the use of more liberal or more conservative
response criteria. In other words, their proficiency at the task remains constant
whilst variation in response criterion being reflected in altered rates of hits, misses,
false alarms and correct rejections.
3.2.3 Comparison to traditional approach
Traditional analyses of belief bias experiments calculate accuracy by simply de-
ducting the number of false alarms from the number of hits (also known as a H-F
index). As such analyses do not separate response criteria from accuracy, they
may lead to erroneous conclusions that individuals with a more extreme response
criterion are apparently showing poorer performance on a given task.
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Figure 3.2: Plots demonstrating a) hits vs. misses and b) correct rejections vs.
false alarms
This is shown in more detail in Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. These figures show
responses from 3 different participants who have identical accuracy, as shown in
the equal distance between the valid and invalid distributions, but vastly differing
response criteria, depicted by the placement of the criterion line. Figure 3.3
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shows the responses from Participant A, who has a very liberal response criteria,
and so requires very little evidence to give a response of ”valid”. Their hit rate
is approximately 99%, but false alarm rate is around 70%. Figure 3.4 shows
Participant B, who requires more evidence to deem a conclusion as valid, and so
their criterion is closer to the centre, and they have a hit rate of around 96% and a
false alarm rate of around 50%. Participant C, as shown in Figure 3.5, requires a
lot of evidence to say that a conclusion is valid, and so has a conservative response
criterion. Their hit rate is around 40%, but false alarm rate is only 5%. Traditional
analyses would show these participants varying significantly in terms of accuracy,
with accuracy scores of 29%, 46% and 35% respectively. However, as can be seen
in the SDT diagrams, their accuracy is the same, but they do differ in the levels of
response bias shown.
c
Figure 3.3: Plot showing example signal and noise distributions where the response
criterion sets hits to 99% and false alarms to 70%
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c
Figure 3.4: Plot showing example signal and noise distributions where the response
criterion sets hits to 96% and false alarms to 50%
c
Figure 3.5: Plot showing example signal and noise distributions where the response
criterion sets hits to 40% and false alarms to 5%
3.2.4 ROC Curves
An SDT approach therefore allows deeper insight into task performance. Graphical
approaches, such as ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves allow us to
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plot an individual’s accuracy whilst taking into account their response criterion;
and example can be seen in Figure 3.6. ROC curves are constructed by plotting
the proportion of false alarms on the x axis and proportion of hits on the y axis.
If multiple individuals’ scores fit on the same curve at different points, as shown
in Figure 3.6, then they have the same accuracy but different response criteria.
The more bowed towards the top left the ROC curve, the higher the sensitivity.
Chance-level performance results in a ROC curve which falls along the central
diagonal. In the next section, I will explain the calculation of SDT measures,
followed by a discussion of how these can be extended to data in which participants
provide ratings of subjective confidence.


















Figure 3.6: Plot of example ROC curve
SDT Statistics
Sensitivity, or accuracy, is measured using 𝑑′ (d prime), the discrimination index
and is calculated thus:
𝑑′ = 𝑧(𝐻)− 𝑧(𝐹 ) (3.1)
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That is, we work out the (one-tailed) z value that corresponds to the proportion
of false alarms, and deduct it from the z value for the proportion of hits. If we plot
𝑧(𝐻) against 𝑧(𝐹 ), we get what is known as a zROC.
Figure 3.7 shows a ROC curve and its equivalent zROC, that is, the values
from the ROC curve transformed into z scores and plotted on a graph. A line can
then be fitted to these value to examine a number of things about the model. If
the points fit the straight line well, it shows that the model is a good fit. If the
line is at a 45 degree angle, this would indicate the suitability of an equal variance
model, otherwise an unequal variance model is necessary.
The slope of a zROC, 𝑠, represents the ratios of standard distributions of the
signal-plus-noise and noise distributions. One of the assumptions of the 𝑑′ statistic
is that the variances of the two distributions are equal, and so values of 𝑠 other
than 1 imply that this assumption has been violated. Dube, Rotello & Heit (2010)
argue that s is often found to be values other than 1 in reasoning experiments, and
so an unequal-variance adjusted version of 𝑑′ should be used.
The unequal-variance SDT model takes into account the differences between






where 𝑠 is the SD of the signal-plus-noise distribution (the SD of the noise dis-
tribution is fixed at 1) and 𝑑2’ is the sensitivity of the signal-plus-noise distribution.








One advantage of using 𝐴𝑧 is that its scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing
complete accuracy and 0.5 representing chance-level performance.
The response criterion, denoted simply as 𝑐, measures levels of response bias.
Negative values of 𝑐 represent a liberal response bias, whereas positive values of 𝑐
represent a conservative response bias. 𝑐 is calculated thus:
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𝑐 = −0.5[𝑧(𝐻) + 𝑧(𝐹 )] (3.4)
In the case of unequal-variance SDT models, as with the sensitivity measure,
the criterion measure is also adjusted.
𝑐𝑎 =
−√2𝑠√
1 + 𝑠2(1 + 𝑠)
[𝑧(𝐻) + 𝑧(𝐹 )] (3.5)
3.2.5 Empty cell adjustments
When calculating the above measures, an adjustment must be made for proportions
of hits or false alarms of 0 or 1, as the z scores of these would be −∞ and ∞
respectively, making the rest of the solution mathematically intractable. A common
solution to this problem is to add or deduct a frequency of 1 observation or a
smaller fraction of an observation to values of 0 or 1. Wickens (2002) highlights
the fact that these possible adjustment strategies are all equally valid. Following
the recommendation of Snodgrass & Corwin (1988) that whatever correction is
made, it should be applied to all cells and not just those containing values of 0 and
1, the following adjustment will be made:
𝐻(𝑎𝑑𝑗) =




((𝐹 *𝑁) + 0.5)
(𝑁 + 1)
(3.7)
where 𝐻 and 𝐹 represent the proportion of hits out of total signal stimuli and
proportion of false alarms out of total noise stimuli respectively, and 𝑁 is the
number of items. The R code used to calculate the equations discussed above
applied to the research presented in this thesis can be found in Appendix B.
Wickens (2002) highlights the fact that analyses on aggregate sensitivity and
criterion placement scores will yield different results to analyses which instead
calculate these scores for each individual participant. It is argued that both
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approaches are legitimate, and therefore the aims of the research should inform
the decision as to which approach is used. However, Klauer & Kellen (2011) argue
that aggregate SDT models hide differences between individuals, rendering results
inaccurate. This view is supported by Trippas et al (2015), who argue that when
individual SDT models are compared to aggregate models, the individual models
tend to provide a better fit to the data. Trippas and colleagues conclude that this is
due to individual differences in reasoning strategies leading to analyses of aggregate
data being inappropriate, due to the extra variance introduced because of these
differences. This recommendation is reiterated by Cohen et al (2008), who argue
that aggregate analyses are useful when there are few data points per participant,
but individual analyses are preferential when this is not the case.
3.2.6 Confidence Rating ROCs
One of the central presumptions of SDT is that the ROC is curved. A curved ROC
indicates that the SDT approach is necessary, whereas a linear ROC would indicate
that an alternative approach, such as an MPT model may be more appropriate.
One way to test that a ROC is curved is to find a way of altering response bias,
whilst keeping accuracy constant. This has been demonstrated by Dube, Rotello &
Heit, 2010, who manipulated across conditions the expectations of participants of
the proportion of trials that will be signal-plus-noise trials, whilst leaving these
rates actually unchanged, and found evidence for curved ROCs, thus supporting
the use of the SDT model.
An alternative approach to this is to plot confidence-rating ROC curves. These
are generated by instructing participants to make both a binary response regarding
signal presence or absence, along with an expression of how confident they are in
their response. Then, the detection rate for each individual level of confidence
is calculated. For example, a binary choice experiment may require participants
to give a response of “yes” or “no”, along with a rating from 1-3 to indicate how
confident they are in their response, with a rating a 1 meaning “completely sure”
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and a rating of 3 indicating that their response is merely a guess. These responses
are then transformed to a scale from 1 to 6, with a rating of 1 corresponding a
response of “yes, completely sure” and a rating of 6 corresponding to “no, completely
sure”. The z score for each rating is then calculated by working out the z score
for the cumulative proportion of ratings. So for a rating of ‘1’, the proportion is
the number of ‘1’ rating score out of the total rating scores; for a rating of ‘2’, the
proportion is the number of ‘1’ and ‘2’ ratings out of the total, and so on. A line is
then fit between the z scores for the signal and noise distributions, and individual
sensitivity and response bias statistic shown in Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.5 can
be calculated, with the intercept and coefficient of the line corresponding to 𝑠 and
𝑑′2.
These calculated values correspond to the multiple criterion for the confidence
ratings, as can be seen in Figure 3.8. Here, there are 6 possible responses, and so
there are five different response criterion. This is expressed mathematically as:
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𝑃 (“1”|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑) = 𝜑 (−𝑐1)
𝑃 (“2”|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑) = 𝜑 (−𝑐2)− 𝜑 (−𝑐1)
𝑃 (“3”|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑) = 𝜑 (−𝑐3)− 𝜑 (−𝑐2)
𝑃 (“4”|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑) = 𝜑 (−𝑐4)− 𝜑 (−𝑐3)
𝑃 (“5”|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑) = 𝜑 (−𝑐5)− 𝜑 (−𝑐4)
𝑃 (“6”|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑) = 𝜑 (𝑐5)
(3.8)
Note that the equations are actually identical for the invalid and valid distri-
butions, but as the calculation involved setting 𝜇𝑖 to 0 and 𝜎𝑖 to 1, these terms
become redundant.
One possible problem with using confidence rating ROCs arises when partici-
pants do not use the full range of the rating scale, rating their confidence as equal
on all or most trials. In this case, even with the empty cell adjustment discussed
above, the confidence rating ROC will be a poor fit, and not accurately reflect the
data. Here, the model should be treated as an equal variance model, and d prime
calculated.
A further criticism of ROC and SDT methods is that, due to the need for a
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number of confidence ratings across multiple participants, they require relatively
large amount of data.
3.3 Mixed Effects Models
The analyses presented in this thesis utilise mixed effects regression models. Mixed
effects model are also known as hierarchical regression models, multilevel models,
or linear mixed models, and are an extension of fixed effects models. They allow
for the inclusion of random effects and can be preferable to fixed effect models as
they account for variability caused by taking multiple measurements from the same
participants. In the case of the experiments presented in this thesis, they allow to
examine the effects of numerous interventions on reasoning, whilst, to some extent,
taking into account individual differences.
Mixed effects models can be specified as Level 1 and Level 2 models to account
for the grouping nature of the data.
The Level 1 model for a random intercept model can be specified as:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑥1𝑖𝑗 + ... + 𝛽𝑛𝑗𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is response 𝑖 for individual 𝑗, 𝛽0𝑗 is the individual-specific intercept
and explained further in the level 2 model. The slope coefficients 𝛽𝑛𝑗𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑗 are the
parameters for the other covariates. This model differs from fixed-effects models,
as each individual has their own error term, 𝜖𝑖𝑗.
The level two model can be expressed as:
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝑈0𝑗
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10
The parameter 𝛽0𝑗 is the same as is in the level 1 model. It is compromised
of 𝛾00, the grand mean, also known as the level 2 intercept, which is the mean
for all individual data points. The other term, 𝑈0𝑗, is the error term for level 2,
effectively, the individual deviation from the grand mean. The term 𝛾10 is the
value for covariate 𝛽1𝑗 and in the case of a random intercept model has no random
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component itself.
The above formulation only includes random intercepts; however, if we wished
to include random slopes, for example, on the covariate 𝛽1𝑗 , the level 1 model would
remain the same, but level 2 model would be expressed as:
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝑈0𝑗
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝑈1𝑗
where 𝑈1𝑗 is individual deviation from fixed slope effect 𝛾10.
One advantage of fitting a mixed effects model to the data is that it allows us to
fit both overall and individual intercepts and slopes to the data. Fixed-effects can
be used to assess the effects of factors such as different experimental conditions, and
are interpretable in the same way as they are in general linear models, generalised
linear models, and ANOVA models. Random effects allow us to account for other
variance and error due to differences between individuals. The inclusion of random
intercepts in a model allow us to assess the impact of, for example, an experimental
condition, but takes into account individual variance when assessing how much
variance in the data that factor accounts for.
The inclusion of random slopes allow us to assess whether the effects of covariates
on dependent variables differ between individuals. For example, in Experiment 1,
we can examine whether the changes over time are the same for all participants
or differ from person to person. This is done by including a random slope for the
variable ‘session’.
Random slopes and intercepts may be correlated or uncorrelated. If uncorrelated,
there is variance between scores and variance between susceptibility to interventions,
but no link between the two. However, if these random effects are correlated, it
could mean, for example, that participants with a higher initial score show more
improvement over time.
Another advantage of mixed effects modelling over the traditional approach of
repeated measures analysis of variances (RM-ANOVA) is that it allows a greater
variety of outcome variables. Whilst RM-ANOVA only permits continuous variables
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as dependent variables, mixed effects modelling allows discrete, categorical and
ordinal data, amongst others. In addition, mixed-effect models allow continuous
variables as predictors, which RM-ANOVA does not. Although such variables
can be transformed into categorical variables (e.g. ‘high ability’ vs. ‘low ability’
grouping), this leads to a potential loss of information with fixed effects which would
have been significant if entered as continuous often showing up as non-significant
when transformed to categorical variables (Cohen, 1983).
As data is analysed in the long format rather than wide format, mixed effects
modelling can accommodate missing data, in cases where participants drop out
part way through the study.
As mentioned earlier, traditional analyses of belief bias data involves calculating
logic, belief, and interaction indices for each participant. These aggregations
transform the binary data into a format which can then be used in an ANOVA.
However, this aggregation leads to some loss of information, and as mixed effects
models can accommodate binary responses, we are able to fit a model to the
individual responses. In addition, we are now able to better explore the effects of
materials, i.e. the specific syllogisms and their content.
3.3.1 Assumptions
Mixed effects model operate under a number of assumptions, which I will discuss
below. One assumption of mixed effects models is that of linearity - the relationship
between variables is linear in nature. Furthermore, it is assumed that the error
terms are normally distributed and also that there is homogeneity of variance -
population variances are equal. In addition, there is an assumptions of independence
- scores are independent of one another. In this case, multiple scores are taken from
the same participant, however, this is accounted for in the models, and would only
be problematic if the score from one participant was dependent on the score from
another participant. Graphical and statistical methods will be used to ensure that
these assumptions have not been violated.
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3.3.2 Multicollinearity
One potential problem when modelling large numbers of variables is that of multi-
collinearity; when independent variables are correlated with one another, typically
with r>0.8. To account for this, the correlations between the individual differences
measures will be calculated and reported, and all such variables will be centred
around zero by deducting the mean from each individual score. This reduces issues
caused by multicollinearity, and also makes interactions between variables simpler
to interpret.
3.3.3 Model Comparison
The mixed effects models presented in this thesis were fitted using the lme4 package
(Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011) in the R Environment for Statistical Computing
(R Development Core Team, 2009). The p-values for the fixed effects were calculated
using likelihood-ratio tests, which compare the deviance of the model with and
without the effect being tested against a chi-square distribution with K df, where K
is the number of extra parameters in the more complex model being proposed. The
comparison of fixed effects was done on models which specified in the syntax that
REML=FALSE. This is based upon a recommendation by Pinheiro & Bates (2000)
for models which vary in terms of fixed effects but not random effects. The default
setting of REML=TRUE modifies the calculations by making restricted maximum
likelihood calculations, and is only applicable for cases of model comparison where
models vary in terms of random effects, the variance of which needs to be accounted
for.
Although the selection of fixed effects can be done using the LRT, this test has
been argued to be inappropriate for the selection of random effects, as it has been
shown to be biased in some cases, and produces p values which are too conservative,
leading to the rejection of random effects which should be included in the model
(Stram & Lee, 1994). An alternative method of selection random effects is to use a
bootstrap method.
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This method calculates restricted likelihood-ratio tests, and calculates the p
values for the random effects by simulating the data for both the reduced and full
model in order to calculate a p value derived from the deviances of both the models.
This method, termed the ‘slow bootstrap’ can be computationally intensive and
time-consuming, and a quicker version, the ‘fast bootstrap’ designed by Crainiceanu
& Ruppert (2004) has been implemeted in R software under the RLRsim package
(Scheipl, Greven & Kuckenhoff, 2008). However, this version of the bootstrap does
not allow for correlated random effects, and so these will be tested for using the
slow bootstrap. The code used for the slow bootstrap is adapted from code found
in Long (2012) and can be found in Appendix B.
All models presented in this thesis use the following procedure to select the
best fitting model. A step-up approach is used, which begins with a null model and
then iteratively adds main effects and their interactions, with only the statistically
significant terms being retained in the model. A theory-driven approach is taken
in specifying interaction effects in order to avoid spurious results that may occur if
a data-driven, often termed ‘data dredging’ approach is taken. As recommended
by Long (2012), the selection of fixed effects and random effects are conducted
separately. This is of most importance in Experiment 1 (Chapter 4), in which
data is taken not only from multiple participants, but also on multiple occasions
from the same participants. In this case, the recommendations of Wallace & Green
(2002) were followed - the fixed effects were first evaluated, using models which
contained a random intercept, but no random slope. Once the final fixed effects
model had been chosen, the inclusion of random slopes was tested for significance.
If this was statistically significant, the fixed effects were tested once again to assess
whether the inclusion of random slopes had an impact upon their significance, and
fixed effects terms were removed if necessary.
In Experiments 2 and 3 (Chapter 5 and 6), there is no longitudinal nature to
the data, and all participants give numerous measurements on a single occasion.
Thus, the inclusion of random intercepts for each of the participants is automatic,
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as this reflects the repeated-measures nature of the data.
3.3.4 Selection of Fixed Effects
In the case of categorical response variables, for which a logistic mixed effects
regression model is fitted, Wald p-values will be reported.
However, p-values for continuous response variables are calculated using the
t-distribution which requires a value for the degrees of freedom. There is ambiguity
as to what constitutes an appropriate degrees of freedom in a mixed effects (Pinheiro
& Bates, 2000). Thus, for continuous response variables, a likelihood ratio test will
be used, and the reported p value will be that returned when comparing the model
with the effect in question and the model without that effect.
The likelihood ratio test can be expressed as:
𝜒2 = 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙
and compares the log-likelihoods of the two models being assessed. This is
assumed to approximate the chi-square distribution and so a p value can be
generated, with degrees of freedom (df) being calculated from the df for the
alternative model minus the df for the null model.
It should be noted that the LR test can only be used when comparing nested
models, and so the models constructed here will be developed using a stepwise
approach in order to fulfil this requirement.
3.4 Summary
It is only recently that the importance of considering both reasoning and response
bias in analysing belief bias data has been fully acknowledged by researchers in
this field. Research has shown that traditional analyses are misleading as they
conflate response bias with reasoning bias. The analyses presented in this thesis
will also examine the results of traditional analyses, and discuss the degree to
which conclusions drawn from these results differ from those drawn from the SDT
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analysis.
In addition to accuracy scores, response times and confidence ratings will
also be considered. It has been argued that response accuracy does not provide
sufficient information to acquire an in-depth view of the processes underlying belief
bias. Stupple & Ball (2014) advocate what they term a ”multi-method approach”,
and emphasise the importance of triangulation, that is, considering a number of
different methods. Given that the focus of this thesis is debiasing reasoning, such
an approach is necessary in ascertaining the specific nature of any shift in strategy
applied by participants.
Response times will be analysed to attempt to determine whether a change in
these can be brought about by debiasing interventions. This is with the caveat that
a change or lack of change in response times is not directly indicative of strategy
alteration; if indeed it is the type of processing and not the amount of processing
that affects performance, as predicted by selective processing theory, this may not
be reflected in the response times. Nevertheless, these measures are important
in terms of triangulation of available data, and still may give some indication of
processing demands, and changes in response times between sessions, for example,
may give additional insight into the effect a given intervention is having upon
reasoning. Given the importance of individual differences in determining how
problems are mentally represented, a change in response time could be taken to
indicate a difference in strategy, which may not be apparent in accuracy scores,
if, for example, participants are employing additional effort but have insufficient
cognitive capacity to arrive at the normatively correct answer.
Confidence ratings also play a crucial part in these analyses; some theories of
belief bias argue that it is metacognitive cues, such as the confidence with which a
response can be given, that governs whether a Type 1 or Type 2 response is given
(e.g. Thompson et al, 2013). Thus, this measure will be analysed both in terms
of the raw confidence ratings, and how such ratings corresponds with accuracy, in
order to evaluate whether debiasing interventions are effective in better calibrating
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response confidence.
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Figure 3.7: Plot showing example of a ROC and an equivalent zROC
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In Chapter 2, I discussed potential ways of debiasing reasoning, and the importance
of using SDT analyses in order to correctly distinguish between changes in reasoning
and changes in response bias. This chapter presents an experiment in which
immediate feedback is used in an attempt to reduce the extent of belief bias.
Feedback is one of the simpler potential debiasing methods as it can be automatically
generated and thus requires little time or effort to administer. It has been found to
be effective in improving cognitive processes in other domains, such as conditional
reasoning (Cheng et al., 1986) and analogical reasoning (Cheshire, Ball, & Lewis,
2005). It has been claimed that this is because it causes reasoners to engage in
self-reflection, which is key to their strategy development (Ball, Hoyle, & Towse,
2010). Feedback is also thought to lead to higher levels of motivation and more
effortful strategies used by learners, even in studies spanning multiple sessions
during trials where participants are aware that they will later be given feedback
on their answers, but feedback has not yet been given (Vollmeyer & Rheinberg,
2005). It should be noted that feedback does not always lead to improvements in
performance; Kluger and Denisi (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of 607 studies
which involved a variety of different feedback interventions. They highlight how
feedback interventions can produce mixed results depending on the specific nature,
relevance and timing of the feedback, and that in some cases, feedback interventions
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can lead to deficits in performance. Carroll and Kay (1988) found that for complex
tasks involving learning to use a novel computer program, the provision of feedback
can interfere with the learning of the task itself, and Jacoby et al (1984) found that
more able participants tend to ignore overly simple feedback when completing a task
involving discovering underlying rules in a decision-making problem. Kluger and
Denisi (1996) argue that one of the main ways in which feedback affects performance
is in shifting some focus from the task to the individual; however, too much of
this can lead to decreased performance. For example, Mikulincer, Glaubman,
Ben-Artzi, and Grossman (1991) found that although feedback led to improved
performance on a simple memory task, it led to a decrease in performance on a
complex memory task which placed greater demands on cognitive resources. They
also highlight how evidence suggests that feedback can increase motivation in task
performance, but may be disadvantageous when the removal of such feedback leads
to a decrease in motivation (e.g. Komaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980). Roberts
and Newton (2003) distinguish between partial feedback (i.e. correct/incorrect)
and full feedback (presenting both an indicator of accuracy along with the correct
answer), and highlight how partial feedback tends to have very little effect on
improving performance on certain tasks, but full feedback can be much more
effective. Empirical evidence supporting this comes from Newton and Roberts
(2000), who administered the compass direction task, a task in which participants
are asked to work out where a person would end up relative to their initial location
after a number of directions such as “they take one step north” and “they take
one step west”. Full feedback led to a higher chance of participants developing a
new strategy than partial feedback. Previous research has investigated the use of
feedback in reducing belief bias. Ball (2013) found that evaluative feedback, that
is, simple “correct”/“incorrect” feedback was useful in reducing the level of bias
shown by participants, and even those who did not receive any feedback showed
some increase in performance over time. This is contrary to the predictions of
Roberts & Newton, as participants in the study by Ball (2013) were not shown
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the original problem alongside the corrective feedback. Ball found that feedback
had an immediate effect in reducing belief bias, and it was concluded that this was
because the provision of feedback led to a rapid strategy change and decreased
reliance on belief to guide reasoning. However, no measures of confidence were
taken, and traditional logic, belief and interaction indices were examined rather
than SDT measures of accuracy, and so it is unclear whether this change was rooted
in accuracy or response bias. Ball (2013) used a microgenetic design (Siegler, 1995),
which is more commonly used in developmental studies, and involves repeated
testing of the same participants over a short period of time. Siegler and Chen
(1998) argue that it is useful as the intensive testing allows insight into changes in
strategy over time, and thus allows for a more in-depth exploration than simply
comparing separate conditions during a single session. Therefore, a similar design
will be used here in order to allow an examination of strategy change over time.
Although it has been demonstrated that feedback can improve performance in
other reasoning tasks, such as analogical reasoning (Cheshire et al, 2005), there
has been little research assessing the impact of feedback on belief bias, with Ball
(2013) claiming novelty for the use of this manipulation. The present experiment
also is a novel approach, with there being no previous research assessing the effects
of feedback on the belief bias effect with an SDT analysis.
Predictions
Theories of belief bias suggested by Dube et al (2010) argue that belief bias
manifests as predominantly a response bias. However, given that the syllogisms
presented in this study are complex syllogisms, which elicit the reasoning stage
effect of belief bias (Trippas et al, 2013), it is predicted that belief bias will initially
have an effect on both reasoning and response bias for participants in both the
feedback and no feedback conditions. Given that the rapid feedback should alert
participants to the fact that their reliance on this heuristic leads to inaccurate
responding, it is predicted that feedback will lead to a decrease in response bias.
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 1 77
Stanovich (2009) discusses the importance of both the reasoner’s tendency to engage
in complex reasoning, and their capacity to do so. Given that even when cognitive
ability is accounted for, differences in reasoning accuracy are still predicted by the
cognitive style of the individual and how likely they are to engage in more reflecting
thinking, the provision of feedback may override many reasoners’ natural tendency
towards cognitive miserliness, and lead to improved performance, reflected in higher
accuracy and longer response times. Previous research has shown that participants
tend to show longer response latencies for conflict problems, that is, those in which
a response made on the basis of logic would be different to a response given upon
the basis of believability (Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2012). Valid-unbelievable and
invalid-believable problems are both conflict problems, although the effect of longer
response latencies is more pronounced on the latter (Stupple et al., 2011). This
increase in response time has been attributed to the recognition of the conflict,
and increase in the type of processing that is necessary to validate a potential
response. It is unclear whether feedback will lead to an increase or decrease in
response times. On the one hand, feedback could increase response times, as
participants become more adept at recognising such problems and employing more
effort to come to a correct answer. Alternatively, feedback may lead to decreased
response times, as participants learn to solve such problems by simply engaging
in logical reasoning and ignoring belief based cues. However, given that such cues
are automatically generated and still need to be suppressed, it seems more likely
that any increase in accuracy will be coupled with longer response times. The
importance of metacognitive cues in determining whether an analytic or a heuristic
response is given is discussed by Thompson, Prowse-Turner, et al. (2013), who
found that the more confident reasoners are in their initial heuristic response, the
less likely they are to give a result consistent with further, analytic, processing.
Thus, feedback may affect reasoning by alerting reasoners to the fact that their
initial confidence is not an effective predictor of their response accuracy, especially
for conflict problems. This leads to the prediction that for the feedback group,
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there will be an initial decrease in confidence, as participants realise that their
reliance on believability leads to incorrect responding. However, if their accuracy
increases, it is predicted that this will be accompanied by an increase in confidence
as a more appropriate strategy is applied, and participants become aware of their
improved performance as verified by the feedback that they are receiving.
4.1 Method
Participants
The participants were 48 undergraduate students from Lancaster University who
took part in exchange for $18.50. No information on age or gender balance was
collected. None had formal training or study in logic or the psychology of reasoning.
Design
Feedback was manipulated between-participants (feedback vs. no feedback) with
half of the participants randomly allocated to each condition. Conclusion validity
(valid vs. invalid), conclusion believability (believable vs. unbelievable) and session
(1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) were within-participants variables.
Materials
Five sets of categorical syllogisms were constructed, which were identical to those
used by Ball (2013), plus an additional set. Each set contained 64 syllogisms 16 dif-
ferent subsets of content appeared once each as valid-believable, valid-unbelievable,
invalid-believable and an invalid-unbelievable problem. Within each set, half of the
premises were in EI mood, and the other half in IE mood, with all conclusions in
the O mood. These particular moods were used to prevent confounds relating to
syllogistic structure (see Chapter 2), and in order to be comparable to the results of
similar studies which used these moods. Only figures one (ABBC) and two (BACB)
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were used, for the same reason. Each set contained equal numbers of syllogisms in
the different combination of premise mood, figure and conclusion order, to prevent
these variables acting as confounds.
The terms (i.e. the specific words which are substituted for ’A’, ’B’ and ’C’ in
the above description) in each set of syllogisms were unique to that particular set.
Each set was divided into four different subsets so that all content appeared in
a different validity and believability combination in each subset. For illustrative
purposes, a table containing a single set of syllogisms divided into four subsets can
be found in Appendix A.
For the first four sessions, the ordering of sets and subsets presented to each
participant was randomised. The subset presented during the final session was the
same across all participants in order to ensure that any effects arising at the final
stage of testing were not materials-specific.
The materials were rated for conclusion believability 20 independent raters.
Once again, these raters were students at Lancaster University. Each conclusion
was presented as a sentence on its own on a computer screen and raters were asked
to provide an assessment of believability by clicking a radio button. Believability
was rated on a scale from -3 (totally unbelievable) to +3 (totally believable) in
increments of 1. Once a rating had been given for a sentence, the next sentence was
displayed on screen. Two conclusions which were rated between -1 and +1 were
replaced with new conclusions which had ratings outside these boundaries. The
mean believability for believable problems was 2.20 (SD=0.56) and for unbelievable
problems was -2 (SD=0.29).
In addition to the categorical syllogisms, a set of conditional syllogisms was
constructed in order to assess whether any changes in reasoning on the categorical
syllogisms as a result of feedback would transfer to another task. The conditional
syllogisms were similar to the double conditionals constructed by Santamara et
al (1998) and were controlled and randomised in the same way as the categorical
syllogisms. These were similar in structure (i.e. mood and figure) to the categorical
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syllogisms, but contained conditional statements; for example:
If David has a cup of tea, then David’s room gets messy.
If David tidies his room, then David has a cup of tea.
Therefore, if David’s room gets messy, then David tidies his room.
Procedure
Testing took place across the course of 5 sessions, which took place on alternate days
across the course of two weeks. Participants were given the following instructions:
This is an experiment to test peoples reasoning ability. In this experi-
ment, you will be given sixteen problems in total. For each problem you
will be shown two premises and a conclusion. You must presume that
the two premises are definitely true, and judge whether the conclusion
logically follows on from them or not.
Here is an example problem:
All humans are mortal
All Greeks are human
Therefore, all Greeks are mortal.
You will be asked to click either yes” or “no” to indicate whether you
think the conclusion follows on from the two sentences. In this case,
the answer would be “yes”.
You will also be asked, on a scale from 0 to 10, how sure you are that
you have answered correctly. 0 indicates that you don’t know at all and
your response was a guess, and 10 means that you are totally sure that
your answer was correct.
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There will be a pause for ten seconds after you have made a response
for the answer and how sure you are. The statement will remain on
screen, along with your response.
If you are in the feedback condition, during sessions 2, 3, and 4, the
word “correct” or “incorrect” will also be displayed on screen.
After 10 seconds has elapsed, the next problem will be shown. Please
ensure your phone is on silent, and if you have any questions about the
experiment or any details of the task, feel free to ask them now.”
The experiment was conducted using software written in Java. Upon confirming
that they understood the instructions and were ready to begin, participants clicked
a button marked ‘start’ on the computer screen. The first syllogism then appeared
in the centre of the screen, with the question “Does the conclusion necessarily follow
from the first two statements” underneath and a pair of buttons labelled “yes” and
“no” further down. Beneath this the question “how sure are you that you have
answered correctly?” was displayed, with an accompanying set of radio buttons
from 0 to 10 with which participants indicated their confidence in their response,
with 0 indicating a guess and 10 indicating total confidence in their response.
Once a validity choice and confidence rating had been given, the chosen buttons
were highlighted, and the screen paused for ten seconds, before displaying the
next syllogism. During this pause, the syllogism and the participant’s responses
remained on screen. For those in the feedback condition, during sessions two to
four only, the word “correct” or “incorrect” was also displayed at the bottom of
the screen during the pause between trials. After ten seconds had elapsed, the
screen went blank for a second, and then the process was repeated with the next
syllogism.
During session five, after completing the final categorical syllogistic reasoning
task, participants also completed the conditional syllogistic reasoning task. No
feedback was given to any participant on this task.
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4.2 Results
Endorsement Rates
Figure 4.1 shows the mean proportion of conclusions of each type endorsed in











































Figure 4.1: Plot of mean endorsement rates by session number, problem type, and
feedback status
response variable was conclusion endorsement (whether the participant responded
with ”valid” or not) and the explanatory variables were feedback condition, validity,
believability, and session.
Validity was significant; more valid conclusions were accepted than invalid
Table 4.1: Parameter Values for Main Task Endorsement Rate Model
Variable 𝛽 SE z Wald-p
Session -0.032 0.050 -0.649 0.516
Feedback -0.070 0.276 -0.253 0.800
Validity (valid) 2.909 0.280 10.401 < 0.001
Believability (believable) 1.309 0.102 12.792 < 0.001
Validity * Believability -1.619 0.157 -10.305 < 0.001
Session * Feedback -0.137 0.0715 -1.911 0.056
Valid * Session -0.068 0.079 -0.863 0.388
Valid * Feedback -0.514 0.367 -1.399 0.162
Valid * Session * Feedback 0.270 0.110 2.447 0.014
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conclusions, 𝜒2(1) = 754.44, p<0.001. Believable conclusions were endorsed more
than unbelievable conclusions, 𝜒2(1) = 57.05, p<0.001.
There was a significant interaction between validity and believability, 𝜒2(1) =
106.82, p<0.001. For valid problems, a conclusion was less likely to be accepted if it
was believable, 𝜒2(1) = 7.133, p=0.007. However, for invalid problems, believable
conclusions led to higher endorsement rates, 𝜒2(1) = 187.44, p<0.001. No other
two-way interactions were observed.
A three-way interaction was found between session, feedback, and validity, 𝜒2(4)
= 11.17, p=0.02. For valid problems, there was no interaction between session
and feedback, 𝜒2(1) = 2.63, p=0.10. However, for invalid problems, the session by
feedback interaction was marginally significant, 𝜒2(1) = 3.52, p=0.06. For invalid
problems, session did not have a significant effect in the no feedback condition,
𝜒2(1) = 0.42, p=0.52. However, for invalid problems in the feedback condition, less
conclusions were endorsed as time passed, 𝜒2(1) =10.46, p=0.001.
The fit of the model was not improved by the inclusion of random slopes, 𝜒2(1)
= 0.00, p=1.00.
SDT Measures
ROC curves for the feedback and no feedback conditions for all five sessions can
be found in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 respectively. Both of these figures show
curved ROCs for most problem types during most sessions. The location of the
ROC curves is higher for unbelievable when compared with believable problems,
indicating the possibility of higher accuracy on these problems.
The SDT measures were calculated using the method discussed in Chapter 3.
The resulting accuracy and response criterion measures were then analysed using a
mixed effects model. The response variables were accuracy and response criterion,
and explanatory variables were feedback, session, and believability.
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Figure 4.2: ROC curves by session and believability for feedback condition
Accuracy
Figure 4.4 shows the accuracy scores. Participants responded more accurately to
unbelievable than believable conclusions, 𝜒2(1) = 39.48, p<0.001. No other main
effects or their interactions were statistically significant. Model parameters can be
seen in Table 4.2.
Response Criterion
Figure 4.5 shows the response criteria. There was a main effect of believability,
𝜒2(1) = 35.85, p<0.001, with participants having a more liberal response criterion
for believable problems.
For the response criteria, there was a marginally significant interaction between
Table 4.2: Parameter Values for Main Task Accuracy Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -0.083 0.013 -6.42 0.001
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Figure 4.4: Mean accuracy scores by believability and feedback group status
feedback and belief, 𝜒2(1) = 3.43, p=0.06. For the believable problems, participants
in the feedback group had a more conservative response criterion, 𝜒2(1) = 4.17,
p=0.04. However, for the unbelievable problems, there was no difference between
the two groups, 𝜒2(1) = 0.42, p=0.52. Model parameters can be found in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.5: Mean response bias scores by believability and feedback condition
Response Times
Figure 4.6 shows the response times. There was a main effect of session, 𝜒2(1) =
53.08, 𝑝 <0.001, with response times decreasing across the five sessions. Validity
was significant, 𝜒2(1) = 97.90, 𝑝 <0.001, with participants responding faster to
valid than invalid problems. Believability had an effect, 𝜒2(1) = 39.77, 𝑝 <0.001,
with participants taking longer to respond to believable problems. Feedback was
not significant, 𝜒2(1) = 0.99, p=0.3191. No two-way or higher order interactions
between the main effects were significant.
Correlated random slopes improved the model, 𝜒2(2) = 88.56, 𝑝 <0.001, in-
dicating that there was a significant amount of variation between participants’
response times, and those who had an initially longer response time showed a
greater increase in response time across the five sessions. Parameter values can be
found in Table 4.4.
There were no effects of accuracy or response criterion on response time.
Table 4.3: Parameter Values for Main Task SDT Response Bias Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -0.279 0.050 -5.639 < 0.001
Feedback (present) 0.052 0.077 0.067 0.089
Believability * Feedback 0.130 0.070 1.850 0.064

















Figure 4.6: Response times by problem type
Confidence
Figure 4.7 shows the confidence ratings across time for both groups. There were no
main effects of feedback or session on confidence. Participants were more confident
in the responses they gave to valid problems, 𝜒2(1) = 154.61, p<0.01, and less
confident in responses given to believable problems, 𝜒2(1) = 8.53, p<0.01.
There was a two-way interaction between validity and believability. For valid
problems, believability had no effect on confidence rating. However, for invalid
problems, believability led to lower confidence ratings, 𝜒2(1) = 29.10, p<0.01.
Validity and feedback, also interacted. Splitting the data by validity revealed
no significant effects; that is, for both the valid and invalid problems, the feedback
group were no more confident than the no feedback group. However, when split
by feedback, participants who were given feedback were more confident of their
responses to valid than invalid problems, 𝜒2(1) = 49.33, p<0.01. The same pattern
was observed for the no feedback group, 𝜒2(1) = 110.78, p<0.01; however, the
Table 4.4: Parameter Values for Main Task Response Times Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Session -0.102 0.011 -9.75 < 0.001
Validity (valid) -0.143 0.014 -10.01 < 0.001
Believability (believable) 0.092 0.014 6.41 < 0.001
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differences between the two problem types were much greater.
There was a significant interaction between session and feedback; participants
who were not given feedback became more confident of their responses across time,
𝜒2(1) = 4.67, p=0.03, whereas participants who were given feedback became less
confident of their answers across time, 𝜒2(1) = 16.85, p<0.01.
There was a three way interaction between validity, session, and feedback. For
valid problems, the interaction between session and feedback was not significant.
However, for invalid problems, the interaction between session and feedback was
significant, 𝜒2(3) = 24.63, p<0.01. Breaking this down by feedback group, on the
invalid problems, confidence ratings increased across time for the no feedback group,
𝜒2(1) = 8.27, p<0.01, t=2.88. However, the feedback group became less confident
on invalid problems across time, 𝜒2(1) = 16.93, p<0.01. Parameter values can be
found in Table 4.5.
Final Session
The results from the final session were analysed separately in order to see whether
they differ from the above results which explore change over time.
Table 4.5: Parameter Values for Main Task Confidence Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Validity (valid) 0.916 0.173 5.310 < 0.001
Believability (believable) -0.397 0.0704 -5.634 < 0.001
Session 0.111 0.035 3.150 0.196
Feedback (present) 0.557 0.411 1.355 0.360
Session * Feedback -0.255 0.050 -5.113 < 0.001
Validity * Feedback -0.840 0.234 -3.594 0.018
Validity * Believability 0.353 0.010 3.545 < 0.001
Validity * Session -0.109 0.050 -2.196 0.385
Validity * Session * Feedback 0.190 0.070 2.706 0.024














































Figure 4.7: Confidence ratings by problem type and feedback condition
Endorsement Rates
Validity was significant, 𝑧 = 8.412, 𝑝 < 0.001, with more valid than invalid problems
being accepted. Believability was also significant, 𝑧 = 5.409, 𝑝 < 0.001, with more
believable than unbelievable problems accepted. Feedback was also significant,
𝑧 = −3.209, 𝑝 = 0.001, with the feedback group endorsing less conclusions.
Validity and believability interacted, 𝑧 = −4.855, 𝑝 < 0.001; for valid problems,
there was no effect of believability, 𝑧 = −1.773, 𝑝 = 0.076, whereas for invalid prob-
lems believable conclusions were accepted more often than unbelievable conclusions,
𝑧 = 1.667, 𝑝 < 0.001. Validity and feedback also interacted, 𝑧 = 3.302, 𝑝 < 0.001;
for valid problems, there was no effect of feedback, 𝑧 = 0.918, 𝑝 = 0.358, whereas for
invalid problems, feedback led to lower rates of acceptance, 𝑧 = −2.198, 𝑝 = 0.028.
SDT - Accuracy
Only believability significantly predicted accuracy; 𝜒2(1) = 7.431, 𝑝 = 0.006, with
participants responding more accurately to unbelievable problems.
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SDT - Response Bias
Believability also predicted response bias, 𝜒2(1) = 4.433, 𝑝 = 0.035, with a more
liberal bias on believable problems.
Response Times
Participants who were given feedback during sessions 2 to 4 showed longer response
times to problems during session 5, 𝜒2(1) = 4.929, 𝑝 = 0.026. Participants took
longer to respond to invalid problems, 𝜒2(1) = 23.913, 𝑝 < 0.001. Believable
problems were answered more slowly than unbelievable problems, 𝜒2(1) = 7.632, 𝑝 =
0.006.
Confidence Ratings
Participants were more confident on their answers to valid problems, 𝑧 = 6.501, 𝑝 <
0.001. Believable problems also led to lower confidence, 𝑧 = −3.578, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Conditional Reasoning Task
Endorsement Rates
The results from the final task containing the conditional reasoning problems
were examined using linear mixed models. Valid problems were more likely to be
accepted than invalid problems, 𝜒2(1) = 28.28, p<0.001. Believable problems were
more likely to be accepted than unbelievable problems, 𝜒2(1) = 11.67 p<0.001.
There was no effect of feedback, 𝜒2(1) = 1.67, p=0.20. Validity and believability
did not interact, 𝜒2(1) = 0.76, p=0.38. No two-way or higher order interactions
were significant.
SDT Measures
Mixed effects models were fitted to the accuracy and response criterion measures,
using feedback and believability as predictors. For the accuracy score, neither
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factors were significant (𝑝𝑠 > 0.05).
For the response criterion, participants had a more liberal response criterion for
believable than unbelievable conclusions, 𝜒2(1) = 11.71, p=0.001. Feedback was
not significant, and did not interact with believability.
Response Times
There was no difference between participants in terms of response times for the
two groups, and no effects of validity or believability.
There was a significant effect of accuracy on response time, with more accurate
responses leading to longer response times, 𝜒2(1) = 4.75, p=0.03. There were
no effects of feedback, believability or response criterion, and none of the effects
interacted.
Confidence Ratings
There were no effects of validity, believability, or feedback on confidence ratings,
and none of these factors interacted.
4.3 Discussion
This experiment aimed to investigate whether feedback is effective in reducing
belief bias. Feedback is not an effective intervention for reducing or eliminating
the reasoning component of the belief bias effect, although it does affect response
bias, as shown by the significant interaction between feedback and believability on
participants’ response criteria, but no effect on their reasoning accuracy. However,
the analysis of the final session alone shows that levels of response bias were similar
for both groups; whether this was due to the reduced statistical power of only
analysing responses from a single session, or due to a lack in difference between the
two groups, it is clear that feedback did not debias reasoning. The present research
adds to the growing body of evidence which suggests that using traditional analyses
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such as logic, belief, and interaction indices can lead to misleading results, conflating
reasoning and response and the SDT approach taken here is crucial in separating
these effects. Relying upon the analysis of raw endorsement rates may have led to
the conclusion that the decrease in acceptance of invalid problems across time for
the feedback group reflected a genuine improvement in reasoning. However, the
SDT analyses clearly show that giving participants feedback had no effect on their
reasoning accuracy, but did alter their response criteria, making them less likely to
endorse believable conclusions, but without reflecting any change in their ability to
distinguish between valid and invalid stimuli. The ROC curves also support the
use of the SDT model, as it can be seen that they are curved rather than linear in
shape, an indicator of the need for an SDT approach (Dube et al, 2010). The SDT
analyses showed a significant effect of belief on both accuracy and response bias.
These findings are at odds with a number of theories of belief bias which argue that
the belief bias effect is either a reasoning bias (e.g. selective scrutiny Evans et al,
1983; misinterpreted necessity Evans et al, 1983; mental models Oakhill et al, 1989;
metacognitive uncertainty Quayle and Ball, 2000) or response bias (e.g. Dube et
al, 2010), but not both. These findings are consistent with the model proposed by
Trippas et al (2013) which argues that belief bias manifests both as a reasoning and
response bias, with the former effect only occurring when complex reasoning takes
place. Feedback led to a more conservative response bias. In concordance with
Ball (2013), the effect of feedback was immediate, implying that the participants’
knowledge that they would be receiving feedback on their answers prompted a
strategy change. However, unlike the findings of Ball (2013), who concluded that
feedback improved reasoning, here the lack of change in accuracy shows that the
strategy change was suboptimal. The response time data also support this view;
one might expect that a change in reasoning strategy should be accompanied by a
change in response time to reflect the change in processing; however, this was not
the case, with there being no significant main effect of feedback nor any interactions
with any other variables. The only effect of feedback on response time was during
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the final session; however during this session no feedback was provided for either
group, so the longer responding may have been simply the consequence of using a
slightly different format. A possible limitation of this study is that the feedback
provided was not sufficiently detailed. Participants were shown the word “correct”
or “incorrect” on screen, along with the original problem and the answer that
they had selected. Although the feedback presented here is closer to what Roberts
and Newton (2003) term “full feedback” than “partial feedback”, as the accuracy
indicator is presented alongside the original problem. Although the correct answer
is not presented, given that the problem is binary choice, extrapolation of the
correct answer is simple. However, this aspect of presentation may still be important
in inducing effective strategy change. The standard belief bias effect of superior
performance on unbelievable problems was somewhat supported in both the SDT
and endorsement rate analyses; participants endorsed more invalid problems if they
were believable, and showed lower SDT accuracy scored for believable problems.
Surprisingly, however, it was also found that valid conclusions were less likely to
be endorsed if they were believable. Although this contradicts previous findings;
typically valid-believable and valid-unbelievable problems show similar levels of
endorsement (e.g. Evans et al, 1983; Ball et al, 2006; Klauer et al, 2000; Newstead
et al, 1992); it could be a further indication that participants were trying to change
their reasoning strategy to be less reliant on heuristics, but were unable to do
this in a sophisticated manner. This is supported by the disappearance of this
effect in the analysis of session 5 alone; believability only had an effect here on
invalid problems. An alternative interpretation is simply that the problematic
nature of endorsement rates leads to inconsistencies in the validity by believability
interaction; Heit and Rotello (2014) comment that it isn’t uncommon for there
to be variability in the interaction effect or lack of effect altogether on occasion
when using traditional measures. There were no effects of feedback on accuracy
or response times for the conditional syllogistic reasoning task. Given the lack of
effects of feedback in the categorical reasoning tasks, this is unsurprising. There
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may have also been intrinsic differences between the two tasks; there were no effects
of belief bias as a reasoning bias on the conditional syllogisms, but it did show
up as a response bias. Unpublished doctoral work by Solcz (2011) supports this
idea, showing evidence that the way in which reasoners evaluate premises and
conclusions is different for categorical and conditional syllogisms. The results of
the conditional reasoning task show further evidence of inconsistencies in the belief
bias effect as measured by traditional indices; no interaction between validity and
believability was found in the endorsement rate analysis; however, the SDT analysis
shows problem believability affecting response bias.
These results may seem to disagree somewhat with the claims of Thompson et
al (2013), who argue that a reasoner’s confidence in their response acts as a cue to
whether Type 2 processing takes place. Here, the decrease in confidence for the
feedback group did not lead to an increase in accuracy. However, the results do
not fully dispute this theory, as this link was found by Thompson et al to occur
when an answer and initial confidence rating were given immediately after the
presentation of an argument, presumably before complex processing could take
place, whereas here the confidence rating was given after an answer has been settled
on. Nevertheless, this does raise the question of whether the lack of improvement
in performance of participants in the feedback condition was due to a lack of
override of a Type 1 response, or if the override was successful, but a lack of
complete knowledge of the principles of logical necessity resulted in their continued
erroneous responses, with participants taking the presence of confirming model for
invalid believable problems as evidence of their validity. In other words, participants
presumed that the presence of a confirming model meant that the problem was valid,
rather than both the presence of a confirming model and absence of disconfirming
model. This view is consistent with claims by Stanovich and Stanovich (2010)
that it is ineffective to suppress a heuristic response when there is no alternative
to replace it. If there is a lack of knowledge of the rules or strategies needed to
successfully give a Type 2 response, a Type 1 response may be given instead; this
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is referred to by Stanovich as a “mindware gap” (Stanovich, 2009), and this will be
explored in more detail in the next chapter. Although feedback did not improve
reasoning across the five sessions in this experiment, it may play a useful purpose
in encouraging participants to engage in reflective behaviour. This is evidenced by
the divergence in confidence ratings for the two groups on invalid problems; whilst
participants who did not receive feedback became more confidence of their answers,
those who did receive feedback became less confident. Although no improvement
in reasoning was conferred from the provision of feedback, across a longer time
scale, the metacognitive change may lead individuals to further seek validation for
their reasoning. Another potential explanation for the lack of result of feedback is
individual differences between reasoners. There has been a growing awareness of
the need to examine individual differences in belief bias. In a rule-based learning
task, Kelley and McLaughlin (2012) found that participants with a higher cognitive
ability performed better with less intensive feedback, with this being reversed
for participants with a lower cognitive ability, and highlighted the importance
of an intervention being suitable for the individual learner. These results are
broadly in agreement with research by Heit and Rotello (2014), who conducted
research involving a different potential debiasing intervention which involved giving
participants altered instructions, which had been found in previous research to alter
the extent of the belief bias effect (Newstead et al, 1992). However, when Heit and
Rotello (2014) applied an SDT analyses to the results of their replication of this
experiment, they found that the altered instructions led to a change in response
bias but not reasoning accuracy. Given that the degree to which believability
affects reasoning can be moderated using manipulations of factors such as time
constraints and problem complexity (Trippas et al, 2013), it seems interesting to
examine which other interventions can be used to moderate the effect of belief on
reasoning accuracy and not just a shift in response bias. Individual differences, for
example, cognitive abilities, also have an effect on to what degree the belief bias
effect manifests itself (Trippas et al, 2013) and examining how cognitive ability
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moderates susceptibility to these interventions is also an important question for
future research. In the next chapter, I will present an experiment which extends the
approach taken by Heit and Rotello (2014). The aforementioned study included a
manipulation which involved giving participants instructions with differing content,
one standard set and one which emphasised the importance of logical necessity.
These instructions led to a change in response bias, but not reasoning bias. In
Experiment 2, participants will be given identical instructions to these, but by
also including a range of individual difference measures, I will be able to explore
whether participants of differing cognitive abilities and styles show differences in
their responses to debiasing interventions.
Chapter 5
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 show that even when reasoners are provided with
feedback to indicate that their reasoning strategy is suboptimal, without a superior
strategy to replace it with, there is no distinct change in accuracy. Instead, only
response bias is affected. A possible explanation for the results of Experiment
1 is that participants may not have fully understood the application of logical
necessity to syllogistic reasoning; that is, if a syllogism is merely possible but not
necessitated by the premises, it is invalid. Although Heit and Rotello (2014) found
that such a manipulation did not improve reasoning performance, no consideration
was made of individual differences. Accounting for such differences may be crucial
in identifying successful debiasing strategies given that it has been found that
participants with higher cognitive ability show belief bias as both a reasoning
and response bias, whereas those of lower cognitive ability only exhibit signs
of response bias (Trippas et al, 2013), and it has been claimed that ignoring
individual differences obscures differences in response patterns (e.g. Stupple et al,
2011; Trippas et al, 2014). Experiment 2 aims to investigate whether providing
participants with instructions that emphasise the importance of logical necessity
will lead to improved performance, and if any changes found are contingent on
participants’ cognitive ability or cognitive style (for example, the tendency to
engage in open-minded thinking). Previous research has found that reasoning
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ability can be predicted by measures of cognitive ability (e.g. Trippas et al, 2013)
and cognitive style (e.g. Baron, 2008), and so I will discuss below how the efficacy
of debiasing interventions may also be affected by these differences. Firstly, I will
discuss accounts of individual differences in reasoning, before moving on to outline
various measures of these differences. I will then examine the literature around
using instructions to alter strategy use before outlining arguments surrounding the
use of online experiments.
Theories of Individual Differences
Stanovich (2009) outlines a tripartite model of thinking which explains individ-
ual differences in deductive reasoning task performance; it is comprised of the
autonomous mind, the reflective mind, and the algorithmic mind. The autonomous
mind is responsible for the kind of automatic responses that many dual process
theories associate with Type 1 responses. Type 2 processing is governed by the
reflective mind and the algorithmic mind. The algorithmic mind is associated with
differences in working memory capacity and the ability to hold multiple representa-
tions of a problem in mind at any one time, and is related to individual differences
in cognitive ability. The reflective mind governs the tendency to examine a variety
of evidence before drawing conclusions, and these tendencies can be distinguished
by measures of cognitive style. Thus, if an individual of higher cognitive ability has
a low tendency to consider alternative representations, this higher ability will confer
them few advantages and so are likely to still provide biased responses (Stanovich
& West, 1997). This is reflected in research which has shown that these thinking
dispositions or styles are still predictive of task performance on heuristics and bias
tasks even when differences in cognitive ability have been controlled for (Toplak &
Stanovich, 2003).
Stanovich (2009) constructed a taxonomy of thinking errors and sources of
bias with five main categories of thinking errors: override failures, defaulting
to autonomous responses, mindware gaps, contaminated mindware, and serial
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associative cognition with focal bias. Override failures are due to reasoners engaging
in both Type 1 and Type 2 processing, but being unable to substitute their
automatic (Type 1) response with a more analytic (Type 2) one. Override failures
differ from defaulting to an autonomous response, as the latter involves no Type 2
processing at all and only Type 1 processing is engaged to give a response. The
term “mindware” refers to the individual’s knowledge of rules or strategies, such as
the laws of probability or logical necessity. Whilst override failure accounts presume
that the relevant mindware is available but not utilised, mindware gap accounts
suggest that an override is attempted but the relevant rules are not available.
Furthermore, mindware contamination describes situations in which the reasoner
has given a response based upon an incorrect or illogical rule. The final category,
serial associative cognition with focal bias, refers to situations when a reasoner does
not employ sufficient effort in exploring multiple representations of a problem to
ascertain the normatively correct answer. Although Stanovich (2009) argues that
the belief bias is down to cognitive miserliness, in the form of override failure, other
accounts place its effect as the result of other thinking errors. For example, the
modified version of selective processing theory suggested by Stupple et al (2011)
which argues that reasoners engage in satisficing searches, fits better into the serial
associative cognition category, and indeed an earlier account by Stanovich and
West (2008) makes similar inferences. In addition, an override failure account may
be ignoring the more subtle details of the phenomenon. Thompson and Johnson
(2014) found that higher ability reasoners showed better performance compared to
lower ability reasoners, and focussed more on Type 2 processing, measured by time
take to rethink an answer and probability of changing this answer, specifically on
conflict problems. However, for this higher ability group, the extra time rethinking
an answer did not lead to an increase in normative responding, despite the extra
Type 2 processing. Thompson and Johnson (2014) suggest that this may be due
to differences in reasoning accounted for by cognitive capacity emerging only at
the point when an initial response is given, as the higher ability group may find it
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easier to apply the relevant logical rules intuitively and immediately (cf. De Neys,
2012). However, this is at odds with the findings of Trippas et al (2013), who found
that when solving syllogisms under time pressure, higher ability reasoners actually
performed worse on unbelievable problems than believable problems, a reversal
of the typical pattern found when no time limit exists. The differences between
these findings could be due to task complexity; Thompson and Johnson (2014)
note differences between findings on syllogistic reasoning tasks when compared to
other, similar, heuristics and biases tasks such as base-rate neglect, and point to
the increased complexity of the former. There is also debate as to whether both
cognitive style and ability play a part in determining reasoning ability, or whether
the high correlation between the two means that the significant effects of one can
account for the positive effects of the other (Trippas, Pennycook, Verde, & Handley,
2015). The only research to date which has attempted to answer this question using
SDT analyses to examine the effects of belief bias is that of Trippas, Pennycook,
et al. (2015) who found that having an analytic cognitive style accounted for the
effects of cognitive ability on belief bias for both response bias and reasoning bias.
They argue that this shows support for the quantity over the quality argument
differences in performance can be attributed to individuals with a more analytic
cognitive style engaged in a greater amount of reasoning, rather than being better
reasoners. The lack of consistency in accounts of the role of individual differences
suggests that more research is needed to better describe the underlying causes of
belief bias, and it is clear that individual differences must be accounted for in any
such account. As mentioned earlier, a number of different scales and tests exist
which allow us to distinguish between individuals on the basis of cognitive ability
and cognitive style. Such tasks enable us, for example, to establish whether an
individual tends to rely on their initial response, or if they prefer to engage in
more deliberate and effortful thinking, and thus are linked with Type 1 and Type
2 responding. Previous research has shown an association between performance on
these tasks and syllogistic reasoning performance (e.g. Trippas et al., 2013; Trippas,
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Pennycook, et al., 2015). Below, I will discuss a number of these measures.
Measures of Individual Differences
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier,
1996) aims to measure individual differences in rational and heuristic thinking
tendencies. It is a self-reported scale comprising a number of items from the Need
For Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which is designed to measure
analytic thinking, and extra questions from a Faith in Intuition (FI) scale, designed
to capture differences in reliance on heuristics. Epstein et al. (1996) argue that
this scale is correlated with independent measures of heuristic thinking. A revised
version containing 40 items (REI-40; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) was developed, which
has been reported to correspond to scores on the ratio bias task. The ratio bias task
is believed to invoke conflict between a Type 1 and a Type 2 response (Mevel et al.,
2014), and Pacini and Epstein (1999) argue that high reliance on experiential (Type
1) processing, inadequate rational (Type 2) processing, or both, leads to higher
levels of bias. Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009) found that high REI scores were
related to higher levels of response confidence, despite no relationship between REI
score and accuracy. The Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (AOT; Stanovich &
West, 1997) is another self-reported scale designed to measure thinking dispositions,
or the tendency to be reflective (Stanovich & West, 1998) and contains 41 items.
It predicts differences in response patterns on tasks involving the evaluation of
arguments, even when ability has been controlled for (Stanovich & West, 1997), and
is thought to indicate the likelihood of reasoners to consider opposite possibilities,
with higher scorers also having better calibrated confidence (Baron, 2008). Trippas,
Verde, and Handley (2015) discuss the importance of considering using behavioural
rather than self-reported scales when measuring cognitive abilty. An alternative
measure of ability is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) which
differs from the REI and AOT as it is not a self-reported scale. Instead, the CRT
contains just three items:
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1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than
the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how
long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?.
The questions which comprise the test are all designed to lead to an easily
accessible quick heuristic response which must be suppressed in order for a correct
answer to be given. For example, the heuristically cued response for question 1 is
“10 cents”, whereas the correct answer is “5 cents”. Frederick (2005) reports links
between CRT scores and delayed gratification. Frederick administered a battery of
tests to performance, and found that CRT scores were correlated with measures of
cognitive ability, they were highly correlated with self-rated measures of cognitive
style which are believed to measure similar constructs, for example, the NFC. This
indicates the possible unreliability of such scales in distinguishing between different
types of respondents. The AH4 Group Test of General Intelligence (Heim, 1970) has
been used in belief bias research to distinguish between participants on the basis of
cognitive ability (e.g. Newstead et al, 2004; Trippas et al 2013). It is a 65 item test
which contains questions related to verbal and numerical reasoning, and is positively
correlated with performance on deductive reasoning tasks. Some of its contents
include items which involve simple calculations which require multiple components
to be remembered simultaneously, number series, and questions containing complex
conditional statements. Although many studies have linked scores on these tests and
scales to reasoning performance, it should be noted that the vast majority of studies
examining the link between these individual measures and syllogistic reasoning
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ability use the traditional indices, and so may conflate individual differences in
reasoning ability with individual differences in response bias. Given the ways
in which individual differences can have strong and varied effects on individuals’
reasoning, it is only logical to assume that individual differences will mediate the
effect of any debiasing interventions. The experiment presented in this chapter
includes a number of these measures to allow us to specifically investigate where
variation in susceptibility lies. I will now go on to discuss the use of instructional
manipulations in debiasing reasoning.
The Use of Instructions to Reduce Belief Bias
Instructions on reasoning principles have been found to be successful in debiasing
the sunk-cost fallacy (Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990). The sunk-cost fallacy is
a phenomenon whereby individuals tend to base decisions about future investments
of time, money or effort too heavily on previous investments rather than choosing
the most beneficial option on the basis of future rewards. Larrick et al. (1990)
found that giving participants training using more normative rules by which to
make decisions led to participants being less biased by sunk costs. Macpherson
and Stanovich (2007) found that instructions encouraging participants to rely less
on prior beliefs improved accuracy on syllogisms for which there was a conflict
between logic and belief. Cognitive ability moderated the effectiveness of the
instructions, with participants of lower cognitive ability gaining the most benefit
from the instructions stressing the need to ignore prior knowledge. However, the
analysis used in this study did not separate reasoning and response bias. Relating
more specifically to syllogistic reasoning tasks, Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009)
found that reasoners had a tendency to misclassify conclusions that were merely
possible as necessary, but those who had been trained to represent syllogisms using
Venn diagrams made fewer such errors. Using Stanovich’ taxonomy of thinking
errors, the predominant theories of belief bias could be said to place the locus of
this effect in override failure or serial associative cognition. Either way, the error
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can be seen as based upon overreliance on Type 1 responses. However, participants
of high cognitive ability and possessing a reflective cognitive style should be able
to complete syllogistic reasoning tasks to normative standards, but consistently do
not. Therefore, the remaining component to improve reasoning standards should
be mindware. Thus, I predict that providing participants with instructions which
explicitly outline the importance of logical necessity should lead to participants of
higher cognitive ability (as measured by AH4 score) and those with a reflective or
open-minded cognitive style or tendency to inhibit Type 1 responses (as measured
by REI, AOT, and CRT scores) to improve performance, whereas those of lower
ability or less reflective style will show little improvement, as they will still be
unable to generate an accurate representation.
Heit and Rotello (2014) is the only current study which has used an SDT
approach to analyse data collected after instructional manipulations. Participants
were given either standard or augmented instructions, based on prior research by
Evans et al (1994) and Newstead et al (1992). The instructions were as follows.
The italicised sections were only included in the augmented instructions condition:
This experiment is designed to find how people solve logical problems.
Your task is to decide whether each conclusion follows logically from
the information given in that problem. The premisesthe information
givenappear above the line and the conclusion appears below the line.
You must assume that all the information you are given is true; this
is very important. If, and only if, you judge that a given conclusion
logically follows from the information given you should answer “Valid.”
If you think that the given conclusion does not necessarily follow from
the information given you should answer “Not Valid.” Also, you will
be asked how confident you are in this judgement.
Please note that according to the rules of deductive reasoning, you can
only endorse a conclusion if it definitely follows from the information
given. A conclusion that is merely possible, but not necessitated by the
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premises is not acceptable. Thus, if you judge that the information is
insufficient and you are not absolutely sure that the conclusion follows
you must reject it and answer “Not Valid.”
Please take your time and be certain that you have the logically correct
answer.
REMEMBER, IF AND ONLY IF YOU JUDGE THAT A GIVEN
CONCLUSION LOGICALLY FOLLOWS FROM THE INFORMA-
TION GIVEN YOU SHOULD ANSWER “Valid,” OTHERWISE “Not
Valid.”
It was found that the augmented instructions affected response bias, but did not
lead to an improvement in accuracy. However, no individual difference measures
were taken, and given the variation found across participants in other studies, this
may account for the lack of change. Other approaches to debiasing have suggested
that manipulations such as disfluency can have an effect on task performance that is
contingent on differences between participants although the results of these studies
vary and seem somewhat task-dependent. Thompson, Turner, et al. (2013) found
that disfluency increased accuracy on the CRT for participants of high cognitive
ability, whereas Trippas, Handley, and Verde (2014) found that the use of a disfluent
font in syllogistic reasoning problems led to a detriment in performance for more
able reasoners, due to the increased demands on cognitive resources. Macpherson
and Stanovich (2007) found a correlation between correct answers on conflict
syllogisms and both cognitive style, and cognitive ability. In addition to this,
they found that they were able to debias participants using specifically designed
instructions. However, these effects varied according to cognitive ability; whilst
the instructional manipulation had little effect on participants in the higher three
quartiles, participants in the lower quartile showed a marked improvement when
given more detailed instructions. However, as these results were analysed using
traditional indices, it still remains to be seen whether these differences were caused
by changes in reasoning bias or response bias. Previous studies have shown that
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belief bias is associated with reasoning bias in reasoners of higher cognitive ability
(Trippas et al, 2013), but only with response bias in participants of lower cognitive
ability. This difference in reasoning accuracy dependent on problem believability
is thought to be the consequence of a different search strategy for unbelievable
problems. Thus, the use of instructions emphasising logical necessity may alter
the search strategy participants use for unbelievable problems and decrease the
belief bias shown by participants who show this bias as a reasoning bias. Although
previous studies have shown null effects of instructional manipulations (e.g. Evans,
Handley, & Harper, 2001; Heit & Rotello, 2014), they did not distinguish between
participants on the basis of cognitive ability, and given the differences in the way
belief bias affects participants of different abilities, it is yet to be seen whether this
distinction is important. Given that research has shown that reasoners are adept
at identifying conflict between logic and belief even when responding inaccurately,
as shown by the lower confidence ratings and longer response times for conflict
problems, the augmented instructions are expected to increase their reasoning
accuracy by providing extra motivation to analyse problems in more depth to
ensure the conditions for necessity are met. Indeed, as cognitive style has been
shown to predict reasoning accuracy even when cognitive ability has been controlled
for, the augmented instructions which encourage further processing should lead
participants who do not typically tend to engage in additional processing to show
an increase in these tendencies.
Online Studies Using Amazon Mechanical Turk
The study presented below consists of data collected in the lab, and data collected
online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon Mechanical Turk, hereafter referred
to as MTurk, is a website which is typically used by individuals or organisations
(“requesters”) to pay anonymous individuals (“workers”) to complete tasks of
varying lengths and complexities. Details of requests, termed Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs) are displayed to workers, who choose which HITs to accept, based
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upon their preferences regarding task type and compensation rate. In more recent
years, there has been a growing trend towards the use of MTurk for data collection
in psychology (e.g. Alter, Oppenheimer, & Zemla, 2010; Eriksson, Simpson, et
al., 2010). One advantage of using MTurk is the possibility of increased sample
diversity and thus overcoming the oft-cited criticism of psychology studies testing
fairly homogenous groups, typically psychology undergraduate students (e.g. Sears,
1986). Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) compared data collected using
MTurk to what they described as a “standard internet sample”, and found similar
proportions of respondents in terms of gender, but greater diversity in terms of age
and nationality. One drawback in the use of online testing is that there is no way
of determining whether participants are cheating, and no real way of having any
control over their surrounding environment. Participants in online studies have a
higher tendency to use a cognitively simpler strategy or just click quickly on options
without properly considering them (Krosnick, 1991; Sargis, Skitka, & McKeever,
2013). However, such responses can be checked for by examining response times
and excluding participants who appear to be simply clicking through the task.
Strategies to prevent such behaviour involve including “attention checking questions”
or “instructional manipulation checks”, such as an item which asks participants to
choose their third item out a list in order to prove they are still paying attention. In
fact, studies comparing MTurk and lab participants have shown that, often, MTurk
participants actually are more likely to give a correct answer on such questions.
Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti (2013) found that these methods, whilst reliable, were
rendered unnecessary by restricting HITs to workers with high approval ratings
on the MTurk website from their previously completed tasks. Restricting workers
to include only ones with high approval ratings may lead to a higher proportion
of workers who have previously completed other psychology studies, and so may
be able to guess the premise of the study and thus show an altered pattern of
effects. However, this problem is likely to be much more prevalent with lab based
samples, given the high reliance on psychology students. Empirical research shows
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that this is not likely to be the case; Sprouse (2011) compared data from 352
participants who took part in a judgement task, half online and the other half in
the lab. Other than a higher drop-out rate for online participants, Sprouse found
that the two samples were almost identical on a variety of statistical measures. A
further argument against the quality of MTurk data is that, although participants
may read instructions thoroughly, their attention may waver during the task. This
claim is supported by evidence from Chandler and Kapelner (2013), and Clifford
and Jerit (2014), who present data from self-reported measures which show that
some workers admit to using mobile phones or completing other tasks at the same
time. That said, this does not seem to be representative of all workers, given
their similarity on various cognitive measures, and results from where attention
checking questions were included partway through a study. Although it may be
of ethical concern that the rates of compensation are typically much lower than
that of lab-based studies, Sargis et al. (2013) highlight how participation is of a
voluntary nature, and many workers do not consider financial recompense to be a
primary motivator for participating (Buhrmester et al., 2011). It may be tempting
to suppose that the level of compensation offered to participants would affect the
quality of data collected; this has been found to not be the case with both survey
data (Buhrmester et al., 2011) and non-survey data (Paolacci, Chandler, & Stern,
2010). Indeed, participants are typically well-motivated, ranking that they “enjoy
doing interesting tasks” and want “to kill time” as the most common motivators
for participating, with participating “to make money” being a much lower priority
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). Further criticisms of online methodology have been
highlighted and addressed by Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, and John (2004), who
conducted a large-scale comparative study with an N of 361703 online participants
and compared these with data from 510 existing studies. The overall conclusion
that they drew was that many concerns with the use of online testing are unfounded,
and those that held true were easily accounted for by altering small aspects of
the study design. Finally, (Paolacci et al., 2010) found that participants given a
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number of heuristics and biases tasks performed similarly to lab-based participants,
and were equally as likely to follow instructions accurately. They advocate the
use of MTurk for collecting such data as long as care is paid to the potential
pitfalls discussed above. In the online experiments presented in this thesis, other
potential ethical issues have been identified and accounted for. Participant data files
remained anonymous, and workers verified that they had completed the experiment
via a randomly generated code, displayed to them once they had completed the
experiment, which they then input on the MTurk website for validation. This
allowed the experimenter to verify that the task had been completed, without
compromising participant anonymity. The data files were stored on a server in a
folder which was inaccessible without a password, and data files were regularly
downloaded and then deleted from the server.
Hypotheses
This study aimed to investigate a number of properties of reasoning. The first
aim was to compare the use of SDT and traditional analyses in analysing data on
individual differences in reasoning. Secondly, I aimed to evaluate the use of online
testing for complex reasoning tasks, and compare with data collected in a lab.
Thirdly, to investigate whether the use of altered instructions can aid reasoning.
Finally, to evaluate whether an individual differences approach leads to more
in-depth insight into any changes due to differing instructions. The inclusion of
multiple individual difference measures should allow for comparison between them,
as well as evaluation of whether it is cognitive style, ability, or both, which contribute
towards the differences in reasoning ability and belief bias. It is predicted that the
inclusion of individual differences measures will lead to an effect of instruction on
belief bias. It is unclear which direction this difference is likely to be in; one the one
hand, the extra information contained in the augmented instructions could provide
a useful cue for participants with a more analytic cognitive style or higher cognitive
ability to engage in increased efforts or better reasoning. On the other hand, the
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augmented instructions may lead to an improvement for participants with a lower
cognitive ability or less analytic cognitive style, as the extra information may inform
them that in order to complete the task an increased level of effort beyond what
they might have otherwise put in is required for successful task completion.
5.1 Method
Participants
There were 96 participants, half of whom were students at Lancaster University,
and the other half were recruited online via the Amazon Mechanical Turk website.
Lab-based participants were paid $3.50 each, and online participants were paid $5
(US dollars).
Design
Instruction set (augmented vs. standard instructions) was manipulated between-
participants, and conclusion validity (valid vs. invalid) and conclusion believability
(believable vs. unbelievable) were manipulated within-participants.
Materials
Participants were presented with 16 syllogisms. The syllogisms used were from one
of the sets from Experiment 1, and thus have identical characteristics, such as EIO
or IEO mood, Figures 1 and 2, and an equal number of AC and CA conclusions.
These particular moods and figures were chosen in order to prevent mood or
figure producing confounding effects. Four subsets were created, as in the previous
experiment, so that the content words in each syllogism appeared in each subset as
either valid-believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable, or invalid-unbelievable,
so that the content was not a confound. A subset of 16 syllogisms was randomly
allocated to each participant.
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As a measure of cognitive ability, participants completed Part 1 of the AH4
Group Test of General Intelligence (Heim, 1967), which has been used to assess
verbal and numeric ability. Measures of cognitive style were the CRT (Frederick,
2005), which measures the tendency to resist an initial Type 1 response; the REI
(Epstein, 1994) which measures the self-reported tendency to rely on logic or
intuition, and the AOT (Stanovich & West, 1997), which measures the tendency
for open-minded thinking.
Procedure
Both the lab-based and online participants viewed the experiment in a web browser
Participants in the lab-based group were tested individually with the experimenter
present. Participants were shown instructions according to the condition they had
been randomly assigned to, which were identical to those used by Heit and Rotello
(2014).
Once participants had finished reading the instructions, they then clicked a
button to begin the experiment. The first syllogism appeared on screen along
with buttons marked “valid” and “invalid”, and radio buttons from 1-10 with the
question “how sure are you that you have answered correctly?” above them. Once
both a validity and confidence rating had been made, the screen paused for 5
seconds, and then the next syllogism was displayed.
To prevent the problem of differences in internet connection speeds leading to
differing lengths of time between problems as the webpage loaded, the underlying
code was designed so that all problems loaded in the background upon initial page
access, and so any delays would only affect the speed at which the responses were
saved.
After participants had completed the syllogisms, they went on to complete the
CRT, REI, AOT, and then AH4. Participants were given the opportunity to take
a break between tasks, but asked to not to pause during the course of individual
tasks. The study took approximately 60 minutes in total to complete.
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 2 112
Only MTurk workers with a high approval ratings were accepted, as per the
recommendations of Peer et al (2013). In addition to this, the login details to
access the website which was hosting the experiment were included at the end of
the instructions in order to screen out any participants who did not thoroughly
read the instructions.
5.2 Results
Comparing the different samples
Before the data were analysed in-depth, a comparison of the online and lab-based
datasets was conducted in order to explore any differences between the two groups
and identify outliers.
Syllogisms
The response times for the syllogisms were examined first, with mixed effects models
fitted to the data to account for the repeated-measures nature of this component
of the experiment. There was no differences in response times between the two
groups, 𝜒2(1)=0.21, p=0.65, with similar response times for the online (M=25.01s)
and lab-based samples (M=23.68s).
There was, however, a difference in ranges of times, with the lab-based par-
ticipants responding within 5s to 130s, and the online participants responding
between 1s to 384s. Due to the theoretically predicted difference in response styles,
simply identifying outliers using the standard method of eliminating values based
on their distance from the mean or interquartile range would not be appropriate
here. Instead, participants were eliminated if 4 or more of their response were
given within 5 seconds or less. An upper bound was considered in order to identify
participants who were completing the task whilst doing something else. However,
no participants consistently showed unusually long response times. In addition,
data were removed from participants who responded with either “valid” to all
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syllogisms, or “invalid” to all syllogisms. This method of identifying problematic
responses led to the removal of data from 2 lab-based participants, and 9 online
participants.
Cognitive style and ability measures
Linear models were fitted to the cognitive style and ability measures to assess
differences between the online and lab-based participants. There were no differences
in AH4 scores between the two groups, t(81) = 1.31, p=0.19, and no differences in
AOT scores either, t(81) = 1.11, p=0.27. The REI is divided into four subscales.
There were no differences between participants on the Rational Ability (t(81)=1.04,
p=0.30), Rational Engagement (t(81)=0.64, p=0.52), Experiential Ability (t(81)=-
0.56, p=0.58), or Experiential Engagement (t(81)=-1.68, p=0.10) scales.
As the scores on the CRT ranged from 0 to 3, it would be inappropriate to
fit a linear model to such data, and instead it was transformed into proportion
correct, and a beta model was instead fitted. A beta model is an extension of
the generalised linear model which allows for response variables that range from
0 to 1. Due to problems fitting the model to data containing proportions of 0,
such scores were transformed to values of 0.000000001, so the model could still
be fitted, with the transformation having negligible effects on the results. There
was a significant difference between the online and lab-based participants, with the
online participants showing higher CRT scores (M=2.35) than the lab participants
(M=1.33), z=5.85, p<0.001.
Correspondence between style and ability measures
Table 5.2 shows the correlations between the different cognitive ability and style
measures. As expected, there were correlation between the AH4, an ability measure,
and the majority of the cognitive style measures.
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 2 114
AH4 AOT REI(RA) REI(RE) REI(EA) REI(EE)
AH4
AOT 0.42***
REI (RA) 0.03 -0.08
REI (RE) 0.16 0.25* 0.64***
REI (EA) -0.33** -0.40*** -0.29** -0.28*
REI (EE) -0.38*** -0.26* -0.30** -0.19 0.81***
CRT 0.31** 0.33** -0.02 0.02 -0.28* -0.18
Table 5.1: Correlations between measures *𝑝 < 0.05, **𝑝 < 0.01, ***𝑝 < 0.001
Endorsement Rates
Binary logistic mixed effects models were fitted to the endorsement rates in order
to examine what inferences might be made from traditional, non-SDT methods
of analysing the data. Initially models with just the main effects of validity,
believability, instruction set and participant group were fit to the data, without
the cognitive ability and style measures. Next, the effects of the cognitive ability
and style measures were examined, along with interactions with any of the initial
variables which were significant, in order to explore whether the inclusion of the
ability and style measures modified any existing effects.
A binary logistic mixed effects model was fitted to the data, with conclusion
endorsement as the response variable, and instruction set, participant group, validity
and believability as explanatory variables.
Instruction set and participant group were not significant as main effects, and
did not interact with any other variables. There was a main effect of validity,
𝜒2(1)=152.60,p<0.001, with more valid problems being endorsed than invalid
problems. There was also a main effect of believability, 𝜒2(1)=41.63, p<0.001, with
more believable problems than unbelievable problems accepted.
Validity and believability also interacted, 𝜒2(1)=13.84, p<0.001, 𝛽=0.93. For
valid problems, believability had no effect on problem acceptance, 𝜒2(1)=2.78,
p=0.10. However, invalid conclusions were more likely to be accepted if they were
believable, 𝜒2(1)=61.96, p<0.001.
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Table 5.2: Parameter Values for Endorsement Rate Model
Variable 𝛽 SE z Wald-p
Validity (valid) 1.027 0.177 5.800 < 0.001
Believability (believable) 1.243 0.165 7.542 < 0.001
Validity x believability 0.931 0.249 3.742 < 0.001
SDT Measures - Accuracy
Models using the SDT measures as response variables were examined next. A mixed
effect model was fitted with accuracy as the response variable, and instruction set
(standard vs. augmented), participant group (online vs. lab), problem believability
(believable vs. unbelievable), CRT score, REI subscale scores, AOT score, and AH4
score as explanatory variables.
Due to the large number of explanatory variables, the inclusion of terms
and their interactions in the model was based on the following approach. The
main effects and interactions of the variables concerning the experimental effects
(instruction set, participant group, and believability) were examined first. Next,
the individual difference measures (CRT score, REI subscales score, AOT score and
AH4 score) were examined as main effects and only tested as interactions where
the experimental effects or their interactions were significant.
Experimental Effects None of the main effects significantly predicted accuracy.
However, there was a marginally significant interaction between believability and
participant group, 𝜒2(3)=7.45, p=0.06. For the lab participants, believability did
not affect their accuracy, 𝜒2(1)=0.04, p=0.84. However, for the online participants,
believability was significantly related to accuracy, 𝜒2(1)=7.00, p=0.008, with
participants in this group showing more accurate performance on unbelievable
syllogisms.
Individual Difference Measures A higher AH4 score led to higher accuracy,
𝜒2(1) = 6.288, 𝑝 = 0.01. In addition, a higher score on the REI Experiential
Subscale led to lower accuracy, 𝜒2(1) = 4.346, 𝑝 = 0.037. There was a three-
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way interaction between participant group, believability and AOT score. For the
online participants, the believability by AOT score interaction was not significant,
𝜒2(1) = 0.880, 𝑝 = 0.348. However this interaction was significant for the lab
participants, 𝜒2(1) = 9.499, 𝑝 = 0.002, for whom a higher AOT score did not
predict accuracy on believable problems, 𝑡 = −0.055, 𝑝 = 0.956, but was linked to
higher accuracy on unbelievable problems, 𝑡 = 3.924, 𝑝 < 0.001.
SDT Measures - Response Bias
Believability was a significant predictor of response bias, 𝜒2(1)=17.62, p<0.001,
𝛽=-0.25, SE=0.06, t=-4.29, with participants showing a more liberal response bias
to believable problems. No other main effects or their interactions were significant.
None of the individual differences measures or their interactions with other
variables affected response bias.
Figure 5.1 shows the ROC curves for the online and lab participants.
Response Times
A mixed effect model was fitted to the data with the log-transformed response
times as the response variable. As with the SDT analyses, firstly the experimental
effects (validity, believability, instruction set, and participant group) and their
interactions were examined as potential explanatory variables, followed by the
Table 5.3: Parameter Values for SDT Accuracy Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) 0.932 0.314 2.968 0.083
Participant Group (online) 0.667 0.294 2.272 0.142
AH4 Score 0.007 0.002 3.025 0.001
REI Experiential Score -0.022 0.010 -2.196 0.037
AOT Score 0.004 0.001 0.393 0.685
Believability x Participant Group -0.121 0.056 -2.147 0.059
Believability x AOT score -0.005 0.002 -2.962 0.301
Participant Group x AOT Score -0.004 0.002 -2.250 0.307
Believability x Participant Group x AOT score 0.004 0.002 1.700 0.015
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Table 5.4: Parameter Values for SDT Response Bias Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -0.258 0.060 -4.286 < 0.001




































Figure 5.1: ROC curves for online and lab participants by believability
individual difference measures (CRT score, REI subscale scores, AOT score, and
AH4 score) and any interactions with the experimental effects.
Experimental Effects Participants responded faster to valid than invalid prob-
lems problems, 𝜒2(1) = 10.461, 𝑝 = 0.001. Response times were slower for believable
problems than they were for unbelievable problems, 𝜒2(1) = 13.705, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Participants who completed the experiment online responded faster than those who
completed it in the lab, 𝜒2(1) = 5.585, 𝑝 = 0.018.
Individual Difference Measures A higher REI Experiential subscale score was
related to faster response times,𝜒2(1) = 8.520, 𝑝 = 0.003. There was an interaction
between CRT score and participant group, 𝜒2(2) = 15.869, 𝑝 < 0.001. For the
online participants, a higher CRT score was related to a faster response time,
𝜒2(1) = 14.150, 𝑝 < 0.001. However for the lab participants, a higher CRT score
was marginally related to slower response time, 𝜒2(1) = 3.415, 𝑝 = 0.064. AOT
score and participant group also interacted, 𝜒2(2) = 8.769, 𝑝 = 0.012. For the
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online participants, there was no relationship between AOT score and response
time, 𝜒2(1) = 2.335, 𝑝 = 0.127. However, for the lab participants, AOT score was
related to longer response times, 𝜒2(1) = 6.318, 𝑝 = 0.012. Believability interacted
with AH4 score, 𝜒2(1) = 9.187, 𝑝 = 0.010. For unbelievable problems, AH4 score
did not predict response times, t(654)=1.461, p=0.144. However, higher AH4
scores were linked to longer response times for believable problems, t(654)=3.719,
𝑝 < 0.001.
Table 5.5: Parameter Values for Response Time Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Validity (valid) -0.323 0.123 -2.620 0.001
Believability (believable) 0.486 0.236 2.056 < 0.001
Participant Group (online) 1.894 0.574 3.298 0.018
REI Experiential Score -0.102 0.029 -3.514 0.003
CRT Score 0.041 0.047 0.869 0.064
AOT Score 0.005 0.002 2.110 0.623
AH4 Score 0.016 0.007 2.347 0.056
Participant Group x CRT Score -0.277 0.085 -3.277 < 0.001
Participant Group x AOT Score -0.009 0.003 -2.595 0.012
Believability x AH4 score -0.011 0.004 -2.499 0.010
Validity x REI Experiential Score 0.037 0.019 1.954 0.028
Confidence Ratings
Finally, confidence ratings were examined as response variables, with validity,
believability, group, and the individual difference measures as explanatory variables.
Experimental Effects Participants who were given the standard instructions
were more confident than those who were given the augmented instructions, z=2.217,
p=0.027. Responses given to unbelievable problems were less confident than
those given to believable problems, z=-2.064, p=0.039. Validity and believability
interacted, z=-3.613, p< 0.001. For valid problems, participants were equally
confident, regardless of believability, 𝑧 = −0.284, 𝑝 = 0.777. However, for invalid
problems, participants were less confident if the problem was believable, 𝑧 =
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−3.813, 𝑝 < 0.001.
There was an interaction between validity, believability, and participant group.
For the online participants, the validity by believability interaction was not signifi-
cant, 𝑧 = −0.160, 𝑝 = 0.873. However, this interaction was significant for the lab
participants, 𝑧 = −3.618, 𝑝 < 0.001. On valid problems, there was a marginally
significant effect of believability, with participants responding more confidently to
believable problems, 𝑧 = −1.958, 𝑝 = 0.050. However, for invalid problems, partici-
pants responded more confidently to unbelievable problems, 𝑧 = 3.320, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Individual Difference Measures Participants with a higher AH4 score were
less confident in their responses, z=-2.874, p=0.004. AH4 score interacted with
believability; on unbelievable problems, AH4 score did not predict confidence.
However, for believable problems, a higher AH4 score led to lower confidence, 𝑧 =
2.018, 𝑝 = 0.043. AH4 score also interacted with validity. On valid problems, AH4
score did not predict confidence, 𝑧 = 0.146, 𝑝 = 0.884; however, for invalid problems,
a higher AH4 score was related to lower confidence, 𝑧 = −1.989, 𝑝 = 0.047.
Table 5.6: Parameter Values for Confidence Model
Variable 𝛽 SE z Wald-p
Validity (valid) -1.375 1.050 -1.310 0.019
Believability (believable) -2.169 1.051 -2.064 0.039
Instruction Set (standard) 0.570 0.257 2.217 0.027
Participant Group (online) 0.340 0.353 0.962 0.552
AH4 Score -0.064 0.025 -2.512 0.004
Validity x Believability -1.147 0.317 -3.618 < 0.001
Validity x Participant Group -0.766 0.333 -2.303 0.021
Believability x Participant Group -0.302 0.325 -0.930 0.352
Believability x AH4 Score 0.053 0.0191 2.776 0.005
Validity x AH4 Score 0.048 0.019 2.562 0.010
Validity x Believability x Participant Group 1.103 0.469 2.353 0.019
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5.3 Discussion
The use of instructions emphasising the importance of the rules of logical necessity
do not lead to an improvement in reasoning performance, even when individual
differences between reasoners are accounted for. There were no effects of instructions
on accuracy, response bias, or response time, indicating that the instructions did not
alter reasoning strategy. There was an effect of instruction set on confidence ratings,
with participants who had received the augmented instructions showing lower overall
confidence, implying that the expanded description did not aid participants in
reasoning but only served to confuse them. These results agree in part with those
of Heit and Rotello (2014) who found that instructional manipulations did not lead
to a change in reasoning bias (although Heit and Rotello found no reasoning bias
at all). However, these results diverge in that, unlike Heit and Rotello (2014), no
effect of instructions on response bias was found. These differences may have been
due to differences between the samples in terms of general levels of response bias, or
due to the fact that the marginal effect of response bias found by Heit and Rotello
(2014) may have been a statistical artefact. None of the individual difference
measures interacted with instruction set either, showing that the hypothesis that
these would mediate the effect of individual differences was not supported. This
experiment also aimed to compare the use of SDT and traditional indices as well as
examining any differences between groups of participants. The analyses presented
here show that SDT analyses are once again crucial in distinguishing between
reasoning bias and response bias. A troubling finding is that the endorsement rate
analysis was unable to distinguish between the online and lab participants in terms
of belief bias. Whilst the endorsement rate analysis showed a general effect of
belief bias for all participants, the SDT analysis revealed that both groups showed
response bias, the online participants all showed reasoning bias, but only the lab
participants with a higher AOT score showed any signs of reasoning bias. Reliance
on endorsement rates would have led to treating both groups as identical, and been
unable to detect the similarities and differences between these groups in terms of
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reasoning and response bias. Psychological studies have been historically criticised
for tending to rely on psychology students as participants. The present study
clearly demonstrates that this can be highly problematic for making inferences from
experimental studies. The lab participants, a group comprising mainly psychology
students, were influenced by belief bias solely as a response bias. However, the
online participants, presumably made up of a much more varied group in terms of
age and educational background, showed belief bias as both a response bias and
a reasoning bias, results which correspond with previous studies. A limitation of
the present study is that no data were collected regarding the age or educational
background of participants, and so these factors could not be accounted for in the
analysis. Although it may be tempting to ascribe this difference in reasoning bias
to these factors, or to cognitive ability or style differences between the two groups,
the individual differences measures show that this is unlikely to be the case, with
both groups showing identical performance on all but one measure (CRT). The
similarity between the two samples in terms of the individual differences measures
further supports the validity of using online testing in psychology studies of belief
bias. There was no difference between the online and lab participants in their mean
AOT, REI, and AH4 scores. A subsequent Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conducted
to examine if there were any differences in terms of variability between the two
groups showed no differences for AOT scores, AH4 scores, and REI Experientiality
subscale score (ps all >0.09), but differences in the CRT score (p<0.01) and the REI
Rationality score (p=0.04). Although the online participants scored significantly
higher on the CRT, this may have been due to either cheating or familiarity; task
familiarity is an increasingly common problem found with the CRT as discussed by
Toplak, West, and Keith (2013). The link between CRT score and faster response
times for the syllogisms for the online participants could support either of these
explanations with participants with a higher CRT score showing faster responses
being linked to either the tendency to engage in less effort or simply familiarity
with these kinds of tasks. The differences in REI Rationality score may account
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for the differences in amount of reasoning bias between the two groups. Greater
variation in the tendency to rely on logic may have led to more visible differences
due to a higher number of individuals with a tendency to rely more on logic and
higher number of those less likely to rely upon logic. The quality of the online data
was lower than that of the lab participants; 9 out of 48 responses collected online
were discarded because of participants simply clicking “valid” for all syllogisms,
or responding within a time insufficient for the problem to have even been read.
However, such responses were easily and automatically identified, and this led to 2
of the lab participants’ data being discarded a level of data checking which may
not have taken place if only using data from lab participants. In addition, the
lack of differences between the two groups in terms of response times or accuracy
supports the argument in favour of the quality of the MTurk data, consistent with
arguments outlined by Hauser and Schwarz (2015).
The lab participants only showed signs of belief bias as a response bias, whereas
the online participants showed both reasoning bias and response bias. This may
also be explained by levels of engagement; belief bias as a reasoning bias is found
mainly in circumstances under which sophisticated reasoning is likely to take place
(Trippas et al, 2013). Individuals who participate in experiments on Amazon
MTurk have been found to be motivated to participate for reasons other than
money, they are after all participating in experiments for low compensation rates
and may thus have higher levels of interest in the study (Buhrmester et al., 2011),
and so may have simply been more engaged in the study than the lab participants.
Cognitive ability, as measured via the AH4 test was predictive of general accuracy.
The AH4 test measures cognitive ability. In the context of syllogistic reasoning
research, this is thought to relate to the number of models that an individual can
hold in mind at any one time, and thus affects their ability to compare different
models of the premises. Therefore, a general link with accuracy is unsurprising
participants with a higher AH4 score were presumably better able to model a
larger range of possibilities and so better discriminate between valid and invalid
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syllogisms. Regardless, AH4 score did not affect the amount of reasoning bias
shown, which would have been indicated by an AH4 by believability interaction.
In other words, higher ability participants are better at reasoning generally, but
equally as biased as lower ability participants. The same claim has been made by
Trippas, Pennycook, et al. (2015) who also found that cognitive ability affected
overall accuracy but not bias.
There was, however, a three-way interaction between believability, group and
AOT score. Despite the lack of effect of belief on accuracy for the lab participants,
there was still an effect on unbelievable problems of AOT, with those with a
tendency towards more open-minded thinking being more accurate. In other
words, for the lab participants, only those with a more open-minded thinking style
showed an advantage for unbelievable problems. AH4 score did not interact with
believability in the accuracy analysis. However, it did interact in the response time
analysis. Participants with a higher AH4 score spent longer examining believable
conclusions; that is, the effect of believability of increasing response times for
believable problems is even stronger for participants of a higher cognitive ability.
However, these longer response times did not lead to an increase in accuracy. This
supports the view suggested by Trippas, Pennycook, et al. (2015) and Stanovich and
West (2008) that an analytic cognitive style is a crucial component of susceptibility
to belief bias; if one is able to engage in better reasoning, this advantage is wasted
if one does not have the tendency to do so. The results presented here can also be
useful in arbitrating between different individual difference measures. Newstead,
Handley, Harley, Wright, and Farrelly (2004) found that self-report measure of
cognitive style were not predictive of general accuracy, but were linked to levels
of bias shown and claimed that this was due to the ability to generate multiple
representations of a problem. The results presented here differ in that they do show
a link between self-reported cognitive style and overall accuracy lower scores on the
REI Experiential scale were related to higher accuracy. Given that Newstead et al.
(2004) did not employ SDT analyses, this may account for the difference between
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those results and results in the present study. Trippas, Pennycook, et al. (2015)
discuss the fact that analytic cognitive style can be measured using both self-report
scales (such as AOT and REI) or performance measures (such as CRT). Although
Trippas, Pennycook, et al. (2015) advocate the use of performance measures, these
results show the opposite; CRT score was not significant in any of the analyses after
variables were entered in the order of most variance explained to least, and only
became significant in the response time analysis, possibly due to task familiarity for
the online group. Both of the self-report measures (AOT and REI) were significant
in analyses, indicating that they both provide a useful contribution to explaining
reasoning accuracy and belief bias despite measuring similar constructs. Differences
between the predictive ability of AOT and REI have been found in studies in other
domains, for example, in factors which affect pathological gambling (Maclaren,
Fugelsang, Harrigan, & Dixon, 2012). To conclude, instructions were ineffective
in debiasing participants. However, the results did show some interesting findings
regarding the use of online testing; it appears that online participants show higher
levels of engagement than lab participants. The feedback manipulation used in
Experiment 1 and the instructional manipulation in Experiment 2 constituted fairly
simple attempts at debiasing, which were unsuccessful. In Chapter 6, the final
empirical chapter of this thesis, I present an experiment in which the use of training
and feedback are combined to evaluate whether a more in-depth approach to
debiasing will be successful. It is clear that individual differences play an important




The previous experiment demonstrated that even when accounting for individual
differences in cognitive style and ability, instructions emphasising the importance of
logical necessity were not sufficient to reduce the effects of belief bias on syllogistic
reasoning. A possible explanation for lack of debiasing effect for both the feedback
manipulation discussed in Chapter 4, and the instructional manipulation discussed
in Chapter 5, is that neither of these interventions clearly provided participants
with an obvious strategy for overcoming their belief bias. In Experiment 1, feedback
seemed to alert participants to the fact that their strategy was suboptimal, as
shown by the change in response bias and longer response times. However, no
accompanying change in accuracy was observed. Similar results were found in
Experiment 2; the augmented instructions led to a decrease in confidence but no
other effects. It seems that instructing individual to engage in additional effort is not
sufficient to lead to a reduction in bias. If participants are only constructing partial
representations, the belief bias effect may be affecting these initial models. Thus,
for a debiasing intervention to be effective, it may be necessary to provide a method
which reasoners can use to exhaustively represent all possibilities. Previous research
by Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009) has found that training participants
in constructing diagrams to represent syllogisms has led to improved accuracy;
however, this research did not use SDT analyses or belief-based materials so it
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is unclear whether this could be used to achieve a debiasing effect. This chapter
reports an experiment in which participants are explicitly provided with a way of
graphically representing the syllogistic reasoning problems, as well as with feedback,
with the aim that this may lead to an altered strategy and the reduction of belief
bias as both a reasoning bias and as a response bias.
Training
Training has been shown to improve reasoning across a range of tasks and biases
including Wason’s selection task (Cheng et al., 1986), conjunction bias (Moutier
& Houde´, 2003), matching bias (Moutier & Angeard, 2010), base-rate problems
(Fong et al., 1986) and, more specifically, syllogistic reasoning (Leighton, 2006;
Prowse-Turner & Thompson, 2009). However, none of these studies directly address
the question of whether training in alternative reasoning strategies can lead to
a reduction in belief bias as they neither manipulate believability or use SDT
analyses. Luo et al (2014) conducted a study in which fMRI was used to examine
the effects of logical training on neural activation whilst participants completed
conditional reasoning tasks including a believability manipulation. They found
that this intervention led to a change in neural activity, and so concluded that
this was due to changes related to cognitive control, that is, participants were
suppressing belief-generated responses in favour of logic-derived answers. However,
the model fitted to this data was not able to take response bias into account as it
used traditional indices rather than SDT measures, and so it is unclear whether the
changes reported here were the results of a change in reasoning or simply a change
in response bias. It has been argued that decontextualisation is important for
reasoning (e.g. Baron, 1995; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003; Kuhn & Udell, 2007) and
Macpherson and Stanovich (2007) found that instructions which told participants to
reason in a more abstract manner led to small accuracy improvement in a syllogistic
reasoning task. Being able to separate beliefs from the reasoning process may be
more easily achieved through the use of diagrams; if participants use the diagrams
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to map out all the possible models, they should be uninfluenced by their prior
beliefs. Regardless of the way in which belief bias affects reasoning, exhaustively
representing all possibilities should lead to normative responding, as predicted in
the extended selective processing model of Stupple et al. (2011). It has also been
suggested that there might be different sub-categories of reasoners. For example,
Ford (1995) asked participants to give answers to a number of syllogisms and
explain how they came to their conclusion. Although it should be noted that this
is a conclusion generation rather than evaluation task, and so different strategies
may have been used, Ford found that reasoners could be roughly divided into two
types. Firstly, there were spatial reasoners who drew diagrams to map out links
between the terms in the premises. Secondly were the verbal reasoners who typically
discussed the problems in a more algebraic way. Although these differences may
point towards further individual differences beyond cognitive ability and style being
important to consider, the findings of Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009) that
participants were able to improve their reasoning with the use of diagrams suggests
that simply equipping reasoners with an alternative strategy to their existing one
may be sufficient to improve reasoning for most individuals.
The content of any training manipulation is also important to consider. An
understanding of the concept of logical necessity is crucial for reasoners to be able to
correctly evaluate the validity of categorical syllogisms (Evans, Jonathan, Handley,
Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999; Prowse-Turner & Thompson, 2009; Torrens,
Thompson, & Cramer, 1999).Although there is a great deal of evidence to suggest
that the misinterpreted necessity account of belief bias (Evans et al., 1983) does not
accurately encapsulate this phenomenon; for example Klauer et al (2000) highlight
how misinterpreted necessity can explain the further difficulties individuals find with
indeterminately invalid syllogisms, but cannot explain how people still find some
determinately invalid syllogisms difficult to evaluate. Despite this, there is some
evidence to suggest that it may well still play some role in participants’ performance
on syllogistic reasoning tasks. For example, Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009)
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used a methodology in which, rather than rating syllogisms as “valid” or “invalid”,
participants had to indicate whether they thought they were “necessary”, “possible”,
or “impossible”. These categorisations were then compared to the logical state of the
syllogism, which were divided into “necessary”, “possible strong”, “possible weak”,
and “impossible”. The terms “necessary” and “impossible” refer to determinately
valid and determinately invalid problems, respectively. “Possible strong” and
“possible weak” are derived from results in a study by Evans et al (1999), with all
such syllogisms containing conclusions which are possible but not necessitated by
the premises (i.e. indeterminately invalid syllogisms). The strong/weak distinction
is based on the number of participants who rated that conclusion as “possible” in
Evans et al. (1999). Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009) trained participants
by showing them how syllogisms could be represented as Venn diagrams, and
giving a verbal explanation of how logical necessity in the context of an individual
problem. Participants in the training condition were trained on four problems in
total as a group, given feedback and training on individual problems, and allowed
to ask questions at any point. All participants went on to complete a further 16
syllogisms individually. Prowse-Turner and colleagues found that, with training,
participants became much more competent at correctly categorising syllogisms,
and their confidence in their own responses was better calibrated than those who
were given no training.
As mentioned earlier, research by Ford (1995) shows that there is variation
between strategies which people employ to reason about syllogisms, and that it
is possible to roughly classify reasoners as either spatial or verbal, depending on
strategy use. Thus, a similar methodology to that of Thompson et al (2009), which
involved a combination of both verbal and visual descriptions will be used here in
order to account for the fact that some participants are more or less likely to engage
in verbal or visual strategies. Combining training with logical instructions is not
only important because of the range of strategies used by reasoners. Heijltjes, Gog,
and Paas (2014) provided participants with training on a number of tasks, including
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a syllogistic reasoning and a base-rate task and assessed the impact of instructions,
training, and practice on performance in a later reasoning task (involving passages
of prose text). Heijltjes et al. (2014) found that it was the combination of both
specific instructions with an opportunity to test out new strategies which led to
a real improvement in participants’ performance on tasks which required critical
thinking. Therefore, the main component of the task in the present experiment will
be prefaced by a section in which participants solve practice syllogisms. Providing
feedback alongside training may provide a key advantage in improving performance,
which training alone cannot deliver. Previous research has shown that whilst
training alone did not improve performance on the Wason selection task (Cheng et
al, 1986), Leighton (2006) found that giving participants feedback led to an increase
in accuracy, presumably because the corrective feedback caused individuals to
engage in greater reflection about the strategies which they were using. Thus, the
effects of feedback during the practice phase of the experiment will be examined.
Predictions
It is predicted that training will improve overall accuracy, similarly to Prowse-
Turner & Thompson (2009), and may reduce belief bias. The aforementioned
study did not employ a believability manipulation, and so it is not immediately
clear whether the beneficial effects of training are likely to extend to effectively
reducing belief bias. However, given that the training procedure involves teaching
participants ways of visually representing syllogisms, it seems feasible that those
who fully engage with this technique may show a reduction in bias as it could result
in participants exhaustively representing all possible conclusions.
It is predicted that participants who receive both training and feedback will
show the most accurate performance on the syllogisms. The accuracy of those who
receive training alone, will vary based upon how successful they are for the practice
syllogisms.
Those who are given feedback with no training may show lower levels of
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response bias, as was the case for participants in the feedback group in Experiment
1. However, it is possible that this effect may not be present, due to the small
number of training syllogisms.
It is also hypothesised that the effects of training will be moderated by individual
differences. The training will most benefit participants with pre-existing tendencies
to rely on prior knowledge rather than logic, that is, those with higher scores on
the REI Experiential subscale.
Due to the differences in the previous experiment between the lab and online
participants, in this study, all data was collected from online participants. In order
to get a greater insight into the specific characteristics of this sample and how they
compare to a typical lab sample, a range of questions were asked concerning things
such as age, gender, and highest level of education completed.
6.1 Method
Participants
In total, 205 participants were recruited online using the Amazon Mechanical Turk
website. No participants had completed training in formal logic. Participants
were aged between 18 and 62, with a mean age of 35.65 years. There were 104
(55%) female participants, and 86 (45%) male participants. Highest educational
level completed was divided into 6 strata; 1% of participants did not graduate
high school, 12% were high school graduates, 31% had completed some college
or university, 11% had an associate’s degree or foundation degree, 38% had a
bachelor’s degree, 7% had a postgraduate qualification other than a doctorate, and
0% had a doctorate.
The minimum approval rating was identical to that of the previous experiment.
In addition, workers who had completed the previous experiment were blocked
from participating in this one.
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Materials
The syllogisms used were all three-model syllogisms with premises in moods AE,
EA, EI, and IE. A similar classification system to that used by Prowse-Turner &
Thompson (2009) was used to categorise the possible strong” and “possible weak”
syllogisms. This was based upon data from Evans (1999) in which participants
were asked to provide judgements of whether syllogisms were necessary, possible or
impossible. The “possible strong” syllogisms used in the present study were those
that followed a structure that was logically possible but not necessitated by the
premises that had been deemed “possible” by 67
A total of 32 syllogisms were shown to each participants; 8 each of necessary,
possible strong, possible weak, and impossible. For each logical validity category
(i.e. necessary, possible strong, possible weak, impossible), the premise moods,
conclusion orders, and conclusion moods were balanced so that they were not
confounded with believability. Necessary and possible strong conclusions were in E
or O moods, and possible weak and impossible conclusions were in A and I moods;
again, these were split evenly so as to not act as a confound.
As in the previous experiment, the AOT and REI were used as measure of
cognitive style, and AH4 as a measure of cognitive ability.
Procedure
The following instructions were shown to participants:
This experiment is designed to find how people solve logical problems.
Your task is to decide whether each conclusion follows logically from
the information given in that problem. The premises - the information
given - appear above the line and the conclusion appears below the
line. You must assume that all the information you are given in the
premises is true; this is very important. If, and only if, you judge
that a given conclusion logically follows from the information given you
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should answer ’Valid’. If you think that the given conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the information given you should answer ’Invalid’.
Also, you will be asked how confident you are in this judgement. A
higher number should be used to rate higher confidence.
In addition, you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion is ‘nec-
essary’, ‘possible’, or ‘impossible’. If you judge that a given conclusion
follows logically from the information given, you should choose ‘neces-
sary’. If you believe that the following conclusion is merely possible but
not necessitated by the premises given, you should choose ‘possible’. If
you think that the conclusion given does not follow logically from the
information given, you should choose ‘impossible’.
Once you have given a response, your answer will be highlighted in
bold and for the practice problems only, you will be given feedback on
your answers. When you are ready click “next” to progress to the next
screen.
Please take your time and be certain that you have the logically correct
answer.
All participants completed a single practice syllogism. Those in the ’training’
condition then completed a further four syllogisms for which they provided an
answer, and were shown a comprehensive description containing Venn diagrams
showing why their response was correct or incorrect (see Appendix D for more
details). Those in the ’no training’ condition completed these syllogisms as further
practice syllogisms, with no explanation of possible reasoning strategies. In addition,
feedback was given to half of the participants in each condition. For those who
were given feedback, the word “correct” or “incorrect” was displayed on screen,
with the correct response highlighted.
All of these initial syllogisms contained belief neutral conclusions. All partici-
pants then proceeded to answer the main set of 32 syllogisms, for which no feedback
or additional explanation was provided.
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Each syllogism was displayed individually on screen and participants clicked on
one of two buttons to indicate whether they thought the problem was valid or invalid.
Underneath these buttons were a series of radio buttons where participants selected
how confident they were in their answer on a scale from 1 to 3. Finally, participants
clicked on another button to indicate whether they thought the conclusion was
’necessary’, ’possible’, or ’impossible’.
There was a five second pause between each syllogism, during which time the
screen went blank. Following the syllogistic reasoning part of the experiment,
participants were given the opportunity to take a break. They then completed the
REI, AOT and AH4.
6.2 Results
Data Cleaning
As in the previous experiment, the data were screened for unusually long or short
response times. Response times ranged from 1 second to 3482 seconds. Once
again, all data from a participant were removed if more than a quarter of responses
from a given participant were made within 4 seconds or less. This led to 10
participants’ responses being removed. An upper limit was again, considered, but
no participants showed consistently exceptionally long response times to multiple
problems; all of the 5 participants with a response time greater than 180 seconds
only had an exceptionally long response time for a single syllogism. This number
of participants to be removed was lower than expected; in the previous experiment
19% of participants’ data had to be excluded, where in the present experiment this
constituted only 5% of data. However, system logs showed that 234 individuals
began the experiment but only 200 completed it. After the data were cleaned, a
total of 190 participants remained.
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Endorsement Rates
A binary logistic mixed-effects model was fitted to participants’ ‘valid’/‘invalid’
judgements as a response variable, with feedback, training, validity, and believability
as explanatory variables. As this analysis was conducted primarily to compare any
evidence for belief bias found here with that found in the SDT analysis, individual
differences variables were not included.
There were no main effects of feedback or training. However, participants’
chance of responding ‘valid’ was contingent on the syllogism’s logical validity,
𝜒2(3)=2320.60, 𝑝 < 0.001. Necessary problems were most likely to be accepted as
valid (M=0.76), more so than possible strong(M=0.58), followed by possible weak
(M=0.16), followed by impossible problems (M=0.08). The paired comparison
differences between all four types of problems were statistically significant (𝑝𝑠 <
0.001). There was a main effect of believability, 𝜒2(1)=144.9, 𝑝 < 0.001, with more
participants accepting believable than unbelievable problems as valid.
There was an interaction between training and validity. For the possible strong
and impossible problems, participants in either condition were equally likely to
accept these problems as valid. For necessary problems, participants who had been
trained were less likely to accept these problems as valid, 𝜒2(1) = 10.16, 𝑝 = 0.001.
For the possible weak problems, trained participants were more likely to accept
these as valid, 𝜒2(1) = 5.68, 𝑝 = 0.02.
An interaction also existed between validity and belief, 𝜒2(3) = 8.66, 𝑝 = 0.03.
For believable problems, the effect of validity was the same as that for the main
effect of validity (𝑝𝑠 < 0.001). Similarly, for unbelievable problems, necessary
problems were more likely to be accepted as “valid” than possible strong, in turn
more likely than possible weak (𝑝𝑠 < 0.001). However, possible weak and impossible
problems were equally likely to be deemed to be valid, 𝑝 = 0.055.
There were no other interactions between variables in this analysis.
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SDT Analyses
SDT analyses presuppose a pair of distributions lying upon a single axis. These pair
of distributions represent signal and noise distributions, or in the case of syllogistic
reasoning research, the distributions for valid and invalid stimuli. Although it
may be tempting to treat the categories of ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, and ‘impossible’
problems as three distributions on the same axis, differing in terms of argument
strength, this raises further complications for confidence rating analyses; although
valid/invalid problems and confidence ratings from 1 to 3 can simply be converted
to a 6 point scale, it seems unclear how one would do this with the present stimuli.
A single scale approach would be inappropriate here, as it does not seem reasonable
theoretically to presume that a high confidence response of “impossible” lies next
to a low confidence response of “possible” on such a scale. Thus, in order to
acquire results which are theoretically interpretable, the SDT analyses are divided
into 3 subsections; 1 for each of the pairings of necessary/possible strong stimuli,
necessary/possible weak stimuli, and necessary/impossible stimuli. These pairings
are possible due to the high numbers of stimuli per participant.
Necessary vs. Possible Strong
Table 6.1: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Strong - Accuracy Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
AH4 0.010 0.002 4.542 < 0.001
REI Rationality Subscale 0.012 0.005 2.227 0.038
Training (present) -0.037 0.019 -1.922 0.055
Believability (believable) 0.309 0.147 2.098 0.060
AH4 x Believability -0.006 0.003 -2.315 0.022
Accuracy There was a marginally significant main effect of training on accuracy,
𝜒2(1) = 3.74, 𝑝 = 0.053, although not in the direction expected; participants who
had received training were less accurate than those who had not. Believability
was also marginally significant, 𝜒2(1) = 3.53, 𝑝 = 0.060, with lower accuracy on
believable compared to unbelievable problems.
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In terms of individual difference measures, AH4 score was significant, 𝜒2(1) =
16.80, 𝑝 < 0.001, with higher AH4 score linked to higher accuracy. The REI
Rational subscale was significant, 𝜒2(1) = 4.281, 𝑝 = 0.039, with higher scores
linked to higher accuracy.
There was a two-way interaction between believability and AH4 score, 𝜒2(1) =
5.283, 𝑝 = 0.022. For believable problems, there was no relationship between AH4
score and accuracy. However, participants with higher AH4 scores were more
accurate than those with lower AH4 score on unbelievable problems, 𝑡(188) =
4.746, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Table 6.2: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Strong - Response Bias
Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -0.414 0.047 -8.752 < 0.001
Training (present) 0.113 0.058 1.945 0.052
Response Bias Participants who were trained showed a trend towards a more
conservative response bias, 𝜒2(1) = 3.787, 𝑝 = 0.052, being less willing to respond
with ‘valid’ to most syllogisms. Participants showed a more liberal response bias
for believable problems, 𝜒2(1) = 64.65, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Necessary vs. Possible Weak
Table 6.3: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Weak - Accuracy Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
AH4 0.008 0.002 5.025 < 0.001
Training (present) -0.056 0.018 -3.141 0.002
REI Rationality Subscale 0.010 0.005 1.864 0.064
Accuracy Trained participants were less able than untrained participants to
accurately distinguish between necessary and possible weak problems, 𝜒2(1) =
9.559, 𝑝 = 0.002. A higher AH4 score was linked to higher accuracy, 𝜒2(1) =
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25.512, 𝑝 < 0.001. Higher scores on the REI Rational subscale were marginally
significantly related with increased accuracy, 𝜒2(1) = 3.442, 𝑝 = 0.064.
Table 6.4: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Weak - Response Bias
Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -1.944 0.385 -5.042 < 0.001
Training (present) 0.152 0.062 2.444 0.246
AH4 -0.009 0.005 -1.746 0.126
Believability * Training -0.182 0.082 -2.224 0.027
Believability * AH4 0.031 0.006 4.521 < 0.001
Response Bias Participants had a more liberal response bias for believable
problem, 𝜒2(1) = 45.044, 𝑝 < 0.001. Training interacted with believability; 𝜒2(2) =
7.186, 𝑝 = 0.028. On believable problems, training had no effect on response
bias. However, for unbelievable problems, trained participants showed a more
conservative response bias, 𝑡(188) = 2.569, 𝑝 = 0.011. Believability and AH4 score
also interacted. For unbelievable problems, there was only a marginally significant
effect of AH4 score on response bias, 𝑡(188) = −1.90, 𝑝 = 0.059, in the direction
of a more liberal bias. However, for believable problems, higher AH4 score was
associated with a more conservative response bias, 𝑡(188) = 4.249, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Necessary vs. Impossible
Table 6.5: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Impossible Accuracy Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) 0.115 0.041969 2.732 0.042
AH4 0.007 0.001540 4.621 < 0.001
REI Rational Subscale 0.017 0.006137 2.792 < 0.001
Training (present) -0.037 0.018449 -2.013 0.045
Believability x REI Rational Subscale -0.011 0.005869 -1.856 0.065
Accuracy Trained participants were less accurate at distinguishing between
necessary and impossible problems than untrained participants, 𝜒2(1) = 4.15, 𝑝 =
0.042. Participants showed higher accuracy on believable, compared to unbelievable
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problems, 𝜒2(1) = 14.595, 𝑝 < 0.001. A higher AH4 score was related to greater
accuracy, 𝜒2(1) = 22.035, 𝑝 < 0.001. Once again, REI Rational subscale was
significant, 𝜒2(1) = 4.019, 𝑝 = 0.045, with a higher REI R score linked to greater
accuracy.
There was a marginally significant interaction between believability and REI
Rational Subscale, 𝜒2(2) = 5.283, 𝑝 = 0.65, with no effect of REI R score on
accuracy for believable problems, but a marginal effect on unbelievable problems,
𝑡(188) = 1.901, 𝑝 = 0.059, with higher REI R scores associated with higher accuracy
on these problems.
Table 6.6: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Impossible Response Bias Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -1.689 0.376 -4.488 < 0.001
Training (present) 0.109 0.041 2.699 0.016
AH4 -0.005 0.005 -1.127 0.017
Believability x AH4 0.027 0.007 4.023 < 0.001
Response Bias Trained participants showed a more conservative response bias
than untrained participants, 𝜒2(1) = 5.838, 𝑝 = 0.016. Participants showed a more
liberal response bias to believable compared to unbelievable problems, 𝜒2(1) =
19.371, 𝑝 < 0.001. Participants with a higher AH4 scores showed a more liberal
response bias. Believability and AH4 score also interacted, 𝜒2(1) = 16.053, 𝑝 <
0.001. For unbelievable problems, AH4 score was not related to response bias.
However, for believable problems, a higher AH4 score was predictive of a more
conservative response bias, 𝑡(188) = 4.459, 𝑝 < 0.001.
Misclassification
As responses consisted of both binary validity responses, and ternary possibility
responses, it seemed relevant to examine to what degree participants really under-
stood the principle of logical necessity. A new binary variable “misclassified” was
created, with a value of 0 for all responses for which the binary validity judgement
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and possibility judgement were consistent with logical necessity, and a value of 1
for all responses that were not (i.e. if a participant deems a problem to be both
valid and either possible or impossible, or both invalid and necessary).
Out of all responses, 31% were found to be misclassified.
A mixed effects model was fitted to the misclassification variable to identify
the causes of this problem. Participants were more likely to have misclassified
believable than unbelievable problems, 𝑧 = −5.93, 𝑝 < 0.001. Validity was also
significant, although surprisingly reflecting a similar pattern to likelihood of con-
clusion acceptance, with necessary>possible strong>possible weak>impossible (𝑝s
all < 0.001).
Participants with a higher AH4 score were less likely to misclassify syllogisms,
𝑧 = −5.71, 𝑝 < 0.001, as were those with a higher REI rational engagement score,
z=-2.21, p=0.027.
Due to the extent of misclassification found, a further SDT analysis was con-
ducted on the binary responses, with corrections made to responses. The ternary
responses (“necessary”, “possible”, and “impossible”) were taken as being rep-
resentative of participants’ true judgements, and the binary (“valid”/“invalid”)
responses were corrected in order to be logically consistent with these. So, for
example, a response of ‘possible’ and ’valid’ would be adjusted to ‘invalid’.
Necessary vs. Possible Strong - Adjusted
Table 6.7: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Strong Accuracy Model -
Adjusted
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -0.043 0.016 -2.670 0.008
AH4 0.005 0.001 2.970 0.002
REI Rationality Subscale 0.011 0.006 1.899 0.059
Accuracy Participants were more accurate at distinguishing between necessary
and possible strong conclusions when conclusions were unbelievable, 𝜒2(1) =
6.999, 𝑝 = 0.008. Those with a higher AH4 score were more accurate, 𝜒2(1) =
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9.295, 𝑝 = 0.002. There was a marginal effect of REI Rational subscale, 𝜒2(1) =
3.571, 𝑝 = 0.059, with higher accuracy linked to higher scores on this scale. All of
these variables were significant in the unadjusted analyses presented earlier, but
the effects of training and interaction between AH4 score and believability were no
longer significant.
Table 6.8: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Strong Response Bias
Model - Adjusted
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Training (present) 0.138 0.065 2.127 0.024
Believability (believable) -0.241 0.043 -5.495 < 0.001
AH4 -0.016 0.005 -2.979 0.003
Response Bias There was a significant effect of believability, 𝜒2(1) = 28.023, 𝑝 <
0.001, with more liberal response criterion for believable problems. Training was
also significant, 𝜒2(1) = 5.115, 𝑝 = 0.024, with trained participants responding more
conservatively. There was also a significant effect of AH4 score, 𝜒2(1) = 8.671, 𝑝 =
0.003, with participants with a higher AH4 score responding more liberally. The
added effect of AH4 score was the only variable which was different to those found
in the unadjusted analysis.
Necessary vs. Possible Weak - Adjusted
Table 6.9: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Weak Accuracy Model -
Adjusted
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
AH4 0.008 0.001 4.702 < 0.001
REI Rational subscale 0.018 0.006 2.817 0.005
Accuracy Participants with higher AH4 scores could better distinguish between
necessary and possible weak arguments, 𝜒2(1) = 21.916, 𝑝 < 0.001. Participants
with a higher score on the REI Rationality subscale were also more accurate,
𝜒2(1) = 7.775, 𝑝 = 0.005. These variables were significant in the unadjusted
analysis; however, training was no longer significant.
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Table 6.10: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Possible Weak Response Bias
Model - Adjusted
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Believability (believable) -0.901 0.363 -2.481 0.002
AH4 -0.015 0.005 -2.814 0.056
Believability x AH4 0.014 0.006 2.166 0.031
Response Bias Participants showed a more liberal response bias on believable
problems, 𝜒2(1) = 9.036, 𝑝 = 0.002. There was a marginally significant effect of
AH4 score, with participants with higher scores showing a more liberal bias, 𝜒2(1) =
3.639, 𝑝 = 0.056. Believability and AH4 score interacted, 𝜒2(1) = 4.635, 𝑝 = 0.031.
For believable problems, AH4 score had no effect on response bias. However, for
unbelievable problems, a higher AH4 score was related to a more liberal response
bias. The adjusted analysis differs in that AH4 score is now significant, but the
believability by training interaction disappeared.
Necessary vs. Impossible - Adjusted
Table 6.11: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Impossible Accuracy Model -
Adjusted
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
AH4 0.009 0.002 4.754 < 0.001
REI Rational Subscale 0.017 0.006 2.612 < 0.001
Accuracy Participants with a higher AH4 score were better able to distinguish
between necessary and impossible problems, 𝜒2(1) = 22.348, 𝑝 < 0.001. Those with
a higher REI Rationality subscale score were more accurate, 𝜒2(1) = 29.053, 𝑝 <
0.001. This analysis differed from the unadjusted analysis in that believability,
training and an interaction between believability and REI Rationality subscale
were no longer significant.
Response Bias Trained participants had a more conservative response bias,
𝜒2(1) = 4.300, 𝑝 = 0.038. There was a more liberal response bias on believable
problems, 𝜒2(1) = 16.463, 𝑝 < 0.001. There was an interaction between believability
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Table 6.12: Parameter Values for Necessary vs. Impossible Response Bias Model -
Adjusted
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Training (present) 0.106 0.053 1.992 0.038
Believability (believable) -1.211 0.358 -3.383 < 0.001
AH4 -0.016 0.005 -2.978 0.125
Believability x AH4 0.018 0.006 2.949 0.004
and AH4 score, 𝜒2(1) = 10.861, 𝑝 = 0.004. For beleivable problems, AH4 score was
unrelated to response bias, 𝑡(188) = 0.351, 𝑝 = 0.726. However, for unbelievable
problems, a higher AH4 score was related to a more liberal response bias, 𝑡(188) =
−3.289, 𝑝 = 0.001. This analysis differs to the unadjusted analysis due to the lack
of a significant main effect of AH4 score in the present analysis.
ROC curves for the unadjusted and adjusted analyses can be found in Figures 6.1
and 6.2 respectively.





















































Figure 6.1: ROC curves for unadjusted analysis by problem type and believability
Response Times
Individual item response times were firstly analysed using a mixed effect model, with
feedback, training, validity, and believability as explanatory variables. Response
times were log transformed in order to satisfy the assumption of being normally
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Figure 6.2: ROC curves for the adjusted analysis by problem type and believability
distributed.
Although data were cleaned earlier to remove participants who had simply
clicked through the experiment, the data had to be cleaned again to remove
outlier which would skew the results of the model. Therefore, responses over 180
seconds were removed. This led to the removal of 30 responses, all from different
participants.
Response time was significantly predicted by validity, 𝜒2(3) = 25.055, 𝑝 < 0.001,
with the ordering of response times: necessary = possible strong > possible weak
= impossible.
Participants responded more slowly to believable problems, 𝜒2(1) = 5.892, 𝑝 =
0.015. Participants who had received training spent longer on each problem, 𝜒2(1) =
4.272, 𝑝 = 0.039, as did participants with a higher AH4 score, 𝜒2(1) = 28.734, 𝑝 <
0.001. REI Experiential subscale was also significant, 𝜒2(1) = 17.297, 𝑝 < 0.001,
with participants who scored highly on this scale spending less time per syllogism.
There was an interaction between validity and believability, 𝜒2(3) = 11.781, 𝑝 =
0.008; for possible weak and impossible problems, believability did not predict
response time (𝑝𝑠 > 0.05). However, participants spent longer responding to
believable conclusions if the problem was either necessary (𝜒2(1) = 9.027, 𝑝 = 0.003)
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Table 6.13: Parameter Values for Response Time Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Validity (necessary) 0.203 0.075 2.708 0.001
Validity (possible strong) 0.317 0.075 4.215 < 0.001
Validity (possible weak) 0.028 0.075 0.382 0.962
Training (present) -0.507 0.261 -1.939 0.039
Believability (believable) 0.004 0.026 0.163 0.015
AH4 score 0.027 0.005 5.305 < 0.001
REI Experientiality -0.049 0.019 -2.484 < 0.001
REI Rationality -0.030 0.022 -1.340 0.684
Validity (necessary) x Believability -0.085 0.036 -2.310 0.003
Validity (possible strong) x Believability -0.075 0.036 -2.057 0.006
Validity (possible weak) x Believability 0.016 0.036 0.440 0.214
Validity (necessary) x REI Experientiality (low) -0.014 0.011 -1.334 0.013
Validity (possible strong) x REI Experientiality (low) -0.032 0.011 -2.935 0.023
Validity (possible weak) x REI Experientiality (low) -0.004 0.011 -0.395 0.785
Training x REI Rationality 0.098 0.036 2.702 0.023
or possible strong ( 𝜒2(1) = 7.484, 𝑝 = 0.006).
Validity and REI Experiential score also interacted, 𝜒2(3) = 10.220, 𝑝 = 0.017.
For all problems, a lower REI Experiential score predicted response time (𝑝𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙 <
0.05). Therefore, a median split was performed by REI Experiential score. For
participants who had a high REI Experiential score, there was no relationship
between validity and response time, 𝜒2(3) = 3.288, 𝑝 = 0.349. However, for
participants who had a lower score in this scale, validity was significant, 𝜒2(3) =
38.844, 𝑝 < 0.001, with the pattern of response times reflecting the main effect of
validity, with necessary = possible strong > possible weak = impossible.
Training and REI Rational score interacted, 𝜒2(2) = 7.560, 𝑝 = 0.023. For
untrained participants, REI rational score did not predict response time, 𝜒2(1) =
1.124, 𝑝 = 0.289. However, for trained participants, a higher REI Rational score
was related to a longer response time, 𝜒2(1) = 7.747, 𝑝 = 0.005.
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Confidence
Once again confidence ratings were examined as response variables, with valid-
ity, believability, feedback, training, and the individual difference measures as
explanatory variables.
There was a main effect of validity, 𝜒2(3) = 69.438, 𝑝 < 0.001; participants’
confidence in their responses was necessary = possible strong < possible weak <
impossible. REI Rationality subscale was also significant, 𝜒2(1) = 26.451, 𝑝 < 0.001,
with higher Rationality scores linked to higher confidence.
Table 6.14: Parameter Values for Confidence Model
Variable 𝛽 SE t LRT-p
Validity (necessary) -0.621 0.084 -7.334 < 0.001
Valiidty (possible strong) -0.591 0.085 -6.943 < 0.001
Validity (possible weak) -0.336 0.085 -3.947 < 0.001
REI Rationality 0.535 0.101 5.281 < 0.001
6.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 aimed to investigate whether the combination of feedback and
training would lead to an improvement in reasoning accuracy, and whether any
change would be contingent on participants’ cognitive style and/or ability. Neither
training, feedback, or a combination of both improved reasoning accuracy. Although
training appeared at first to lead to a decrease in accuracy for distinguishing all
invalid problem subtypes (possible strong, possible weak, and impossible) from valid
(necessary) problems, once misclassfication was corrected for, this effect disappeared.
In the adjusted comparisons of necessary and possible strong problems, - those most
similar to ones used in other studies as valid and invalid problems, training affected
response bias but not reasoning bias. This was also the case for the comparison of
necessary and impossible problems.
These results differ to those of Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009) as training
did not improve participants’ ability to discriminate between valid and invalid
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syllogisms. One explanation for the lack of effect of training is that participants in
the training condition did not engage in any extra effort compared to untrained
participants. However, the response time data does not support this view; trained
participants took significantly longer than untrained participants to respond. As
well as this, training did however cause participants with more rational tendencies
to spend longer on each problem. However, this result did not lead to an increase
in overall accuracy or a reduction in bias. This may be consistent with a selective
processing theory account of belief bias; although trained participants were more
likely to be aware of alternative representations after being shown the diagrams
in the training phase of the experiment, whether they constructed verifying or
falsifying representations may have been affected by conclusion believability. This is
consistent with Thompson et al. (2003) who found that even when participants were
instructed to construct multiple representations of syllogisms (using Euler circles),
they still tended to constructed a single representation. A further explanation of
the lack of effect of feedback and training is the online format of the experiment.
In Prowse-Turner and Thompson (2009), participants were given feedback and
training face-to-face, and with extra explanations if they were unsure of an answer.
Kluger and Denisi (1996) highlight how verbal feedback can have a greater effect
in improving task performance than written feedback.
As training was insufficient to improve performance, it may have simply served
to confuse participants - trained participants were much poorer at distinguishing
between valid conclusions and any of the other conclusion type, whether possible
or impossible. However, when misclassifications were corrected for, this effect of
training was no longer significant.
These results also provide further support for the use of SDT models in dis-
tinguishing between reasoning and response bias. Although the endorsement rate
analysis showed that believability affected endorsement for all problems, the SDT
analyses showed that although believability affected response bias for all prob-
lems, belief bias only affected reasoning when looking at participants’ ability to
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 3 147
distinguish between necessary and possible strong problems.
Interesting insights can be gained from the misclassification analysis, which
showed that almost a third of responses did not conform to the rules of logical
necessity. One potential explanation for this is that many participants may have
been simply ‘clicking through’ the task without engaging with it and thus choosing
answers at random. However, this seems unlikely given the extensive data screening
procedure that had been used to identify such participants on the basis of both
response time and answers given. An alternative explanation for this is that many
participants had a poor understanding of the concept of logical necessity, and
therefore responded in this manner. This finding has important implications;
typically it is assumed that instructions which emphasise that a conclusion can only
be valid if it is necessitated by the premises are sufficient to account for any lack of
complete knowledge of logical necessity. However, the evidence presented here is
not consistent with that view. When binary choice models are used, participants
who realise a syllogism is ‘ossible’ rather than ‘necessary’ but don’t realise that this
means the conclusion is not valid, are thought to be less accurate in discriminating
between valid and invalid problems. In addition, it was found that participants
with a more rational thinking style, and those with higher cognitive ability were
less likely to misclassify responses. These results also call in to question Stanovich
(2009) classification of belief bias as being mainly the result a failure of Type 2
processing to override Type 1 processing; here there is evidence that it is the result
of multiple sources, including mindware gaps, as shown in the misclassification
analysis.
The results are consistent with previous individual differences approaches which
argue that competent syllogistic reasoning relies on both cognitive ability and
cognitive style (e.g. Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2015). Once misclassification had
been accounted for, both AH4 score and REI Rationality subscale were significant
in all models for the SDT accuracy measures, and also in the response time model.
These results differ from those found in Experiment 2; in the previous experiment,
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the effect of cognitive style on accuracy was contingent on problem believability.
Here, there was no interaction between style and believability, but these effects
separately predicted accuracy. This, however, may have been due to differences
between the two samples; the previous experiment used a mix of online and lab
participants, and the believability by AOT interaction was only found in the lab
participants. This difference may have been due to the online participants being
more engaged with the problems. The experiment presented in this chapter used
only online participants, which may explain the effect of believability across all
participants regardless of AOT or REI scores.
A problematic finding is that once misclassifications were accounted for, the
advantage for participants with a higher AH4 score on unbelievable problems
disappeared. One possible explanation for this is that participants of a higher
ability simply are more likely to have a better grasp of the concept of logical
necessity.
A possible criticism of this study is regarding the quality of the data due to it
being collected online. Participants may have not been fully paying attention during
the study. However, this seems unlikely; data were removed from participants who
showed consistently unrealistically short or long response times, which constituted
only 5% of participants, and individual long or short responses were removed from
the response time analyses, leading to just 1% of responses being removed. The
mean response time was 25.86 seconds, comparable to the mean response time of
25.01 seconds in the previous experiment.
Unexpectedly, a much smaller proportion of responses were removed after the
data cleaning procedure than in Experiment 2. Another finding was that 15% of
participants who began the experiment did not complete it. This may have been
because many of the participants who would have simply “clicked through” in
the previous experiment gave up due to the longer length of the present study.
However, this may have also led to a less representative sample, as it could have
been participants who found the task difficult gave up at the start. Thus, the
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sample may have been distorted by containing a higher number of participants who
had higher syllogistic reasoning ability than might have been expected.
There was no effect of belief bias on participants’ reasoning for possible weak
or impossible problems. This is reflected in the lack of effect of believability in
the accuracy model for these conclusion type, and also the fact that although
believability predicted response times for necessary and possible strong problems,
it did not predict response times for possible weak or impossible problems. This
seems to be analogous to Evans et al’s (2001) finding of positive belief bias (an
increased tendency to endorse believable conclusions) for possible weak problems,
and negative belief bias (a decreased tendency to endorse unbelievable problems) for
possible strong problems. What Evans and colleagues termed positive and negative
belief bias may be roughly analogous to the response and reasoning components of
belief bias.
A further explanation for the lack of training effect is differences in reasoning
style; Monaghan and Stenning (2004) report that being able to decontextualise
graphically and linguistically are dissociable skills. Thus, participants who employed
a primarily non-graphical way of representing syllogisms would have been unlikely
to benefit from training.
In summary, training and feedback did not lead to an improvement in reasoning.
However, the misclassification analysis affords interesting insights into some aspects
of reasoning. In the final chapter, I will discuss the empirical and theoretical
implications of the research presented in this thesis.
Chapter 7
General Discussion
The main aim of this thesis was to examine methods of debiasing reasoning with
a view to reducing the impact of belief bias on syllogistic inference. Debiasing
reasoning is important for multiple reasons; firstly, because unbiased logical thinking
is important to the improvement of critical thinking skills (Macpherson & Stanovich,
2007), and secondly because looking at how individuals improve performance may
allow us deeper insight into how the underlying cognitive processes behind biased
and unbiased thinking operate. This thesis aimed to untangle reasoning and
response bias by applying an SDT approach to analyses in order to avoid the
problems that earlier analytic methods had in conflating the two types of bias.
These earlier methods, such as calculating linear indices of logic, belief and an
interaction between the two led to problematic results as such analytic methods
cannot distinguish between reasoning bias and response bias. Thus, the use of SDT
is necessary in getting a fine-grained view of reasoning. This is especially true in the
present research that aims to examine methods of debiasing reasoning; it is crucial
that we are able to distinguish between methods which lead a genuine change in
reasoning and those which simply alter participants’ patterns of responses. Another
aim was to examine the contribution of individual differences in cognitive style and
ability to strategy use and susceptibility to debiasing interventions.
Experiment 1 aimed to examine the effects of feedback and practice upon
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belief bias. Participants completed 16 syllogisms per session across the course of 5
sessions. It was predicted that feedback would lead to a decrease in both reasoning
and response bias, and that repeated practice may also affect responding. It was
found that although feedback led to changes in response bias, it had no effect
upon reasoning biases. In addition, this change was immediate and remained fairly
stable across the five sessions. These results were supported by an examination of
response times, which showed that there was no accompanying change in response
time, which one would expect if a genuine change in strategy had occurred. In
addition, it was shown that changes in response bias are task-specific, with there
being no differences between the feedback and no-feedback groups on a secondary
conditional reasoning task.
Experiment 2 aimed to examine the effects of instructions emphasising the
importance of logical necessity on reasoning and whether individual differences
played a part in mediating the strength of any such effects. It was predicted that
there would be an effect of instructional condition and this would be contingent on
participants’ cognitive ability or cognitive style. The differing instructions did not
lead to a change in performance and seemed to serve only to confuse participants.
Although not the original focus of the analyses, differences between online and lab
participants were also examined when it became clear that they had a crucial effect
on the results. Although previous research has shown similarities between online
and lab participants in similar research concerning topics in heuristics and biases,
the analyses presented in Experiment 2 show that differences between these groups
may be masked by non-SDT approaches which cannot separate response bias and
reasoning bias. Whilst the online group showed belief bias as both a reasoning
and a response bias, it was only the lab participants with a more open-minded
cognitive style who showed signs of reasoning bias. It was concluded that this was
due to the former group engaging with more effort on the task, a view supported
by evidence surrounding the motivational characteristics of online participants.
In Experiment 3, the effects of training and feedback were examined, combined
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with measures of individual differences to again examine the different propensity of
individuals to be affected by training and feedback. It was predicted that training
and feedback would lead to a decrease in reasoning bias. However, there were
no main effects of either feedback or training. Although limited in terms of the
minimal effects arising from such interventions, it was nevertheless shown that giving
participants training led to an increase in response time for participants with greater
pre-existing tendencies towards relying upon rational thought, suggesting that such
participants attempted to engage in more effort, but were still unable to increase
their performance levels. Furthermore, the analyses presented in this chapter also
showed how responses may be affected by some degree of lack of understanding
of the concept of logical necessity, and that when results are corrected for this,
it allows for a clearer picture of significant effects. The examination of multiple
problem types provided further evidence that the reasoning bias and response bias
components of belief bias may be analogous to what previous approaches have
termed “positive belief bias” and “negative belief bias”.
In all three experiments, evidence was found to support theories of belief
bias which place the locus of its effects in both reasoning and response bias.
Furthermore, the importance of the SDT approach was emphasised; the use of
traditional analyses in all of the three experiment would have led to misleading
or inaccurate results which either falsely showed differences between conditions,
or hid differences between different groups of participants or different materials.
These results undermine earlier theories of belief bias such as selective scrutiny,
misinterpreted necessity, metacognitive uncertainty, and mental-models theory, as
none of these theories predict both a reasoning and response bias effect. However,
they support the SDT model suggested by Trippas et al, who argue that belief bias
primarily manifests as a response bias but in the case of participants who engage
in complex reasoning, belief bias is also a reasoning bias.
One limitation of the present study is that no belief-neutral premises were used.
Thompson (1996) found that the believability of the premises could affect response
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choice. However, later research by Thompson et al (2013) found that premise
believability was irrelevant to how many models were generated, and given that
syllogistic reasoning in the format presented in this thesis is thought to consist of
conclusion-to-premise reasoning, it is unlikely to have had much, if any, effect upon
the results.
7.1 Theoretical Implications
The research presented in this thesis provides further evidence regarding the
importance of considering individual differences. In both Experiments 2 and 3,
cognitive ability accurately predicted accuracy. In Experiment 2, accuracy was
predicted by open-minded thinking for the lab participants, although not for the
online participants. In Experiment 3, although training had no effect on improving
task performance, it did lead to an increase in response times for participants with
a predisposition towards rational thinking, indicating the potential importance of
individual differences in developing debiasing methods.
This research also contributes to the debate over whether it is analytic cognitive
style or cognitive ability which predicts reasoning performance. Although Trippas
et al (2010) and Trippas et al (2014, Experiment 4) supported the theory that
higher cognitive ability is linked to reasoning bias, Trippas et al (2014, Experiment
5) suggest that it is in fact cognitive style which is important, with the apparent
effects of cognitive ability being the result of the high degree of correlation between
analytic cognitive style and higher cognitive ability. This argument is developed
further by Trippas et al (2015) who found that although cognitive ability is linked
to general accuracy, it is cognitive style which predicts reasoning bias. In this
thesis, Experiment 3 provided further evidence that both cognitive style and ability
had an effect on overall accuracy when distinguishing between necessary and
possible strong problems those commonly used in belief bias studies. However,
the ability of AH4 score to predict the amount of belief bias shown disappeared
once misclassifications were accounted for, implying that it is this misclassification
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which drives the advantage. The effect of cognitive style remained, despite the
correction, suggesting that it is really style but not ability which is predictive of
belief bias as a reasoning bias.
The REI, AOT, and CRT have been used as measures of cognitive style previ-
ously, and all three were included as measures of cognitive style in Experiments 2
and 3 to examine which is the better self-reported measure of cognitive style. Given
the inconsistency in their predictive effects, it seems prudent to explore what the
difference is between these measures. Newstead et al (2004) caution that the REI
should not be treated as a general measure of System 1 type thinking, and argue
that nor should any self-reported measures. Trippas et al (2015) also emphasise the
use of performance measure over self-report scales. Nevertheless, the use of all three
scales produced some interesting findings. In Experiment 2, the CRT was not a
better predictor than REI or AOT of any response variables (except response time)
and so was not included in Experiment 3. In Experiment 2, lab participants only
showed reasoning bias if they were prone to more open-minded thinking. Reasoning
bias was not contingent on thinking style for online participants. However, in
both Experiments 2 and 3, the REI predicted general accuracy; in Experiment 2,
participants who relied more on experiential thinking were less accurate, and for all
problem types in Experiment 3, those who relied more on rational thinking showed
higher accuracy. Given the differences in the predictive nature of the two tests,
there is clearly some distinction between what each of them measure. It seems that
whilst the AOT examines the tendency to consider different alternatives, a view
also supported by Stanovich & West (1998), the REI measures a general tendency
to analyse at things in more depth but not necessarily to consider opposites. Thus,
participants with higher REI rational or lower REI experiential scores may spend
more time considering their answers (as shown by the response time analyses in
Experiments 2 and 3), but may simply be searching for further justifications for
their chosen response. This would be consistent with Evans et al (1983) who
found that even when participants had to provide justification for their choice of a
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particular response, when giving a biased response, simply referred to irrelevant
information in their answer.
More recent research by Pennycook et al (2015) suggests similar roles for
cognitive style and ability, albeit under a different framework. Their theory posits
three stages in reasoning. Firstly, Type 1 processing can cue multiple responses.
In the second stage, a conflict between multiple responses may be detected. In the
third stage, if conflict is detected, two sorts of Type 2 outputs are possible; firstly,
the Type 1 response might be supported by (inaccurate) Type 2 responses, or
secondly, a normatively correct Type 2 response may be given as the result of further
simulation. Stages 2 and 3 may be akin to cognitive style and ability; participants
with a more open-minded cognitive style may be more likely to consider a wider
range of alternatives, and so more likely to detect conflict. During stage 3, cognitive
ability comes into play; those able to simulate multiple possibilities succeed and
those unable to do so proceed to rationalise their chosen salient response. This
model is distinct from some earlier dual-process models in that it highlights the fact
that Type 2 processing may still have occurred in non-normative responding, and
thus contributes to the ‘quality’ argument (Evans 2007); that differences in levels
of bias shown are contingent on the kind of reasoning rather than the amount.
In other words, if one is more open-minded, one can detect conflict better -
as a wider range of possible models are considered. But any effect on accuracy
is contingent on having higher cognitive ability and be able to separate belief
from logic, otherwise the original heuristic decision is simply further justified. The
findings of Experiment 2 do not support this theory; one would expect longer
response times for those of a more open-minded or reflective cognitive style, but
given that both cognitive style and ability were included in the analyses, it should
be cognitive ability which predicts the effects of reasoning bias. However, it was
found that for the lab participants, it was in fact cognitive style which predicted the
degree of reasoning bias shown. Experiment 3, however, does lend some support
to this theory; for participants with more rational thinking dispositions, training
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led to longer response times, indicating that it encouraged these participants to
consider more options. However, this was not accompanied by an increase in
accuracy; perhaps these participants simply expended more effort rationalising
these decisions. This would also be consistent with the view discussed above that
whilst the AOT measures the tendency to consider alternatives, the REI simply
measures the tendency to rationalise one’s choices.
7.2 Methodology
7.2.1 Online Testing
The experiments presented in this thesis highlighted important methodological
considerations for belief bias research. Firstly, differences between the data collected
in the lab compared to online highlight differences in motivations for these partici-
pants. In Experiment 2, online participants all showed reasoning bias, whereas the
lab participants’ results were more in line with those seen in comparable studies
(e.g. Trippas et al., 2013); only participants with a more open-minded thinking
style were more accurate on unbelievable problems. A similar result was also found
in Experiment 3, where there was no interaction between believability and thinking
style or cognitive ability in any of the analyses focussing on accuracy. Previous
research has shown that participants recruited via Amazon Turk often show high
levels of attention and task motivation. The online participants in Experiment 2
showed a greater degree of reasoning bias, and given the similarities in terms of
individual difference measures, one may assume that this is the consequence of
these participants being more engaged with the task. Given the speed in which
large volumes of data can be collected in this manner, online testing may be of
great use in belief bias research. Although concerns have been raised previously
about the quality of such data, the use of participant screening and data cleaning
alleviates such concerns as long as these procedures involve clearly defined and
theoretically based criteria for inclusion and exclusion. One limitation of online
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testing, however, is task familiarity. In Experiment 2, the online participants score
significantly higher in the CRT than the lab participants. Given that the CRT
is widely used in psychology experiments and attention has already been drawn
to the fact that many participants are already familiar with its contents (Toplak,
West & Stanovich, 2013), this highlights the importance of developing materials
for online tests that will not be familiar to the participant pool, some of whom will
have participated in a large number of psychology experiments (Buhrmester et al,
2011) and thus been exposed on numerous occasions to many widely used tests.
Despite online testing being advantageous due to being an inexpensive way of
rapdily collecting large amounts of data, an obvious disadvantage is the sacrifice
in level of experimenter control, compared to that which would be found in a
laboratory experiment. Despite instructions indicating otherwise, participants
may have been completing the experiment whilst otherwise distracted. Linked
to this is the lack of opportunity for further elaboration and explanation by the
experimenter. Given the positive results of training found by Prowse-Turner &
Thompson (2009) which was very similar to the one presented in the present study,
one might have expected similar results in Experiment 3. However, it may have
been the lack of in-depth explanation which prevented participants from benefiting
from the training in the present study. Therefore, the decision of whether to test
participants in a lab setting or online should take into account the nature of the
experimental factors being manipulated in deciding if online testing is appropriate
or not.
7.2.2 Analyses
A number of the key contribution of this thesis centre around combining established
methods with an SDT approach in order to distinguish between reasoning bias
and response bias. In Experiment 1, feedback affected response but not reasoning
bias, and this distinction was only apparent due to the use of SDT analyses. Using
traditional measures of accuracy would have led to the conclusion that feedback had
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improved reasoning performance. Similarly, the SDT approach was also important
in Experiment 2 in showing the differences between the two groups. Whilst the
SDT approach showed that only the online participants showed a general effect of
belief bias as a reasoning bias but lab participants only showed signs of response
bias unless they had higher cognitive ability, the traditional analyses simply implied
a general effect of belief bias on all participants.
Another key contributions of this thesis was to demonstrate the importance
of triangulation of measures when examining belief bias, the importance of which
has been emphasised by Stupple & Ball (2014). The use of response times and
confidence ratings allowed an examination of changes in performance, even when
accuracy and response bias remained constant. For example, in Experiment 1, the
case for a lack of an accuracy effect of feedback was strengthened by the lack of a
response time effect of feedback. In Experiment 3, it was found that those with
more rational tendencies were more likely to spend longer on each problem, but
did not show an increase in accuracy.
One potential limitation of the research presented in this thesis is the method
of analysis used to calculated the SDT accuracy value. Due to issues with getting
models to fit data which had empty cells (i.e. if participants didn’t use the full range
of the confidence rating scale), there were problems with using existing software
packages, and a method described by Trippas et al (2014) as “more straightforward
if less reliable”, the regression of z scores for hits against the z scores for false
alarms, was used. However, I tested this methodology on example data sets from
textbooks (e.g. Wickens, 2002), and no significant differences were found between
this analysis, and ones reported , and so this limitation should not have had any
real effects on the results.
7.3 Debiasing
In Experiment 1, participants were given feedback and opportunities to practice
solving syllogisms. These interventions may have caused participants to become
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more aware of their own biased responding; however, an attempt to change strategy
led to simply a change in response bias, as there was not a complete understanding
of the reason for error.
In Experiment 2, extra emphasis on the importance of logical necessity was
still insufficient to debias reasoning, despite the fact that in Experiment 3 it was
demonstrated that some of the variation in performance was attributable to an
incorrect understanding of logical necessity. The final experiment found that even
with training on constructing alternative representations of syllogisms, there was
no increase in accuracy for these participants generally or specifically on believable
problems. However, training did lead to an increase in effort with this effect
amplified in participants who had greater rational tendencies. This suggests that
the consideration of individual differences between participants may be a crucial
consideration in developing an effective method of debiasing reasoning.
Although not shown in the results presented in this thesis, it still remains feasible
that training could improve reasoning and reduce reliance on belief. Prowse-Turner
& Thompson (2009) included a training manipulation which involved one-to-one
instruction and careful elaboration by an experimenter, which was found to improve
performance on a syllogistic reasoning task containing neutral content. Future
research should examine whether a similarly elaborate training procedure to that
used by Prowse-Turner & Thompson (2009) can lead to the reduction of belief bias.
Such research could also involve a detailed qualitative analysis of any diagrams
which participants create in order to examine whether, as predicted by selective
processing theory, participants are likely to construct confirming or disconfirming
models on the basis of belief, and whether it is more effective for a successful
training method to encourage them to rely on constructing a disconfirming model,
or exhaustively represent all possible models. Such analysis may provide clear
arbitration between different theories of belief bias.
A further possibility could be tailored training or different forms of training.
Although it is tempting to suggest that training could be tailored to the individual
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on the basis of individual differences, it may be simpler to allow individuals to have
more control over their own learning. Johnson-Laird (2015) claims that the key way
to improve reasoning is to teach individuals to consider all possibilities. He argues
that this can be done through intensive critical thinking training, or through the
use of diagrams. Johnson-Laird recommends what is termed the ’model method’
over general diagrams, claiming that the model method has the advantages of
not needing to be represented graphically, is simple to learn, and applicable to
multiple contexts. The model method was devised by Bell (1999) and consists of a
single instruction: “Try to construct all the possibilities consistent with the given
information”. Participants are then given a conditional reasoning problem, and are
shown a worked out example to guide them in constructing representations, but
are allowed to construct their own representations using any form of diagram that
they choose. Although Johnson-Laird (2015) concedes that it remains to be seen
whether the model method would be effective for syllogisms, this method sounds
feasible. It is expected that given that reasoners are sufficiently motivated, the
greatest benefit would be seen in those who have a lower score on the AOT as
those with a higher score are already likely to think more flexibly.
7.4 Conclusion
The results presented in this thesis show that debiasing reasoning is not a trivial task
and any successful interventions must do more than simply encourage participants
to engage in deeper reflection on their answers. The reasoning component of belief
bias is an extremely persistent cognitive bias and a successful debiasing intervention
must necessarily be in-depth and comprehensive. It is also important to carefully
consider the effects of the particularly methodology used; the sample of participants
used may be as important as the debiasing method attempted. In addition, SDT
analyses are crucial for distinguishing between reasoning and response bias, and
for getting a clear and accurate picture of results. Finally, it is clear that previous
approaches which equated higher accuracy or longer response times alone as a
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simple metric of Type 2 processing are insufficient, and that both must be viewed
alongside one another if we are to make useful inferences about these processes.
In addition, exploring individual differences is also an important consideration if
we wish to get an accurate picture of what is going on. Debiasing reasoning is a
noble aim for science, but also a deeply complicated one, and the nuances of the





One Complete Set of Syllogisms
One complete set of syllogisms. The coloured backgrounds indicate subsets (i.e. so
all syllogisms with a yellow background belong to subset 1, all syllogisms with a
green background belong to subset 2 etc). Continued overleaf.
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